THE GENERAL STATUTES OF NORTH CAROLINA

ANNOTATED

1994 CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT

Volume 21

North Carolina Constitution, United States Constitution and Tables

Prepared under the Supervision of

The Department of Justice
of the State of North Carolina

BY

The Editorial Staff of the Publishers

Under the Direction of

D. S. TUSSEY, K. S. MAWYER, K. J. KENNEDY
AND F. J. PAYNE

Annotated through 443 S.E.2d 468. For complete scope of annotations, see scope of volume page.

Place Behind Supplement Tab in Binder Volume. This Supersedes Previous Supplement, Which May Be Retained for Reference Purposes.

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Preface

This Cumulative Supplement to Volume 21 contains amendments and supplementary annotations to the Constitution of North Carolina and the Constitution of the United States. It also contains a table of the general laws enacted by the General Assembly through the 1993 (Reg. Sess., 1994) Session.

Beginning with the opinions issued by the North Carolina Attorney General on July 1, 1969, any opinion which construes a specific statute is cited as an annotation to that statute. For a copy of an opinion or of its headnotes write the Attorney General, P. O. Box 629, Raleigh, N.C. 27602.

The members of the North Carolina Bar are requested to communicate any defects they may find in the General Statutes or in this Cumulative Supplement, and any suggestions they may have for improving the General Statutes, to the Department of Justice of the State of North Carolina, or to The Michie Company, Law Publishers, Charlottesville, Virginia.

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User's Guide

In order to assist both the legal profession and the layperson in obtaining the maximum benefit from the North Carolina General Statutes, a User's Guide has been included in Volume 1. This guide contains comments and information on the many features found within the General Statutes intended to increase the usefulness of this set of laws to the user. See Volume 1 for the complete User's Guide.

Scope of Volume

Constitutions:

Amendments to the Constitution of North Carolina.
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

Annotations:

Sources of the annotations to the General Statutes appearing in this volume are:

North Carolina Reports through Volume 336, p. 77.
North Carolina Court of Appeals Reports through Volume 114, p. 505.
South Eastern Reporter 2nd Series through Volume 443, p. 468.
Federal Reporter 3rd Series through Volume 21, p. 1127.
Federal Supplement through Volume 848, p. 212.
Federal Rules Decisions through Volume 154, p. 535.
Bankruptcy Reports through Volume 166, p. 498.
Supreme Court Reporter through Volume 114, p. 1877.
North Carolina Law Review through Volume 72, p. 1128.
Wake Forest Law Review through Volume 29, p. 646.
Campbell Law Review through Volume 16, p. 145.
Duke Law Journal through Volume 43, p. 1348.
North Carolina Central Law Journal through Volume 20, p. 229.
Opinions of the Attorney General.

The General Statutes of North Carolina
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VOLUME 21

Constitution of North Carolina

Article III.

Executive.

Sec.
7. Other elective officers.

Article IV.

Judicial.

18. District Attorney and prosecutorial districts.

Sec.
19. Vacancies.

Article V.

Finance.

12. Higher education facilities.
13. Seaport and airport facilities.
14. [Not in effect.]

ARTICLE I

DECLARATION OF RIGHTS

Section 1. The equality and rights of persons.

Legal Periodicals. —

For essay, "'Fundamental Principles' in North Carolina Constitutional History," see 69 N.C.L. Rev. 1357 (1991).

For article, "Rediscovering State Constitutions," see 70 N.C.L. Rev. 1741 (1992).

For article, "North Carolina Constitutional History," see 70 N.C.L. Rev. 1759 (1992).

For note, "The Cause of Action for Damages Under North Carolina's Constitution: Corum v. University of North Carolina," see 70 N.C.L. Rev. 1899 (1992).

For essay, "Liberty, the 'Law of the Land,' and Abortion in North Carolina," see 71 N.C.L. Rev. 1839 (1993).

CASE NOTES

This section creates a right to conduct a lawful business or to earn a livelihood that is "fundamental" for purposes of state constitutional analysis. Treants Enters., Inc. v. Onslow County, 83 N.C. App. 345, 350 S.E.2d 365 (1986), aff'd, 320 N.C. 776, 360 S.E.2d 783 (1987).

But this section and N.C. Const., Art. I, § 19 permit the State, through the exercise of its police power, to regulate economic enterprises, provided the regulation is rationally related to a proper governmental purpose. This is the test used in determining the validity of state regulation of business under both N.C. Const., Art. I, § 1 and Art. I, § 19. Poor Richard's, Inc. v. Stone, 322 N.C. 61, 366 S.E.2d 697 (1988).

A business involved in the buying and selling of military property has features which distinguish it from other types of retail sales in a way which justifies its regulation. Poor Richard's, Inc. v. Stone, 322 N.C. 61, 366 S.E.2d 697 (1988).

Article 1, Chapter 127B, regulating businesses dealing in military goods, is constitutional under the due process and equal protection provisions of the State and federal Constitutions. Poor Richard's, Inc. v. Stone, 322 N.C. 61, 366 S.E.2d 697 (1988).

Terminable at Will Employee Had No Legitimate Claim of Entitlement Under Due Process Clause. — Where there was nothing in the record which suggested that plaintiff had a contract for a definite term, her contract of employment was terminable at the will of either party, irrespective of the quality of performance, and plaintiff had no property interest in employment and no legitimate claim of entitlement under the due process clause. Peele v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 90 N.C. App. 447, 368 S.E.2d 892, appeal dismissed, 323 N.C. 366, 373 S.E.2d 547 (1988).

The classification created by § 127B-1 is not so arbitrary or unreasonable as to be violative of the equal protection requirement. Poor Richard's, Inc. v. Stone, 322 N.C. 61, 366 S.E.2d 697 (1988).

The provisions of § 127B-1 are not unreasonably burdensome within the meaning of this section and N.C. Const., Art. I, § 19. Poor Richard's, Inc. v. Stone, 322 N.C. 61, 366 S.E.2d 697 (1988).

Challenge to School Financing. — Action for declaratory and injunctive relief brought by minors who were, or would be in the future, enrolled in public schools in the county, and their parents or legal guardians, alleging that the present statutory system of financing public schools in this state resulted in inequities in educational programs and facilities between the public schools within that county, which had a relatively low tax base from which to draw funds, and those in other counties with relatively high tax bases, and that the operation of five separate school systems in that county prohibited effective use of facilities and staff and promoted inequitable use of state and local funds, thus depriving them of equal opportunity to a free public school education in violation of this section, N.C. Const., Art. I, §§ 15 and 19, and Art. IX, § 2(1), failed to allege facts entitling them to relief or conferring jurisdiction on the courts of this State. Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 86 N.C. App. 262, 357 S.E.2d 432, appeal dismissed, 320 N.C. 790, 361 S.E.2d 71 (1987).

Provisions Held Unconstitutional. —

A county ordinance subjecting businesses which provide male or female "companionship" to various licensing requirements was held to lack any rational, real and substantial relation to any valid objective of the county and thus to offend this section and N.C. Const., Art. I, § 19. Treants Enters., Inc. v. Onslow County, 83 N.C. App. 345, 350 S.E.2d 365 (1986), aff'd, 320 N.C. 776, 360 S.E.2d 783 (1987).

An ordinance enacted to regulate the business of providing male and female companionship was overbroad and not rationally related to a substantial government purpose and violated the State Constitution. Treants Enters., Inc. v. Onslow County, 320 N.C. 776, 360 S.E.2d 783 (1987).

Cited in DiDonato v. Wortman, 80 N.C. App. 117, 341 S.E.2d 58 (1986); Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., 89 N.C. App. 154, 365 S.E.2d 909 (1988); Woodard v. North Carolina Local Governmental Employees' Retirement Sys., 108 N.C. App. 378, 424 S.E.2d 431 (1993).

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Moratorium on Granting of Permits for Hazardous Waste Facilities. — The Governor does not have the authority to issue a moratorium on the granting of permits for hazardous waste facilities in this State. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. Tom Karnoski, Hazardous Waste Treatment Commission (now the Hazardous Waste Management Commission), 55 N.C.A.G. 73 (1986).

Sec. 2. Sovereignty of the people.

CASE NOTES

Constitutionality of 1970 Ballot. — Defendant's defense to real estate tax liability (based on alleged defects in 1970 ballot which, defendant asserted, rendered the 1970 amendments violative of due process) was barred by laches where defendant waited 18 years before inquiring into the effect of the 1970 ballot and where he participated in the ballot. Franklin County v. Burdick, 103 N.C. App. 496, 405 S.E.2d 783 (1991).

Cited in Bradshaw v. Administrative Office of Courts, 320 N.C. 137, 357 S.E.2d 370 (1987).

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Moratorium on Granting of Permits for Hazardous Waste Facilities. — The Governor does not have the authority to issue a moratorium on the granting of permits for hazardous waste facilities in this State. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. Tom Karnoski, Hazardous Waste Treatment Commission (now the Hazardous Waste Management Commission), 55 N.C.A.G. 73 (1986).

Sec. 6. Separation of powers.

Legal Periodicals. —

For article on the "Battle Among the Branches: The Two Hundred Year War," see 65 N.C.L. Rev. 901 (1987).

For note on the separation of powers and the power to appoint, see 66 N.C.L. Rev. 1109 (1988).

For note, "The Forty-Two Hundred Dollar Question: 'May State Agencies Have Discretion in Setting Civil Penalties Under the North Carolina Constitution?'," see 68 N.C.L. Rev. 1035 (1990).

CASE NOTES

I. In General.
II. Delegation of Legislative Power.

I. IN GENERAL.

Court's Proper Exercise of Jurisdiction. — There is no violation of the Separation of Powers Clause when a court issues an order within its inherent power to do what is reasonably necessary within the scope of its constitutional and statutory jurisdiction. In re Doe, 329 N.C. 743, 407 S.E.2d 798 (1991).

There was no violation of the Separation of Powers Clause when the district court, exercising its exclusive, original jurisdiction, issued the order for a juvenile sex offender's commitment and the order denying the juvenile's conditional release as requested by Division of Youth Services, both of which included dispositional directives regarding the juvenile's needs for specialized sexual offender treatment. In re Doe, 329 N.C. 743, 407 S.E.2d 798 (1991).

Appointment of Director of Office of Administrative Hearings. — It is not a violation of the separation of powers provision of the Constitution for the General Assembly to provide that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall appoint the Director of the Office of Administrative Hearings. State ex rel. Martin v. Melott, 320 N.C. 518, 359 S.E.2d 783 (1987).

The order of the Supreme Court establishing the Client Security Fund and requiring annual payments by attorneys to the Fund was an essential corollary to the court's function, was required for the proper administration of justice, and did not violate the Constitution. Beard v. North Carolina State Bar, 320 N.C. 126, 357 S.E.2d 694 (1987).

Applied in State ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 325 N.C. 438, 385 S.E.2d 473

(1989); News & Observer Publishing Co. v. Poole, 330 N.C. 465, 412 S.E.2d 7 (1992).

Cited in Granville County Bd. of Comm'rs v. North Carolina Hazardous Waste Mgt. Comm'n, 329 N.C. 615, 407 S.E.2d 785 (1991).

II. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.

Necessity for Adequate Standards, etc. —

The General Assembly must prescribe the standard for an administrative board with sufficient definiteness so that the board is bound by legislative policy and cannot, under the name of finding facts, actually set policy. Farlow v. North Carolina State Bd. of Chiropractic Exmrs., 76 N.C. App. 202, 332 S.E.2d 696, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 314 N.C. 664, 336 S.E.2d 621 (1985).

Delegation of Power Upheld. —

The proscription of "unethical conduct" in § 90-154 is a sufficiently definite standard so that the Board of Chiropractic Examiners may set policies within it without exercising a legislative function. Farlow v. North Carolina State Bd. of Chiropractic Exmrs., 76 N.C. App. 202, 332 S.E.2d 696, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 314 N.C. 664, 336 S.E.2d 621 (1985).

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Delay of Rules by Review Commission. — An act vesting in the Administrative Rules Review Commission (ARRC), a commission appointed by the General Assembly, the power to delay indefinitely the effective date of duly adopted agency rules which it deems in excess of statutory authority would likely be held to violate this section by vesting the ARRC with judicial powers reserved to the court and with supreme legislative powers reserved to the General Assembly. See opinion of Attorney General to Henson P. Barnes, President Pro Tempore, Senate, 60 N.C.A.G. 70 (1991).

Sec. 7. Suspending laws.

CASE NOTES

Cited in State ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 325 N.C. 438, 385 S.E.2d 473 (1989).

Sec. 8. Representation and taxation.

CASE NOTES

Drainage district assessments are not taxes. Northampton County Drainage Dist. Number One v. Bailey, 326 N.C. 742, 392 S.E.2d 352 (1990).

The order of the Supreme Court establishing the Client Security Fund and requiring annual payments by attorneys to the Fund was an essential corollary to the court's function, was required for the proper administration of justice, and did not violate the Constitution. Beard v. North Carolina State Bar, 320 N.C. 126, 357 S.E.2d 694 (1987).

Cited in State ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 325 N.C. 438, 385 S.E.2d 473 (1989).

Sec. 10. Free elections.

CASE NOTES

Ballot Access Restriction. — The ten percent (10%) numerical signature requirement contained in § 163-122(a)(3) is an unconstitutional ballot access restriction for unaffiliated candidates in violation of the U.S. Const., Amend. I and XIV and N.C. Const., Art. I, § 19 and this section. Obie v. North Carolina State Bd. of Elections, 762 F. Supp. 119 (E.D.N.C. 1991).

Sec. 12. Right of assembly and petition.

CASE NOTES

Stated in State v. Neville, 108 N.C. App. 330, 423 S.E.2d 496 (1992).

Sec. 13. Religious liberty.

Legal Periodicals. —
For article, "The Concept of Religion in State Constitutions," see 8 Campbell L. Rev. 437 (1986).

CASE NOTES

Counsel may not attack credibility of a witness because of the witness's religious beliefs or rights of conscience. State v. James, 322 N.C. 320, 367 S.E.2d 669 (1988).

Prosecutor's argument as to defendant's credibility held not to violate this section or § 8C-1, Rules 603 or 610, despite an indirect reference to defendant's affirmation as a witness. State v. James, 322 N.C. 320, 367 S.E.2d 669 (1988).

But the spiritual welfare of a child is a factor that may be considered, etc. —
In a child custody proceeding, a limited inquiry may touch upon the religious practices of the parties as they relate to the health and safety of the child, but such inquiry may not focus on the general beliefs and doctrines of a religion. Petersen v. Rogers, 111 N.C. App. 712, 433 S.E.2d 770 (1993).

For a case where plaintiffs adoptive parents' right to freedom of religion guaranteed by the federal Constitution and the State Constitution was violated by extensive and overly intrusive inquisitioning of their religion at trial, see Petersen v. Rogers, 111 N.C. App. 712, 433 S.E.2d 770 (1993).

Chapter 74A has a secular legislative purpose, its primary effect is neither to advance nor to inhibit religion, it does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion and it is not an unconstitutional delegation of the State's law enforcement authority. As such, it does not violate either the State or the federal Constitution. State v. Pendleton, 112 N.C. App. 171, 435 S.E.2d 100 (1993), cert. denied, 335 N.C. 563, 441 S.E.2d 131 (1994).

Cited in Delconte v. State, 313 N.C. 384, 329 S.E.2d 636 (1985); Grace Baptist Church v. City of Oxford, 320 N.C. 439, 358 S.E.2d 372 (1987); State v. Artis, 325 N.C. 278, 384 S.E.2d 470 (1989); Hill v. Cox, 108 N.C. App. 454, 424 S.E.2d 201 (1993).

Sec. 14. Freedom of speech and press.

Legal Periodicals. —

For article, "Of Libel, Language, and Law: New York Times v. Sullivan at Twenty-Five," see 68 N.C.L. Rev. 273 (1990).

CASE NOTES

This section and N.C. Const., Art. I, § 19 do not require that a statewide standard be judicially incorporated into § 14-190.1 in order to render the statute facially valid. State v. Mayes, 323 N.C. 159, 371 S.E.2d 476 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1009, 109 S. Ct. 792, 102 L. Ed. 2d 784 (1989).

The words "shall never be restrained" are a direct personal guarantee of each citizen's right of freedom of speech. Corum v. University of N.C. ex rel. Bd. of Governors, 330 N.C. 761, 413 S.E.2d 276 (1992).

Section 163-274(7), prohibiting anonymous, derogatory charges against candidates for primary or general elections, does not violate the free speech guarantees of the U.S. Const., Amend. I, or this section. State v. Petersilie, 334 N.C. 169, 432 S.E.2d 832 (1993).

Applied in Kaplan v. Prolife Action League, 111 N.C. App. 1, 431 S.E.2d 828 (1993).

Cited in Cinema I Video, Inc. v. Thornburg, 83 N.C. App. 544, 351 S.E.2d 305 (1986); State v. Anderson, 322 N.C. 22, 366 S.E.2d 459 (1988); Madison Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Morganton, 325 N.C. 634, 386 S.E.2d 200 (1989); Corum v. University of N.C., 97 N.C. App. 527, 389 S.E.2d 596 (1990); Lenzer v. Flaherty, 106 N.C. App. 496, 418 S.E.2d 276 (1992); Shell v. Wall, 808 F. Supp. 481 (W.D.N.C. 1992).

Sec. 15. Education.

Legal Periodicals. —

For note, "Delconte v. State: Some Thoughts on Home Education," see 64 N.C.L. Rev. 1302 (1986).

For article, "Constitutional Rights of Students, Their Families, and Teachers in the Public Schools," see 10 Campbell L. Rev. 353 (1988).

CASE NOTES

Challenge to School Financing. — Action for declaratory and injunctive relief brought by minors who were or would be in the future enrolled in public schools in the county, and their parents or legal guardians, alleging that the present statutory system of financing public schools in this State resulted in inequities in educational programs and facilities between the public schools within that county, which had a relatively low tax base from which to draw funds, and those in other counties with relatively high tax bases, and that the operation of five separate school systems in that county prohibited effective use of facilities and staff and promoted inequitable use of State and local funds, thus depriving them of equal opportunity to a free public school education in violation of this section, N.C. Const., Art. I, §§ 1 and 19, and Art. IX, § 2(1), failed to allege facts entitling them to relief or conferring jurisdiction on the courts of this State. Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 86 N.C. App. 282, 357 S.E.2d 432, appeal dismissed, 320 N.C. 790, 361 S.E.2d 71 (1987).

No Right to Disseminate Pornography. — The right to an education does not involve the right to disseminate material which, but for its use in an educational context, would otherwise be deemed obscene. Any serious educational value of sexually-explicit materials must be derived, in turn, from some serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. State v. Watson, 88 N.C. App. 624, 364 S.E.2d 683, cert. denied, 322 N.C. 485, 370 S.E.2d 235 (1988).

Sec. 16. Ex post facto laws.

CASE NOTES

Judicial Abrogation of Common-Law Criminal Principles. — Whereas this decision holds that the year and a day rule as formerly utilized in murder prosecutions is no longer part of the common law of the state, to apply this decision abrogating the year and a day rule to permit defendant to be convicted of murder in the present case would, at the very least, permit his conviction upon less evidence than would have been required to convict him of that crime at the time the victim died and would, for that reason, violate the principles preventing the application of ex post facto laws. The judgment against defendant for second degree murder was vacated where defendant did not die within a year and a day of the acts in question; however, under the circumstances of this case, a conviction for involuntary manslaughter was appropriate. State v. Vance, 328 N.C. 613, 403 S.E.2d 495 (1991).

Timing of Acts and Result of Murder. — Depriving defendant of the defense of the "year and a day" rule based on the Supreme Court's prospective abrogation of that rule in State v. Vance, 328 N.C. 613, 403 S.E.2d 495 (1991) violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws where the murderous acts occurred prior to the abrogation and the victim's death occurred after the abrogation but more than a year and a day after the murderous acts. State v. Robinson, 335 N.C. 146, 436 S.E.2d 125 (1993).

Amendment made in 1991 to §§ 122C-268.1(i) and 122C-276.1(c), which required respondent to bear the burden of proof to show that he was no longer dangerous or mentally ill and opened the hearing to the public, were procedural changes that did not violate substantive rights or protections though they could have disadvantaged respondent. Therefore, there was no violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. In re Hayes, 111 N.C. App. 384, 432 S.E.2d 862, appeal dismissed, 335 N.C. 173, 436 S.E.2d 376 (1993).

Application Only to Tax Statutes Taxing Retrospectively. — This section applies only to tax statutes "taxing retrospectively sales, purchases, or other acts previously done." Chapter 1052 of Session Laws 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988) is not a tax or revenue statute within the meaning of N.C. Const., Art. II, § 23. North Carolina E. Mun. Power v. Wake County, 100 N.C. App. 693, 398 S.E.2d 486 (1990), cert. denied, 329 N.C. 270, 407 S.E.2d 838 (1991).

Tax Not Retrospective. — Contention that as to appellant § 105-282.7 was a retrospective tax in violation of this section was without merit, where the statute was ratified in 1981 and did not become effective until January 1, 1982, and where appellant was not taxed under it for any period prior to its enactment. In re Champion Int'l Corp., 74 N.C. App. 639, 329 S.E.2d 691, cert. denied, 314 N.C. 540, 335 S.E.2d 15 (1985).

Sec. 18. Courts shall be open.

Legal Periodicals. —

For note, "Wilder v. Amatex Corp.: A First Step Toward Ameliorating the Effect of Statutes of Repose on Plaintiffs with Delayed Manifestation Diseases," see 64 N.C.L. Rev. 416 (1986).

For note on the six year statutory bar to products liability actions, in light of Tetterton v. Long Manufacturing Co., 314 N.C. 44, 332 S.E.2d 67 (1985), see 64 N.C.L. Rev. 1157 (1986).

For article, "The American Medical Association vs. The American Tort System," see 8 Campbell L. Rev. 241 (1986).

For comment on tort reform, see 10 Campbell L. Rev. 439 (1988).

For article, "North Carolina Employment Law After Coman: Reaffirming Basic Rights in the Workplace," see 24 Wake Forest L. Rev. 905 (1989).

For note, "The North Carolina Supreme Court Engages in Stealthy Judicial Legislation: Doe v. Holt," see 71 N.C.L. Rev. 1227 (1993).

CASE NOTES

I. In General.
II. Access to the Courts.
III. Public Trials.
V. Speedy Criminal Trials.

I. IN GENERAL.

Notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to depriving a person of his property are essential elements of due process of law which are guaranteed by U.S. Const., Amend. XIV and this section. State v. Cox, 90 N.C. App. 742, 370 S.E.2d 260 (1988).

Use of Closed Circuit Television Held Adequate to Allow Defendant to Confront Child Victim. — Where, in prosecution for taking indecent liberties with a four-year-old child, during voir dire hearing as to victim's competency as a witness, defendant, although absent from the courtroom, was able to hear all testimony, interact freely with his attorney, and through his attorney confront the victim, thereby accomplishing effective cross-examination, the exclusion of defendant did not violate N.C. Const., Art. I, §§ 18, 19 or 23, as the trial court's use of a closed circuit television and its act of providing defendant and his attorney adequate opportunity to communicate during the victim's testimony were sufficient to permit defendant to hear the evidence and to refute it. State v. Jones, 89 N.C. App. 584, 367 S.E.2d 139 (1988).

Prosecutor's Conflict of Interest. — A prosecutor may not be disqualified from prosecuting a criminal action in this State unless and until the trial court determines that an actual conflict of interests exists. In this context, an "actual conflict of interests" is demonstrated where a district attorney or a member of his or her staff has previously represented the defendant with regard to the charges to be prosecuted and, as a result of that former attorney-client relationship, the prosecution has obtained confidential information which may be used to the defendant's detriment at trial. Any order of disqualification ordinarily should be directed only to individual prosecutors who have been exposed to such information. State v. Camacho, 329 N.C. 589, 406 S.E.2d 868 (1991).

Jury Conversations. — Where the record established that the substance of a conversation between a juror and the court related to the juror's having "overheard something about the case," where the court excused the juror, and to insure that "no one should be suspicious" about his ability to be fair and impartial, this juror was removed from the case prior to deliberations, and where no other juror indicated that he or she had overheard anything about the case, the conversation between the court and the juror could not have influenced the verdict. State v. Harrington, 335 N.C. 105, 436 S.E.2d 235 (1993).

Applied in Pangburn v. Saad, 73 N.C. App. 336, 326 S.E.2d 365 (1985).

Stated in State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 370 S.E.2d 553 (1988).

Cited in Walker v. Santos, 70 N.C. App. 623, 320 S.E.2d 407 (1984); DeSoto Trail, Inc. v. Covington Diesel, Inc., 77 N.C. App. 637, 335 S.E.2d 794 (1985); Gardner v. Asbestos Corp., 634 F. Supp. 609 (W.D.N.C. 1986); Atlantic Ins. & Realty Co. v. Davidson, 320 N.C. 159, 357 S.E.2d 668 (1987); Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 325 N.C. 172, 381 S.E.2d 445 (1989); State v. Huff, 325 N.C. 1, 381 S.E.2d 635 (1989); State v. Porter, 326 N.C. 489, 391 S.E.2d 144 (1990); Ragan v. County of Alamance, 98 N.C. App. 636, 391 S.E.2d 825 (1990); Harrison v. Edison Bros. Apparel Stores, 924 F.2d 530 (4th Cir. 1991); In re Alamance County Ct. Facilities, 329 N.C. 84, 405 S.E.2d 125 (1991).

II. ACCESS TO THE COURTS.

Statutes of Limitations. — Section 1-50 does not violate the "open courts" provision of the North Carolina Constitution. Tetterton v. Long Mfg. Co., 314 N.C. 44, 332 S.E.2d 67 (1985).

Sections 1-50(5) and 1-15(c) are not unconstitutional as being violative of the open courts provision of the North Carolina Constitution and the equal protection clauses of the State and federal Constitutions. Square D Co. v. C.J. Kern Contractors, 314 N.C. 423, 334 S.E.2d 63 (1985).

Section 1-75.12 Does Not Deny Litigants Access to North Carolina Courts. — Section 1-75.12, which gives the trial court the power to enter a stay pending final disposition of another similar action litigated in another court, does not deny litigants access to North Carolina courts in violation of this section, but merely postpones litigation here pending the resolution of the same matter in another sovereign court. Home Indem. Co. v. Hoechst-Celanese Corp., 99 N.C. App. 322, 393 S.E.2d 118 (1990).

Trial court's application of § 1-75.12 did not violate the "open courts" provision contained in this section. Lawyers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Nexsen Pruet Jacobs & Pollard, 112 N.C. App. 353, 435 S.E.2d 571 (1993).

Jurisdiction over Justiciable Matters of Civil Nature. — Except for areas specifically placing jurisdiction elsewhere (such as claims under the Workers' Compensation Act), the trial courts of North Carolina have subject matter jurisdiction over all justiciable matters of a civil nature. Harris v. Pembaur, 84 N.C. App. 666, 353 S.E.2d 673 (1987).

Contract dispute between the parties constituted a "justiciable matter" that was "cognizable" in North Carolina trial courts; therefore, the trial judge's determination that there was no subject matter jurisdiction was in error. Harris v. Pembaur, 84 N.C. App. 666, 353 S.E.2d 673 (1987).

III. PUBLIC TRIALS.

The public, and especially the parties, etc. —

A criminal defendant also has the right to a public trial, a right guaranteed by this section and U.S. Const., Amends. VI and XIV. The public, and especially the parties are entitled to see and hear what goes on in the courts. State v. Callahan, 102 N.C. App. 344, 401 S.E.2d 793 (1991).

Judge's Ex Parte Communications with Jury Before Verdict. — Where, during the course of the trial, the presiding trial judge engaged in an ex parte communication with the jury, and prior to reconvening court, the judge entered the jury room where the jurors had gathered and was alone with the jurors, this conduct on the part of the presiding judge violated the defendant's rights under N.C. Const., Art. I, § 23 and this section, and U.S. Const., Amends. VI and XIV. State v. Callahan, 102 N.C. App. 344, 401 S.E.2d 793 (1991).

Civil Commitment Proceedings. — This section does not create a constitutional right on the part of the press and public to attend civil commitment proceedings. WSOC Television, Inc. v. State ex rel. Att'y Gen., 107 N.C. App. 448, 420 S.E.2d 682, cert. denied, 333 N.C. 168, 424 S.E.2d 905 (1992).

Judge's Warning to Restrict Public Egress Was Proper. — Where trial judge informed those in the courtroom that he was concerned that the jury would be distracted by movement of spectators in and out of the room, and where he consequently warned them that if they wished to leave the courtroom, they should do so immediately, for they would not be allowed to do so after closing arguments began, barring an emergency, the order was not a denial of a public trial in violation of this section since the judge did not vacate the courtroom nor bar the courtroom door without due warning to those within and without, and since the judge was authorized under § 15A-1034(a) to impose reasonable limitations on access to the courtroom. State v. Clark, 324 N.C. 146, 377 S.E.2d 54 (1989).

V. SPEEDY CRIMINAL TRIALS.

Unless some fixed time limit is prescribed, etc. —

In accord with the main volume. See State v. Bare, 77 N.C. App. 516, 335 S.E.2d 748 (1985), cert. denied, 315 N.C. 392, 338 S.E.2d 881 (1986).

Undue delay which is arbitrary and oppressive or the result of deliberate prosecution efforts to hamper the defense violates the constitutional right to a speedy trial. State v. Bare, 77 N.C. App. 516, 335 S.E.2d 748 (1985), cert. denied, 315 N.C. 392, 338 S.E.2d 881 (1986).

Burden on Defendant. — The length of a delay is not determinative of whether a violation has occurred; the issue must be resolved on the facts of each case, and the defendant has the burden of establishing that the delay was purposeful or oppressive or by reasonable effort could have been avoided by the State. State v. Bare, 77 N.C. App. 516, 335 S.E.2d 748 (1985), cert. denied, 315 N.C. 392, 338 S.E.2d 881 (1986).

Defendant was not deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by this section, since delay of two and one-half years was not inordinate, State had a legitimate reason for its delay and defendant showed no prejudice resulting from the delay. State v. Avery, 95 N.C. App. 572, 383 S.E.2d 224 (1989), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 326 N.C. 51, 389 S.E.2d 96 (1990).

Sec. 19. Law of the land; equal protection of the laws.

Legal Periodicals. —

For 1984 survey, "Double Jeopardy and Substantial Rights in North Carolina Appeals," see 63 N.C.L. Rev. 1061 (1985).

For note on the Declaratory Judgment Act and due process in expulsions from voluntary trade associations, in light of Harrison v. Gaston Bd. of Realtors, Inc., 311 N.C. 230, 316 S.E.2d 59 (1984), see 21 Wake Forest L. Rev. 121 (1985).

For note, "Wilder v. Amatex Corp.: A First Step Toward Ameliorating the Effect of Statutes of Repose on Plaintiffs with Delayed Manifestation Diseases," see 64 N.C.L. Rev. 416 (1986).

For article, "The Battle to Preserve North Carolina's Estuarine Marshes: The 1985 Legislation, Private Claims to Estuarine Marshes, Denial of Permits to Fill, and the Public Trust," see 64 N.C.L. Rev. 565 (1986).

For note on the six year statutory bar to products liability actions, in light of Tetterton v. Long Manufacturing Co., 314 N.C. 44, 332 S.E.2d 67 (1985), see 64 N.C.L. Rev. 1157 (1986).

For note on the retroactive application of section 39-13.6 under a vested rights analysis, see 65 N.C.L. Rev. 1195 (1987).

For note discussing the evolution of the law governing double jeopardy and multiple punishments in a single prosecution context, particularly with regard to larceny and breaking and entering, in light of State v. Gardner, 315 N.C. 444, 340 S.E.2d 701 (1986), see 65 N.C.L. Rev. 1267 (1987).

For note, "Does Double Jeopardy Include a Double Standard?," see 66 N.C.L. Rev. 1191 (1988).

For article, "In Defense of Aston Park: The Case for State Substantive Due Process Review of Health Care Regulation," see 68 N.C.L. Rev. 253 (1990).

For article, "Ake Revisited: Expert Psychiatric Witnesses Remain Beyond Reach for the Indigent," see 68 N.C.L. Rev. 763 (1990).

For note, "United States v. Halper: Remedial Justice and Double Jeopardy," see 68 N.C.L. Rev. 979 (1990).

For essay, "Liberty, the 'Law of the Land,' and Abortion in North Carolina," see 71 N.C.L. Rev. 1839 (1993).

CASE NOTES

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I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

Federal Decisions Do Not Control Interpretation by North Carolina Supreme Court. — Decisions by the federal courts as to the construction and effect of the due process clause of the United States Constitution are binding on the North Carolina Supreme Court; however, such decisions, although persuasive, do not control an interpretation by the North Carolina Supreme Court of this section. The North Carolina Supreme Court will therefore make an independent determination of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs under this section. McNeill v. Harnett County, 327 N.C. 552, 398 S.E.2d 475 (1990).

N.C. Const., Art. I, § 14 and this section do not require that a statewide standard be judicially incorporated into § 14-190.1 in order to render the statute facially valid. State v. Mayes, 323 N.C. 159, 371 S.E.2d 476 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1009, 109 S. Ct. 792, 102 L. Ed. 2d 784 (1989).

Requirement That Taxpayer Reduce His Carryover Losses Not Violative of This Section. — The requirement that the taxpayer reduce his North Carolina carryover losses by his non-North Carolina income did not result in a sophisticated scheme which belatedly taxed the non-North Carolina income and did not violate either the due process clause of the United States Constitution or the law of the land clause of this section. Aronov v. Secretary of Revenue, 323 N.C. 132, 371 S.E.2d 468, rehearing denied, 323 N.C. 480, 373 S.E.2d 860 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1096, 109 S. Ct. 1568, 103 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1989).

A governmental agency is not precluded from competing with its franchisee, despite the fact that the value of the franchise is diminished or destroyed by such competition. Such competition does not result in a taking or injuring of the franchisee's property without due process of law. Stillings v. City of Winston-Salem, 311 N.C. 689, 319 S.E.2d 233 (1984).

Applied in State v. Rogers, 68 N.C. App. 358, 315 S.E.2d 492 (1984); McDowell v. Estate of Anderson, 69 N.C. App. 725, 318 S.E.2d 258 (1984); State v. Rose, 312 N.C. 441, 323 S.E.2d 339 (1984); Pangburn v. Saad, 73 N.C. App. 336, 326 S.E.2d 365 (1985); State v. Raines, 319 N.C. 258, 354 S.E.2d 486 (1987); In re Murphy, 105 N.C. App. 651, 414 S.E.2d 396 (1992); State v. Bromfield, 332 N.C. 24, 418 S.E.2d 491 (1992); State v. Walker, 332 N.C. 520, 422 S.E.2d 716 (1992).

Stated in Ervin v. Speece, 72 N.C. App. 366, 324 S.E.2d 299 (1985); Knight v. City of Wilmington, 73 N.C. App. 254, 326 S.E.2d 376 (1985); Ratton v. Ratton, 73 N.C. App. 642, 327 S.E.2d 1 (1985); State v. James, 111 N.C. App. 785, 433 S.E.2d 755 (1993).

Cited in Cabarrus County v. City of Charlotte, 71 N.C. App. 192, 321 S.E.2d 476 (1984); State ex rel. Banking Comm'n v. Citicorp Sav. Indus. Bank, 74 N.C. App. 474, 328 S.E.2d 895 (1985); State v. Avery, 315 N.C. 1, 337 S.E.2d 786 (1985); Town of Emerald Isle v. State, 78 N.C. App. 736, 338 S.E.2d 581 (1986); United Va. Bank v. Air-Lift Assocs., 79 N.C. App. 315, 339 S.E.2d 90 (1986); State v. Perry, 316 N.C. App. 87, 340 S.E.2d 450 (1986); Yates v. Jamison, 782 F.2d 1182 (4th Cir. 1986); DiDonato v. Wortman, 80 N.C. App. 117, 341 S.E. 2d 58 (1986); State v. Kuplen, 316 N.C. 387, 343 S.E.2d 793 (1986); State v. Gilliam, 317 N.C. 293, 344 S.E.2d 783 (1986); Pritchard v. Elizabeth City, 81 N.C. App. 543, 344 S.E.2d 821 (1986); State v. Hurst, 82 N.C. App. 1, 346 S.E.2d 8 (1986); Cinema I Video, Inc. v. Thornburg, 83 N.C. App. 544, 351 S.E.2d 305 (1986); State v. Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 352 S.E.2d 653 (1987); State v. Jones, 85 N.C. App. 56, 354 S.E.2d 251 (1987); State v. Robbins, 319 N.C. 465, 356 S.E.2d 279 (1987); State v. Pakulski, 319 N.C. 562, 356 S.E.2d 319 (1987); State v. Carson, 320 N.C. 328, 357 S.E.2d 662 (1987); Atlantic Ins. & Realty Co. v. Davidson, 320 N.C. 159, 357 S.E.2d 668 (1987); Jackson v. Housing Auth., 321 N.C. 584, 364 S.E.2d 416 (1988); State v. Green, 321 N.C. 594, 365 S.E.2d 587 (1988); Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., 89 N.C. App. 154, 365 S.E.2d 909 (1988); Empire Distribs. of N.C., Inc. v. Schieffelin & Co., 677 F. Supp. 847 (W.D.N.C. 1988); State v. Anderson, 322 N.C. 22, 366 S.E.2d 459 (1988); State v. Agudelo, 89 N.C. App. 640, 366 S.E.2d 921 (1988); Hedrick v. Hedrick, 90 N.C. App. 151, 368 S.E.2d 14 (1988); Truesdale v. University of N.C., 91 N.C. App. 186, 371 S.E.2d 503 (1988); State v. Ghaffar, 93 N.C. App. 281, 377 S.E.2d 818 (1989);

State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Thornburg, 324 N.C. 478, 380 S.E.2d 112 (1989); In re Moravian Home, Inc., 95 N.C. App. 324, 382 S.E.2d 772 (1989); State v. Artis, 325 N.C. 278, 384 S.E.2d 470 (1989); State v. Davis, 96 N.C. App. 545, 386 S.E.2d 743 (1989); State v. Jones, 97 N.C. App. 189, 388 S.E.2d 213 (1990); Harwood v. Johnson, 326 N.C. 231, 388 S.E.2d 439 (1990); Corum v. University of N.C., 97 N.C. App. 527, 389 S.E.2d 596 (1990); Dunn v. Pate, 98 N.C. App. 351, 390 S.E.2d 712 (1990); Ragan v. County of Alamance, 98 N.C. App. 636, 391 S.E.2d 825 (1990); State v. Smith, 99 N.C. App. 184, 392 S.E.2d 625 (1990); Hawkins v. Hawkins, 101 N.C. App. 529, 400 S.E.2d 472 (1991); Weston v. Carolina Medicorp, Inc., 102 N.C. App. 370, 402 S.E.2d 653 (1991); State v. Camacho, 329 N.C. 589, 406 S.E.2d 868 (1991); State v. Robinson, 330 N.C. 1, 409 S.E.2d 288 (1991); State v. Maye, 104 N.C. App. 437, 410 S.E.2d 8 (1991); Howell v. Town of Carolina Beach, 106 N.C. App. 410, 417 S.E.2d 277 (1992); Blackwelder v. City of Winston-Salem, 332 N.C. 319, 420 S.E.2d 432 (1992); State v. Cunningham, 108 N.C. App. 185, 423 S.E.2d 802 (1992); Woodard v. North Carolina Local Governmental Employees' Retirement Sys., 108 N.C. App. 378, 424 S.E.2d 431 (1993); State v. Ainsworth, 109 N.C. App. 136, 426 S.E.2d 410 (1993); Dunn v. Pate, 334 N.C. 115, 431 S.E.2d 178 (1993); State v. Webster, 111 N.C. App. 72, 431 S.E.2d 808 (1993); State v. Pendleton, 112 N.C. App. 171, 435 S.E.2d 100 (1993); Alt v. Parker, 112 N.C. App. 307, 435 S.E.2d 773 (1993); State v. Baynes, 114 N.C. App. 165, 442 S.E.2d 529 (1994).

II. DUE PROCESS AND THE "LAW OF THE LAND".

The "law of the land" is equivalent, etc. —

The term "law of the land," as used in this section, is synonymous with "due process of law" as that term is applied under U.S. Const., Amend. XIV. In re Smith, 82 N.C. App. 107, 345 S.E.2d 423 (1986); State v. Smith, 90 N.C. App. 161, 368 S.E.2d 33 (1988), aff'd, 323 N.C. 703, 374 S.E.2d 866, cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1100, 109 S. Ct. 2453, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1007 (1989).

"Law of the land" is synonymous with "due process of law" under the Fourteenth Amendment, and United States Supreme Court interpretations of the latter, though not binding, are highly persuasive in construing the former. Bentley v. North Carolina Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 107 N.C. App. 1, 418 S.E.2d 705 (1992).

Whether a statute violates the law of the land clause is a question of degree and reasonableness in relation to the public good likely to result from it. Lowe v. Tarble, 313 N.C. 460, 329 S.E.2d 648 (1985).

This section is synonymous with due process clause of the U.S. Const., Amend. XIV. McNeill v. Harnett County, 327 N.C. 552, 398 S.E.2d 475 (1990).

Federal Due Process Decisions Persuasive. — "Law of the land" is equivalent to the federal Fourteenth Amendment "due process of law," and federal court interpretations of the latter, though not binding, are highly persuasive in construing our own amendment. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 85 N.C. App. 93, 354 S.E.2d 350 (1987), rev'd on other grounds, 322 N.C. 396, 368 S.E.2d 595 (1988); State v. Smith, 90 N.C. App. 161, 368 S.E.2d 33 (1988), aff'd, 323 N.C. 703, 374 S.E.2d 866, cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1100, 109 S. Ct. 2453, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1007 (1989).

The North Carolina Supreme Court would employ a different method for deciding what procedural safeguards are due under the "law of the land" clause to a person deprived of a protected interest than the United States Supreme Court has proposed for deciding similar questions under the due process clause. Henry v. Edmisten, 315 N.C. App. 474, 340 S.E.2d 720 (1986).

Statute Must Serve Legitimate Purpose and Be Rationally Related Thereto. — For a statute to be within the limits set by the federal due process clause and the North Carolina "law of the land" provision, all that is required is that the statute serve a legitimate purpose of state government and be rationally related to the achievement of that purpose. Shipman v. North Carolina Private Protective Servs. Bd., 82 N.C. App. 441, 346 S.E.2d 295, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 318 N.C. 509, 349 S.E.2d 866 (1986).

A legitimate entitlement does not always rise to the level of "property" protected against "taking" by the due process clause of the State and federal Constitutions. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 85 N.C. App. 93, 354 S.E.2d 350 (1987), rev'd on other grounds, 322 N.C. 396, 368 S.E.2d 595 (1988).

Right to military retirement pay is not a constitutionally protected "vested property right"; the right to retirement pay is a creature of federal statute, not private contract. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 85 N.C. App. 93, 354 S.E.2d 350 (1987), rev'd on other grounds, 322 N.C. 396, 368 S.E.2d 595 (1988).

Reclassification of Retirement Pay as Marital Property. — Defendant's right to his retirement pay was "vested" such that it could be included as marital property under § 50-20(b), yet his right to this government benefit was never "so far perfected as to permit no statutory interference." Thus the legislature's reclassification of defendant's military retirement pay as marital property violated neither the Constitutional guarantees of due process nor the law of the land. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 85 N.C. App. 93, 354 S.E.2d 350 (1987), rev'd on other grounds, 322 N.C. 396, 368 S.E.2d 595 (1988).

A tenant in a publicly subsidized housing project is entitled to due process protection. Roanoke Chowan Regional Hous. Auth. v. Vaughan, 81 N.C. App. 354, 344 S.E.2d 578, cert. denied, 317 N.C. 706, 347 S.E.2d 439 (1986).

When the furtherance of a legitimate state interest requires the State to engage in prompt remedial action adverse to an individual interest protected by law, and the action proposed by the State is reasonably related to furthering the state's interest, the law of the land ordinarily requires no more than that before such action is undertaken, a judicial officer determine that there is probable cause to believe that the conditions which would justify the action exist. Henry v. Edmisten, 315 N.C. 474, 340 S.E.2d 720 (1986).

The "Law of the Land" Requires Notice and Opportunity to Be Heard. — The "law of the land" clause contained in this section mandates that a party be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before he or she can be deprived of a legal claim or defense. First Union Nat'l Bank v. Rolfe, 83 N.C. App. 625, 351 S.E.2d 117 (1986).

And to Notice and Opportunity to Be Heard. —

The defendant, who had defaulted on the original complaint which alleged that she was a resident of this State, was entitled to notice of the plaintiff's subsequent motion to declare that none of her property was exempt by virtue of nonresidency and an opportunity to contest the factual allegations as to her non-residency; where she was given neither notice nor an opportunity to be heard, in violation of statutory and constitutional provisions, the order declaring that her property was not exempt was invalid, and she was entitled to relief therefrom pursuant to § 1A-1, Rule 60(b)(4). First Union Nat'l Bank v. Rolfe, 83 N.C. App. 625, 351 S.E.2d 117 (1986).

Appraisal clause did not deprive plaintiff of his right to due process under the North Carolina Constitution. Bentley v. North Carolina Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 107 N.C. App. 1, 418 S.E.2d 705 (1992).

Court reporter's allegedly poor transcription of murder trial proceedings did not deny defendant due process where defendant failed to point to any significantly incoherent, inconsistent or senseless language in the transcript, where there was no indication of efforts to work with either the court reporter or the district attorney to attempt to correct them and where there was no suggestion that the transcript could not have been reconstructed if this were truly necessary for a proper understanding of the case on appeal. State v. Robinson, 327 N.C. 346, 395 S.E.2d 402 (1990).

The chemical analysis statute (§ 20-139.1) does not violate the Law of the Land Clause of Art. I, § 19 of the North Carolina Constitution. State v. Jones, 106 N.C. App. 214, 415 S.E.2d 774 (1992).

Passage of Ordinance Mandating Connection to Sewer System. — The law of the land clause does not require notice and opportunity for hearing prior to the passage of an ordinance mandating connection to a sewer system adopted under the authority of § 153A-284; to require notice and opportunity for hearing to all individual property owners prior to the adoption of an ordinance mandating connection of improved properties pursuant to the enabling act would be burdensome, costly to local governments, and not consistent with procedures employed in the exercise of other police powers. McNeill v. Harnett County, 327 N.C. 552, 398 S.E.2d 475 (1990).

No Due Process Right of Entitle-

ment in Terminable at Will Contract. — Where there was nothing in the record which suggested that plaintiff had a contract for a definite term, her contract of employment was terminable at the will of either party, irrespective of the quality of performance, and plaintiff had property interest in employment and no legitimate claim of entitlement under the due process clause. Peele v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 90 N.C. App. 447, 368 S.E.2d 892, appeal dismissed, 323 N.C. 366, 373 S.E.2d 547 (1988).

City of Charlotte's grievance procedure was not adopted pursuant to an ordinance or expressly incorporated by the City Council into plaintiff's employment contract and the undisputed material facts show that plaintiff was nothing more than an "at-will" employee, and, therefore, he was not entitled to the procedural safeguards of U.S. Const., Amend. XIV or N.C. Const., Art. I, § 19 prior to termination. Reid v. White, 703 F. Supp. 428 (W.D.N.C. 1988).

Unilateral Expectation of Continued Employment Did Not Create Property Interest. — Plaintiff failed to raise genuine issue of material fact that he had more than a unilateral expectation of continued employment and such abstract desires are insufficient to create a property interest protected under U.S. Const., Amend. XIV or N.C. Const., Art. I, § 19. Reid v. White, 703 F. Supp. 428 (W.D.N.C. 1988).

Utilities Commission's order requiring that monies collected pursuant to a line loss and compressor fuel charge be included in the Industrial Sales Trucker (IST) did not amount to an impairment of contract in violation of U.S. Const., Art. I, § 10 nor an unlawful taking of property other than by the law of the land or without due process in violation of N.C. Const., Art. I, § 19. State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. North Carolina Natural Gas Corp., 323 N.C. 630, 375 S.E.2d 147 (1989).

Reasonable Exercise of State Police Power. — This section imposes flexible restraints on the exercise of state police power which are satisfied if the act in question is not unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and ... the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be obtained. McNeill v. Harnett County, 327 N.C. 552, 398 S.E.2d 475 (1990).

Establishment and Operation of Sewer System. — The establishment and operation of a sewer system by the sewer district and the county is a valid exercise of the police power under this section. McNeill v. Harnett County, 327 N.C. 552, 398 S.E.2d 475 (1990).

Settlement Proceedings. — Discretion given trial court by subsection (j) of § 97-10.2 (statute giving trial court discretion as to how to distribute settlement proceeds from third-party tort-feasor's insurer between injured worker and workers' compensation carrier) does not violate United States Constitution or this section. Allen v. Rupard, 100 N.C. App. 490, 397 S.E.2d 330 (1990), appeal withdrawn, 328 N.C. 328, 404 S.E.2d 864 (1992).

Water and Sewer Line Connection Charges. — Section 153A-284 and the county mandating ordinances met the requirements of both the federal and State Constitutions in authorizing the imposition of connection charges and user/availability fees related to mandated connections. McNeill v. Harnett County, 327 N.C. 552, 398 S.E.2d 475 (1990).

County ordinance regulating off-premises signs larger than 15 square feet held to meet the constitutional requirements of due process. Summey Outdoor Adv., Inc. v. County of Henderson, 96 N.C. App. 533, 386 S.E.2d 439 (1989).

III. EQUAL PROTECTION.

To withstand an equal protection claim, etc. —

This section requires that if a class is created there must be a reasonable basis for such classification and the consequent difference in treatment under the law. This means that the creation of the class must be reasonably related to the accomplishment of some purpose which the legislature has the power to reach. Durham Council of Blind v. Edmisten, 79 N.C. App. 156, 339 S.E.2d 84, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 316 N.C. 552, 344 S.E.2d 5 (1986).

Test Is Reasonableness, etc. —

In the area of economics and social welfare, a statute containing a legislative classification which is rationally related to a legitimate state objective does not violate this section or the equal protection clause of U.S. Const., Amend. XIV. The traditional equal-protection test does not require the very best classification in the light of a legislative or regulatory purpose, but does require that such classification in relation to such purpose attain a minimum (undefined and undefinable) level of rationality. State v. Stanley, 79 N.C. App. 379, 339 S.E.2d 668 (1986).

The ownership distinctions of §§ 105-277.2(4)b and 105-277.2(5a) satisfy the equal protection requirements of the State and federal Constitutions. In re Consol. Appeals of Certain Timber Cos., 98 N.C. App. 412, 391 S.E.2d 503 (1990).

Test to Determine Blood Alcohol Content. — All individuals arrested for driving while impaired who are tested under the model 900 breathalyzer are given the same initial test to determine blood alcohol content. The regulations merely treat the same group of people in a different way depending on the results of the first test. This classification is not of the type that can be considered a denial of equal protection. State v. Garvick, 98 N.C. App. 556, 392 S.E.2d 115 (1990).

Review of Annexation Where Violation of Fundamental Right Not Alleged. — In a case alleging that annexation under a local act was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the equal protection clause, but not contending that the annexation violated a fundamental right or created a suspect class, a less heightened, lower tier avenue of review was available. Piedmont Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. City of Greensboro, 90 N.C. App. 692, 370 S.E.2d 262 (1988), rev'd on other grounds, 324 N.C. 499, 380 S.E.2d 107 (1989).

The ban on the use or possession of tobacco products by students at school is a valid exercise of the authority delegated to the various boards of education by the legislature, and does not violate the guarantee of equal protection contained in U.S. Const., Amend. XIV and this section. Craig v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 80 N.C. App. 683, 343 S.E.2d 222, appeal dismissed, 318 N.C. 281, 348 S.E.2d 138 (1986).

Landowners in Drainage District Deprived of Vote. — Where some landowners who lived in a drainage district could vote for the clerk who appointed the commissioners of the drainage district and some landowners could not, the defendant nonvoters had been deprived of a fundamental right; furthermore, plaintiff drainage district failed to show that the classification of voters in this case was necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest; therefore, defendants were deprived equal protection of the laws in violation of this section. Northampton County Drainage Dist. Number One v. Bailey, 326 N.C. 742, 392 S.E.2d 352 (1990).

IV. RIGHTS OF DEFENDANTS.

A. In General.

No Right to Same Judge for Pretrial and Trial. — There is no right to have the same judge hear all pretrial motions and other procedural matters as well as preside over the trial itself, whether the trial is complicated or straightforward. State v. McLaughlin, 323 N.C. 68, 372 S.E.2d 49 (1988), sentence vacated and remanded for further consideration at 494 U.S. 1021, 110 S. Ct. 1463, 108 L. Ed. 2d 601 (1990), in light of McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 110 S. Ct. 1227, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1990).

Setting Aside of Judgment on Negotiated Plea Held Error. — Where negotiated plea had been adjudicated and sentence had been imposed, no valid reason had been offered by the State to set aside that plea and adjudication, and defendant could not again be tried for the charges which underlied the indictments without twice being placed in jeopardy, trial judge's setting aside of the judgment which had been entered on the negotiated plea agreement was error. State v. Johnson, 95 N.C. App. 757, 383 S.E.2d 692 (1989).

Statement of Defendant at Sentencing Hearing. — This section, while permitting a defendant to speak at sentencing hearing, does not require the trial court to personally address the defendant and ask him if he wishes to make a statement in his own behalf. State v. McRae, 70 N.C. App. 779, 320 S.E.2d 914 (1984), cert. denied, 313 N.C. 175, 326 S.E.2d 35 (1985).

B. Composition of Juries.

Petit juries must be drawn from a source fairly representative of the community; however, petit juries actually chosen need not mirror the community nor reflect the various distinctive groups in the population. State v. Davis, 325 N.C. 607, 386 S.E.2d 418 (1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 905, 110 S. Ct. 2587, 110 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1990).

Selection of Grand Jury Foreman by Racially Neutral Standard. — A method of selecting a grand jury foreman that meets the racially neutral standard must ensure that all grand jurors are considered by the presiding judge for his selection and that his selection be made on a racially neutral basis. State v. Cofield, 324 N.C. 452, 379 S.E.2d 834 (1989).

Prima Facie Case of Racial Discrimination in Selection of Grand Jury Foreman. — A black defendant may make out a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the grand jury foreman's selection by showing either (1) that the selection procedure itself was not racially neutral, or (2) that for a substantial period in the past, relatively few blacks have served in the position of foreman even though a substantial number have been selected to serve as members of grand juries; the State may rebut such a prima facie case on remand by offering evidence that the process used in selecting the grand jury foreman was in fact racially neutral. State v. Cofield, 320 N.C. 297, 357 S.E.2d 622 (1987).

Evidence Held Insufficient, etc. — Defendant found guilty of murder and robbery failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination, or a violation of this section, in the State's use of its peremptory challenges where the State's questions during voir dire focused on the prospective juror's feelings about capital punishment and the age of the juror, or his or her children, as compared with defendant's age; the venire persons were brought into the courtroom individually, so neither defendant nor the State knew how many black citizens were present in the venire or whether a black citizen would be examined next, and three of the first four jurors seated were black, both defendant and the victim were black, thus diminishing the likelihood that racial issues were inextricably bound up with the conduct of the trial. State v. Davis, 325 N.C. 607, 386 S.E.2d 418 (1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 905, 110 S. Ct. 2587, 110 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1990).

State's Challenges to Jurors Opposed to Death Penalty, etc. — The practice of "death qualifying" juries in capital cases violates neither the United States Constitution nor this section of the North Carolina Constitution. State v. Barts, 316 N.C. 666, 343 S.E.2d 828 (1986); State v. Johnson, 317 N.C. 343, 346 S.E.2d 596 (1986); State v. Smith, 320 N.C. 404, 358 S.E.2d 329 (1987).

It was not error under this section or N.C. Const., Art. I, § 24 for the prosecution to use its peremptory challenges to excuse veniremen who had qualms about the death penalty, but were not excludable pursuant to Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S. Ct. 1770, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776, rehearing denied, 393 U.S. 898, 89 S. Ct. 67, 21 L. Ed. 2d 186 (1968); State v. Allen, 323 N.C. 208, 372 S.E.2d 855 (1988), sentence vacated and remanded for further consideration at 494 U.S. 1021, 110 S. Ct. 1463, 108 L. Ed. 2d 601 (1990), in light of McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 110 S. Ct. 1227, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1990), rehearing denied, — U.S. —, 113 S. Ct. 1885, 123 L. Ed. 2d 503 (1993).

Exclusion Due to Bias Against Death Penalty. — Where prospective juror in a first-degree murder prosecution initially responded to both the prosecutor and the court that she did not have any moral or religious convictions against, and could vote for, the death penalty, but she subsequently responded, upon further questioning by the prosecutor, that she would vote against the death penalty without regard to the evidence and notwithstanding the facts or circumstances, and upon further questioning by the court, she was unable to affirmatively agree to follow the law and recommend a sentence based on the evidence and the law and that she would be trying to find ways she could vote against the death penalty and would be predisposed or biased in some respect, the trial court did not err in excusing prospective juror for cause. State v. Jennings, 333 N.C. 579, 430 S.E.2d 188 (1993), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 114 S. Ct. 644, 126 L. Ed. 2d 602 (1994).

Racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury foreman from a panel of grand jurors selected in a nondiscriminatory manner violates this section and N.C. Const., Art. I, § 26. State v. Cofield, 320 N.C. 297, 357 S.E.2d 622 (1987).

C. Double Jeopardy.

Where multiple punishment is involved, the double jeopardy clause acts as a restraint on the prosecutor and the courts, not the legislature. State v. Gardner, 315 N.C. App. 444, 340 S.E.2d 701 (1986).

And Courts May Not Impose More Punishment Than Intended by Legislature. — The double jeopardy clauses of both the United States and North Carolina Constitutions prohibit a court from imposing more punishment than that intended by the legislature. State v. Gardner, 315 N.C. 444, 340 S.E.2d 701 (1986).

But Legislature May Authorize Cumulative Punishment. — Where the legislature specifically authorizes cumulative punishment under two statutes, regardless of whether those who statutes proscribe the "same" conduct, a court's task of statutory construction is at an end, and the prosecutor may seek and the trial court or jury may impose cumulative punishment under such statutes in a single trial. State v. Gardner, 315 N.C. 444, 340 S.E.2d 701 (1986).

Intent of Legislature Determines Punishment. — When a defendant is tried in a single trial for violations of two statutes that punish the same conduct, the amount of punishment allowable under the double jeopardy clause of the federal Constitution and the law of the land clause of our State Constitution is determined by the intent of the legislature. State v. Freeland, 316 N.C. 13, 340 S.E.2d 35 (1986).

Double jeopardy does not prohibit multiple punishments for the same offenses, where both are tried at the same time, and the Legislature clearly intended them to be punished separately. State v. Strohauer, 84 N.C. App. 68, 351 S.E.2d 823 (1987).

When Jeopardy Attaches. —

In a nonjury criminal trial, jeopardy attaches when the court begins to hear evidence or testimony. State v. Brunson, 327 N.C. 244, 393 S.E.2d 860 (1990).

For case espousing a test that includes bad faith prosecutorial overreaching or harassment aimed at prejudicing defendant's chances for acquittal, whether in the current trial or a retrial, as a standard for prosecutorial misconduct to be applied in assessing double jeopardy claims under the Constitution of North Carolina, see State v. White, 85 N.C. App. 81, 354 S.E.2d 324 (1987), aff'd, 322 N.C. 506, 369 S.E.2d 813 (1988).

Test for determining under our State Constitution whether a case may be retried after the court grants a defendant's motion for a mistrial is as follows: If a defendant moves for a mistrial, he or she normally should be held to have waived the right not to be tried a second time for the same offense. Where the defendant makes such a motion because of prosecutorial misconduct, and the court grants the motion, retrial is not barred by this section unless the defendant shows that the prosecutor was motivated by the intent to provoke a mistrial instead of merely the intent to prejudice the defendant. State v. White, 322 N.C. 506, 369 S.E.2d 813 (1988).

Double Jeopardy Shown in Capital Case. — Where the initial declaration of a mistrial during the defendant's first trial on the capital charge against her was not the result of manifest necessity, and therefore was error, and it could not be determined from the record whether the error in initially declaring a mistrial caused the jury to fail to reach agreement after the court had reinstated the jury, and thus deprived the defendant of a verdict, the trial court erred when it later denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of murder in the first degree against her for the reason that she had formerly been placed in jeopardy for the same offense. State v. Lachat, 317 N.C. 73, 343 S.E.2d 872 (1986).

Defendant's failure to object to termination of her first trial for capital murder by a declaration of mistrial would not prevent her from receiving the relief to which she was otherwise entitled on grounds of former jeopardy, on appeal of her conviction at a second trial. State v. Lachat, 317 N.C. 73, 343 S.E.2d 872 (1986).

Conviction Under Federal Statute With Sanctions Under State Statute Held Not Double Jeopardy. — A conviction under a federal statute followed by disciplinary sanctions pursuant to a State statute for the same conduct does not violate the double jeopardy clause. In re Cobb, 102 N.C. App. 466, 402 S.E.2d 475, cert. denied, appeal dismissed, 329 N.C. 269, 407 S.E.2d 832 (1991).

Reinstatement of a guilty plea following correction of an error of law did not violate the principles of double jeopardy. State v. Oakley, 75 N.C. App. 99, 330 S.E.2d 59 (1985).

Prosecutorial Misconduct Intended to Provoke Motion for Mistrial. — Where the former trial is terminated by a mistrial granted at the request of, or with the consent of, the defendant, the general rule is that the double jeopardy clause does not bar retrial, even if the defendant's motion for mistrial is made as a result of prosecutorial error; however, where the prosecutorial misconduct giving rise to the defendant's motion for mistrial is intended to goad or provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial, the defendant may invoke the protection of the double jeopardy clause to bar a retrial. State v. Major, 84 N.C. App. 421, 352 S.E.2d 862 (1987).

Double Jeopardy Not Shown. — Defendant's convictions of two violations of § 14-27.7, engaging in a sexual act and in intercourse with a person over whom his employer had custody, following his earlier acquittal of second degree rape under § 14-27.3 and committing a sex act on a person who was physically helpless under § 14-27.5 and vacation of his conviction of engaging in a sex act by force and against victim's will in violation of § 14-27.5 did not violate the double jeopardy clauses of U.S. Const., Amend. V and this section of the North Carolina Constitution, as the offenses that defendant was convicted of were not lesser included offenses of the crimes that he was earlier tried for. State v. Raines, 81 N.C. App. 299, 344 S.E.2d 138 (1986), aff'd, 319 N.C. 258, 354 S.E.2d 486 (1987).

Defendant who was convicted for robbing a bank in this State of $6,058.00 with a dangerous weapon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) was not entitled to dismissal of an indictment in the Superior Court of Perquimans County for committing the same robbery with a dangerous weapon in violation of § 14-87 on double jeopardy grounds, as defendant was not being prosecuted for the "same offense" as he had been punished for in federal court. State v. Myers, 82 N.C. App. 299, 346 S.E.2d 273 (1986).

Convictions of statutory rape, taking indecent liberties with a child, and incest, all arising out of the same transaction, did not violate the defendant's rights against double jeopardy; the three are legally separate and distinct crimes, none of which is a lesser included offense of another. State v. Etheridge, 319 N.C. 34, 352 S.E.2d 673 (1987).

The crime against nature, taking indecent liberties with a child, and sexual offense in the second degree are legally separate and distinct crimes, and convictions for all three crimes arising out of the same transaction did not place the defendant in double jeopardy. State v. Etheridge, 319 N.C. 34, 352 S.E.2d 673 (1987).

Defendant held to have failed to establish his double jeopardy claim under the State Constitution based on prosecutorial misconduct resulting in his request for a mistrial, where it could not be said that the State's case was going so badly and the prejudice resulting from the prosecutor's conduct was so grave that the defendant's choice to continue or to abort the proceedings was rendered unmeaningful. State v. White, 85 N.C. App. 81, 354 S.E.2d 324 (1987), aff'd, 322 N.C. 506, 369 S.E.2d 813 (1988).

Trial court did not err by permitting State to try defendant for both burglary and first degree murder of victim; although the intended felony for the burglary was murder of the victim; since at least one essential element of each crime was not an element of the other, there was no merit in defendant's contentions that he was subjected to double jeopardy. State v. Parks, 324 N.C. 94, 376 S.E.2d 4 (1989).

Prosecution on two counts of discharging a firearm into occupied property did not violate federal and State prohibitions against double jeopardy even though 3606 and 3608 Jonquil Street were apartments located within the same building; the facts alleged in the second count of the indictment — that the building was located at 3608 Jonquil Street and was occupied by one set of victims, would not have sustained defendant's conviction for shooting into 3606 Jonquil while that residence was occupied by another set of victims. State v. Ray, 97 N.C. App. 621, 389 S.E.2d 422 (1990).

Convictions May Be Had for Breaking or Entering and Larceny. — The prohibitions in the United States and North Carolina Constitutions against placing a person twice in jeopardy do not prohibit, in a single trial, convictions and punishment for both breaking or entering and felony larceny based upon that breaking or entering. State v. Gardner, 315 N.C. 444, 340 S.E.2d 701 (1986).

Conviction and punishment for both felony breaking or entering and felonious larceny based upon the same breaking or entering in a single trial is not prohibited by the provisions of either the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of North Carolina. State v. Edmondson, 316 N.C. 187, 340 S.E.2d 110 (1986).

Because the crimes of larceny and obtaining property by false pretenses are separate and distinguishable offenses, the issuance of a second indictment for false pretenses, after the dismissal of larceny charges at the close of the State's evidence, did not constitute double jeopardy. State v. Kelly, 75 N.C. App. 461, 331 S.E.2d 227, cert. denied, 315 N.C. 187, 339 S.E.2d 409 (1985).

Each Seized Item of Obscene Material a Separate Offense. — The trial court did not err by refusing to arrest judgment on defendant's two counts of disseminating obscenity, even though the films sold police were sold in the same transaction, since it was the clear intent of the legislature to treat the dissemination of each seized item of obscene material as a separate offense. State v. Von Wilds, 88 N.C. App. 69, 362 S.E.2d 605 (1987), cert. denied, 322 N.C. 329, 368 S.E.2d 873 (1988).

In this State a defendant may not be punished both for felony murder and for the underlying "predicate" felony, even in a single prosecution. Whether in other situations multiple punishments may be imposed when a defendant, in a single trial, is convicted of multiple offenses when some are fully, factually embraced within others is to be determined on the basis of legislative intent. State v. Gardner, 315 N.C. 444, 340 S.E.2d 701 (1986).

Order Denying Motion Immediately Appealable. — A defendant's right not to be unconstitutionally subjected to multiple criminal trials for the same offense is a substantial right, a violation of which cannot be fully remedied by an appeal taken after the subsequent trial has already occurred because the mere fact of the subsequent trial is a violation of the protected right; therefore, where a motion for dismissal of criminal charges is based upon double jeopardy grounds, an order denying the motion is immediately appealable. State v. Major, 84 N.C. App. 421, 352 S.E.2d 862 (1987).

D. Right to Counsel.

Right to Counsel Guaranteed. — An accused's right to counsel in a criminal prosecution is guaranteed by U.S. Const., Amend. VI and is applicable to the states through U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, N.C. Const., Art. I, § 23 and this section. State v. Shores, 102 N.C. App. 473, 402 S.E.2d 162 (1991).

Test of effective assistance of counsel, etc. —

In accord with first paragraph in the main volume. See State v. Scober, 74 N.C. App. 469, 328 S.E.2d 590 (1985).

For case upholding finding that defendant's counsel was not ineffective but if he was, the defendant did not show prejudice, see State v. Swann, 322 N.C. 666, 370 S.E.2d 533 (1988).

Illustrative Cases. —

The counsel's substandard performance was prejudicial to the rape defendant where the defense's failure to produce any evidence to support the theories proffered at the outset of the trial, including consent of the victim and inability of the defendant to perform the alleged acts, formed the basis of one of the principal closing arguments made by the State in favor of conviction. State v. Moorman, 320 N.C. 387, 358 S.E.2d 502 (1987).

E. Time to Prepare Defense.

Defendant Offered Insufficient Evidence. — The circumstances surrounding the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to continue did not demonstrate that it was unlikely that the defendant could have received effective assistance of counsel. The defendant failed to offer evidence tending to establish a violation of his constitutional right to a reasonable time to investigate, prepare and present his defense for murder charge and did not show that he had inadequate time to confer with counsel or that counsel had inadequate time to prepare for trial. State v. Tunstall, 334 N.C. 320, 432 S.E.2d 331 (1993).

Illustrative Cases. —

Where defendant made no credible demonstration that a continuance would have enabled him to secure his psychiatrist's attendance, the judge did not err, nor did he abuse his discretion, by refusing to grant a continuance, and even had the judge's denial of the motion been erroneous constitutionally, defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice. State v. Attmore, 92 N.C. App. 385, 374 S.E.2d 649 (1988), cert. denied, 324 N.C. 248, 377 S.E.2d 757 (1989).

F. Witnesses.

Section Preserves, etc. —

The "law of the land" guaranteed by this section is synonymous with "due process," and it preserves the right of confrontation and cross-examination to an accused party. State v. Phillips, 88 N.C. App. 526, 364 S.E.2d 196 (1988), rev'd on other grounds, 325 N.C. 222, 381 S.E.2d 325 (1989).

Victim impact statements may be used at sentencing hearings, except in capital cases. State v. Phillips, 325 N.C. 222, 381 S.E.2d 325 (1989).

Use of Closed Circuit Television in Court Room Held Adequate to Provide Defendant Opportunity to Cross-examine Child Victim. — Where, in prosecution for taking indecent liberties with a four-year-old child, during voir dire hearing as to victim's competency as a witness, defendant, although absent from the courtroom, was able to hear all testimony, interact freely with his attorney, and through his attorney confront the victim, thereby accomplishing effective cross-examination, the exclusion of defendant did not violate this section or N.C. Const., Art. I, §§ 18 or 23, as the trial court's use of a closed circuit television and its act of providing defendant and his attorney adequate opportunity to communicate during the victim's testimony were sufficient to permit defendant to hear the evidence and to refute it. State v. Jones, 89 N.C. App. 584, 367 S.E.2d 139 (1988).

Illustrative Cases. — Where defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine both witnesses in his murder trial, the confrontation clause was not violated as to the victim's grandmother's testimony concerning what she told the defendant and as to the letter written from the victim to the defendant, authenticated by two witnesses. State v. Quick, 323 N.C. 675, 375 S.E.2d 156 (1989).

H. Self-Incrimination.

Exclusion of Second Confession after Improper First Confession. — Neither this section nor § 23 of N.C. Const., art. I required the suppression of a defendant's second confession, made after proper warnings and the defendant's voluntary waiver of his constitutional rights, when that confession followed an earlier confession which had to be excluded under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). State v. Hicks, 333 N.C. 467, 428 S.E.2d 167 (1993).

I. Restraint of Defendant at Trial.

There is no ban, constitutional or otherwise, against physical restraint in the courtroom per se. What is forbidden by the due process and fair trial guarantees of U.S. Const., Amend. XIV and this section of the North Carolina Constitution is physical restraint that improperly deprives a defendant of a fair trial. State v. Wright, 82 N.C. App. 450, 346 S.E.2d 510 (1986).

A defendant may be physically restrained during his trial when restraint is necessary to maintain order, prevent the defendant's escape, or protect the public. State v. Wright, 82 N.C. App. 450, 346 S.E.2d 510 (1986).

J. Punishment.

Death Penalty. — The North Carolina Supreme Court reaffirmed its position that the North Carolina death penalty statute does not violate the U.S. Const., Amends. VIII and XIV and the N.C. Const., Art. I, § 27 and this section. State v. McHone, 334 N.C. 627, 435 S.E.2d 296 (1993), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 114 S. Ct. 1577, 128 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1994).

Imposition of a 30-year sentence for a habitual felon who under the facts could have received a maximum sentence of life imprisonment under § 14-1.1 is within constitutional limits and does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. State v. Aldridge, 76 N.C. App. 638, 334 S.E.2d 107 (1985).

General statistical studies of the operation of the death penalty showing that a person is more likely to be executed if the murder victim is white and the chance is more likely yet if the defendant is black, could not be used by defendant to show a violation of his rights under U.S. Const., Amends. VIII and XIV or under this section. State v. Green, 329 N.C. 686, 406 S.E.2d 852 (1991).

VI. POLICE POWER.

This section and N.C. Const., Art. I, § 1 permit the State, through the exercise of its police power, to regulate economic enterprises, provided the regulation is rationally related to a proper governmental purpose. This is the test used in determining the validity of state regulation of business under N.C. Const., Art. I, §§ 1 and 19. Poor Richard's, Inc. v. Stone, 322 N.C. 61, 366 S.E.2d 697 (1988).

Legislature may make the doing of an act a criminal offense. — As a matter of both State and federal constitutional law, legislatures may make the doing of an act a criminal offense even in the absence of criminal intent. State v. Smith, 90 N.C. App. 161, 368 S.E.2d 33 (1988), aff'd, 323 N.C. 703, 374 S.E.2d 866, cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1100, 109 S. Ct. 2453, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1007 (1989).

Limitations on Use of Private Property. —

The "vested rights" doctrine has evolved as a constitutional limitation on the State's exercise of its police power to restrict an individual's use of private property by the enactment of zoning ordinances; the doctrine is rooted in the "due process of law" and the "law of the land" clauses of the federal and State Constitutions. Godfrey v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 317 N.C. 51, 344 S.E.2d 272 (1986).

VII. TAKING OF PRIVATE PROPERTY FOR PUBLIC USE.

A. In General.

Test to Determine Whether Taking Has Occurred. — The test to determine whether a taking of private property for public use has occurred involves as two-part analysis. An "ends-means" test is applied to decide whether that particular exercise of the police power was legitimate, by determining whether the ends sought, i.e., the object of the legislation, is within the scope of the power, and then whether the means chosen to regulate are reasonable. Finch v. City of Durham, 325 N.C. 352, 384 S.E.2d 8, rehearing denied, 325 ‸N.C. 714, 388 S.E.2d 452 (1989).

The test for determining whether a taking has occurred in the context of a rezoning is whether the property as rezoned has a practical use and a reasonable value. Finch v. City of Durham, 325 N.C. 352, 384 S.E.2d 8, rehearing denied, 325 N.C. 714, 388 S.E.2d 452 (1989).

Zoning restrictions on property may be so strict as to amount to a taking of that property. However, for there to be such a "taking," the restriction must deprive the owner of virtually all the beneficial uses of his land. Sherrill v. Town of Wrightsville Beach, 81 N.C. App. 369, 344 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 318 N.C. 417, 349 S.E.2d 600 (1986).

Deprivation of Previously Available Property Rights. — A taking does not occur simply because government action deprives an owner of previously available property rights. Finch v. City of Durham, 325 N.C. 352, 384 S.E.2d 8, rehearing denied, 325 N.C. 714, 388 S.E.2d 452 (1989).

Riparian rights are vested property rights that cannot be taken for private purposes or taken for public purposes without compensating the owner, and they arise out of ownership of land bounded or traversed by navigable water. In re Mason ex rel. Huber, 78 N.C. App. 16, 337 S.E.2d 99 (1985), cert. denied, 315 N.C. 588, 341 S.E.2d 27 (1986).

Lease for shellfish cultivation issued under § 113-202 did not infringe upon riparian rights of landowner. In re Mason ex rel. Huber, 78 N.C. App. 16, 337 S.E.2d 99 (1985), cert. denied, 315 N.C. 588, 341 S.E.2d 27 (1986).

C. Compensation.

As Part of the Law of the Land. — In accord with first paragraph in the main volume. See Finch v. City of Durham, 325 N.C. 352, 384 S.E.2d 8, rehearing denied, 325 N.C. 714, 388 S.E.2d 452 (1989).

While N.C. Const., Art. I, § 19 does not expressly prohibit taking property without compensation, this right is nevertheless considered a part of the "law of the land" under the amendment. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 85 N.C. App. 93, 354 S.E.2d 350, rev'd on other grounds, 322 N.C. 396, 368 S.E.2d 595 (1988).

Damages for Delay in Payment. — When the taking of property by the State precedes the payment of compensation, the owner is entitled to additional compensation for the delay in payment. This section and U.S. Const., Amends. V and XIV require this additional payment as a part of just compensation. The additional sum awarded for delay in payment of the value for the property taken is not interest eo nomine, but interest is a fair means for measuring the amount to be arrived at of such additional sums. Lea Co. v. North Carolina Bd. of Transp., 317 N.C. 254, 345 S.E.2d 355 (1986), aff'd, 323 N.C. 697, 374 S.E.2d 866, cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1100, 109 S. Ct. 2453, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1007 (1989).

Property owner's actual investment in property prior to rezoning is not determinative of practical use and reasonable value of the property after rezoning. Finch v. City of Durham, 325 N.C. 352, 384 S.E.2d 8, rehearing denied, 325 N.C. 714, 388 S.E.2d 452 (1989).

E. Illustrative Cases.

State Regulation of Public Streets and Beaches. — Session Laws 1983, Chapter 539 (former § 113A-134.10), which, inter alia, prohibited motor vehicle traffic over a vehicular access ramp and right-of-way constructed by a town to provide access to the beach did not constitute a taking in violation of this Article, since the State has paramount legislature authority to regulate the use and control of public streets and beaches. Town of Emerald Isle ex rel. Smith v. State, 320 N.C. 640, 360 S.E.2d 756 (1987).

PCB Disposal Facility. — Plaintiff landowners failed to demonstrate that they were entitled to recover based upon inverse condemnation on account of the State's location and operation of a PCB disposal facility, the buffer zone to which was adjacent to their land. Twitty v. State, 85 N.C. App. 42, 354 S.E.2d 296, cert. denied, 320 N.C. 177, 358 S.E.2d 69 (1987).

Five-year amortization provisions of county ordinance regulating off-premises signs of over 15 square feet were sufficient, and the ordinance did not constitute a taking of plaintiff's property without compensation. Summey Outdoor Adv., Inc. v. County of Henderson, 96 N.C. App. 533, 386 S.E.2d 439 (1989).

Denial of a project application for preliminary plat approval which would violate the valid condition of a previously approved and substantially undertaken proposal worked no taking of a three-acre area at issue. River Birch Assocs. v. City of Raleigh, 326 N.C. 100, 388 S.E.2d 538 (1990).

A requirement of dedication of park space for subdivision approval does not necessarily constitute a taking. Where the subdivider creates the specific need for parks, it is not unreasonable to charge the subdivider with the burden of providing them. River Birch Assocs. v. City of Raleigh, 326 N.C. 100, 388 S.E.2d 538 (1990).

Application of § 105-116 to Electric Cooperative. — Section 105-116 taxes billings for electrical service rendered by cooperatives in the same manner as billings for service rendered by investor-owned utilities; therefore, application of that section to electric cooperative did not violate that entity's rights under this section or N.C. Const., Art. V, §§ 2 and 3. Four County Elec. Membership Corp. v. Powers, 96 N.C. App. 417, 386 S.E.2d 107 (1989), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 326 N.C. 799, 393 S.E.2d 894 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040, 111 S. Ct. 711, 112 L. Ed. 2d 700 (1991).

VIII. TAXATION.

Statute Held Valid. — The distinction between "homes for the aged, sick, or infirm" and individual residential property owners under § 105-275(32) is not unconstitutional under the equal protection clause. In re Barbour, 112 N.C. App. 368, 436 S.E.2d 169 (1993).

IX. MISCELLANEOUS RIGHTS.

Equal access to participation in the public school system.

Action for declaratory and injunctive relief brought by minors who were, or would be in the future, enrolled in public schools in the county, and their parents or legal guardians, alleging that the present statutory system of financing public schools in this State resulted in inequities in educational programs and facilities between the public schools within that county, which had a relatively low tax base from which to draw funds, and those in other counties with relatively high tax bases, and that the operation of five separate school systems in that county prohibited effective use of facilities and staff and promoted inequitable use of state and local funds, thus depriving them of equal opportunity to a free public school education in violation of this section, N.C. Const., Art. I, §§ 1 and 15, and Art. IX, § 2(1), failed to allege facts entitling them to relief or conferring jurisdiction on the courts of this State. Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 86 N.C. App. 262, 357 S.E.2d 432, appeal dismissed, 320 N.C. 790, 361 S.E.2d 71 (1987).

Vested Rights in Pre-1983 Estates by the Entirety. — The claim of a vested property right may not rest upon state enforcement of common law which is unconstitutionally discriminatory. Thus, to the extent that defendant husband's claims to the exclusive right to the control and income of pre-1983 estates by the entirety were based solely upon common-law incidents of the tenancy, they would fail, as the right recognized by the common law could not be said to be a "vested property right." Perry v. Perry, 80 N.C. App. 169, 341 S.E.2d 53, appeal dismissed, 320 N.C. 170, 357 S.E.2d 925 (1987). See § 39-13.6.

X. CHALLENGES TO STATUTES, ETC., ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS.

Separate Classifications. — Under

the state and federal equal protection clauses, a state statute or regulation which has the effect of creating separate classifications preferring one group over another must be rationally related to legitimate state interest(s). Harris v. Flaherty, 90 N.C. App. 110, 367 S.E.2d 364 (1988).

No Vested Right in Continuation of an Existing Law. — The fact that husband acquired property during marriage but prior to the effective date of the Equitable Distribution Act does not mean that he also acquired a vested right in the law governing the disposition of property upon divorce which was in effect either at the time the property was acquired or at the time of his marriage. There is no such thing as a vested right in the continuation of an existing law. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 322 N.C. 396, 368 S.E.2d 595 (1988).

XI. ILLUSTRATIVE CASES.

A. Statutes, Proceedings, etc., Upheld.

Annexation. — It is not a denial of the equal protection of the law for a city to annex land without annexing other land similarly situated. Piedmont Ford Truck Sale, Inc. v. City of Greensboro, 324 N.C. 499, 380 S.E.2d 107 (1989).

Ballot Access Restriction. — The ten percent (10%) numerical signature requirement contained in § 163-122(a)(3) is an unconstitutional ballot access restriction for unaffiliated candidates in violation of the U.S Const., Amend I and XIV and N.C. Const., Art. I, § 10 and this section. Obie v. North Carolina State Bd. of Elections, 762 F. Supp. 119 (E.D.N.C. 1991).

Section 53-229, relating to the acquisition and control of certain nonbank banking institutions, does not violate the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution, nor the equal protection, exclusion emoluments and antimonopoly provisions of N.C. Const., Art. I, §§ 19, 32 and 34. Citicorp v. Currie, 75 N.C. App. 312, 330 S.E.2d 635, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 314 N.C. 538, 335 S.E.2d 15, 16 (1985).

Conditions for licenses to operate bingo games set out in §§ 14-309.7 and 14-309.8 are reasonably related to a legitimate interest that bingo games not be operated by full-time professionals for profit. Durham Council of Blind v. Edmisten, 79 N.C. App. 156, 339 S.E.2d 84, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 316 N.C. 552, 344 S.E.2d 5 (1986).

A city ordinance providing for conveyance of open space to an association of home owners living within the subdivision is reasonably related to the purpose of preserving urban open space so as to withstand a challenge under this section. River Birch Assocs. v. City of Raleigh, 326 N.C. 100, 388 S.E.2d 538 (1990).

Criminal Statutes. —

For a discussion of the constitutionality of § 20-141.4(a2), relating to misdemeanor death by vehicle, see State v. Smith, 90 N.C. App. 161, 368 S.E.2d 33 (1988), aff'd, 323 N.C. 703, 374 S.E.2d 866, cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1100, 109 S. Ct. 2453, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1007 (1989).

Drug Testing. — Plaintiff's duties consisted of generally performing preventative maintenance and repairs on airport terminal air conditioning and ventilating and heating systems, but plaintiff also had security clearance to drive a motor vehicle 10 M.P.H. in a designated area on the apron of the flight area in order to get access to the systems located on the outside of the building. Plaintiff, if drug-impaired while operating a motor vehicle on the apron of the flight area, could increase the risk of harm to others. Accordingly, a drug testing policy implemented by defendants (employer) was constitutional. Boesche v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 111 N.C. App. 149, 432 S.E.2d 137, cert. granted, 334 N.C. 687, 436 S.E.2d 370 (1993).

Provisions of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. — Sections 52A-29 and 52A-30 comport with the due process requirements of the federal and State Constitutions. Allsup v. Allsup, 323 N.C. 603, 374 S.E.2d 237 (1988).

Eviction Proceedings. — An eviction proceeding in a North Carolina state court pursuant to the North Carolina eviction statute will provide the tenant with all the process that is due. Roanoke Chowan Regional Hous. Auth. v. Vaughan, 81 N.C. App. 354, 344 S.E.2d 578, cert. denied, 317 N.C. 706, 347 S.E.2d 439 (1986).

Interest. —

Section 24-5 does not violate the equal protection clause of U.S. Const., Amend. XIV or this section. Powe v. Odell, 312 N.C. 410, 322 S.E.2d 762 (1984).

Section 24-5, relating to the imposition of interest, does not violate N.C.

Const., Art. I, §§ 19 and 32 and the equal protection and due process clauses of U.S. Const., Amend. XIV. Harris v. Scotland Neck Rescue Squad, Inc., 75 N.C. App. 444, 331 S.E.2d 695, cert. denied, 314 N.C. 329, 333 S.E.2d 486 (1985).

Limitation Statutes. —

Sections 1-50(5) and 1-15(c) are not unconstitutional as being violative of the open courts provision of the North Carolina Constitution and the equal protection clauses of the State and federal Constitutions. Square D Co. v. C.J. Kern Contractors, 314 N.C. 423, 334 S.E.2d 63 (1985).

Section 1-50 does not distinguish between manufacturers and retail sellers of products who are protected from liability beyond the six-year period of repose and does not violate the equal protection clauses or the State or federal Constitutions. Tetterton v. Long Mfg. Co., 314 N.C. 44, 332 S.E.2d 67 (1985).

Section 24-5, relating to the imposition of interest, does not violate this section, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, or the exclusive emoluments clause contained in N.C. Const., Art. I, § 32. Lowe v. Tarble, 312 N.C. 467, 323 S.E.2d 19 (1984), rehearing granted, 313 N.C. 176, 326 S.E.2d 32, aff'd on rehearing, 313 N.C. 460, 329 S.E.2d 648 (1985).

Section 24-5 does not violate the equal protection clause of U.S. Const., Amend. XIV or this section. Powe v. Odell, 312 N.C. 410, 322 S.E.2d 762 (1984).

Section 24-5, relating to the imposition of interest, does not violate Art. I, §§ 19 and 32 of the North Carolina Constitution and the equal protection and due process clauses of U.S. Const., Amend. XIV. Harris v. Scotland Neck Rescue Squad, Inc., 75 N.C. App. 444, 331 S.E.2d 695, cert. denied, 314 N.C. 329, 333 S.E.2d 486 (1985).

Article 1, Chapter 127B, regulating businesses dealing in military goods, is constitutional under the due process and equal protection provisions of the State and federal Constitutions. Poor Richard's, Inc. v. Stone, 322 N.C. 61, 366 S.E.2d 697 (1988).

The provisions of § 127B-1 are not unreasonably burdensome within the meaning of this section and N.C. Const., Art. I, § 1. Poor Richard's, Inc. v. Stone, 322 N.C. 61, 366 S.E.2d 697 (1988).

The classification created by § 127B-1 is not so arbitrary or unreasonable as to be violative of the equal protection requirement. Poor Richard's, Inc. v. Stone, 322 N.C. 61, 366 S.E.2d 697 (1988).

State's failure to take and to preserve an additional breath sample for independent testing by defendant or to produce the control and test ampules for defendant's breathalyzer examination did not violate state or federal due process. State v. Jones, 106 N.C. App. 214, 415 S.E.2d 774 (1992).

Obscenity. — Where, in an obscenity trial, the trial judge declined to judicially restrict or expand the term "community," permitting the jurors to apply the standards of the community from which they came in much the same manner as they would determine the propensities of a reasonable person in other areas of the law, neither § 14-190.1 nor the judge's instructions contravened the Constitution by failing to specify what is meant by "community." State v. Mayes, 86 N.C. App. 569, 359 S.E.2d 30, petition allowed as to additional issues, 321 N.C. 122, 361 S.E.2d 599 (1987), aff'd, 323 N.C. 159, 371 S.E.2d 476, 488 U.S. 1009, 109 S.Ct. 792, 102 L.Ed.2d 784 (1988).

Ordinance which required escort bureaus to keep a record of transactions with clients or customers was vague and overbroad and violated this section; the sweep of the ordinance infringed on rights of association guaranteed by U.S. Const., Amend. I. Treants Enters., Inc. v. Onslow County, 94 N.C. App. 453, 380 S.E.2d 602 (1989).

A provision of a city ordinance requiring paved parking lots, challenged on due process and equal protection grounds, was held valid. Grace Baptist Church v. City of Oxford, 320 N.C. 439, 358 S.E.2d 372 (1987).

Eligibility to Receive Day-Care Benefits. — Division of Social Services' definition of "family" and the relevant eligibility criterion used in distinguishing among those eligible to receive day-care benefits intended to foster a fair meeting out of state and federal funds to promote the objectives of the social services programs and as such are rationally related to the State's legitimate objectives. Harris v. Flaherty, 90 N.C. App. 110, 367 S.E.2d 364 (1988).

The Preambles to the Ethical Principles of Psychologists are unconstitutionally vague for purposes of being cited for specific violations under U.S. Const., Amends. V and XIV and under this section of the N.C. Const. White v. North Carolina State Bd. of Exmrs. of Practicing Psychologists, 97 N.C. App.

144, 388 S.E.2d 148, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 326 N.C. 601, 393 S.E.2d 891 (1990).

Ethical Principles of Psychologists. — Principles 1f, 2e, 3c, 3d, 5c, 7b, 8c, and 8d, are not unconstitutionally vague. White v. North Carolina State Bd. of Exmrs. of Practicing Psychologists, 97 N.C. App. 144, 388 S.E.2d 148, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 326 N.C. 601, 393 S.E.2d 891 (1990).

B. Statutes, Proceedings, etc., Held Unconstitutional.

A county ordinance subjecting businesses which provided male or female "companionship" to various licensing requirements was held to lack any rational, real and substantial relation to any valid objective of the county and thus to offend this section and N.C. Const., Art. I, § 1. Treants Enters., Inc. v. Onslow County, 83 N.C. App. 345, 350 S.E.2d 365 (1986), aff'd, 320 N.C. 776, 360 S.E.2d 783 (1987).

An ordinance enacted to regulate business providing male and female companionship was overbroad and not rationally related to a substantial government purpose and violated our State Constitution. Treants Enters., Inc. v. Onslow County, 320 N.C. 776, 360 S.E.2d 783 (1987).

Sec. 20. General warrants.

Legal Periodicals. —

For note on warrantless aerial surveillance endorsed in California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 90 L. Ed. 2d 210, rehearing denied, 478 U.S. 1014, 106 S. Ct. 3320, 92 L. Ed. 2d 728 (1986), see 9 Campbell L. Rev. 497 (1987).

For note, "North Carolina Adopts the Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: — State v. Garner," see 15 Campbell L. Rev. 305 (1993).

CASE NOTES

I. General Consideration.
II. Warrantless Searches.
III. Search Warrants.

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure, etc. —

Pointing to the differences in language in the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and this section of the North Carolina Constitution, the North Carolina Constitution is more protective of a person's privacy and requires a stricter standard in justifying a warrantless search. State v. Mills, 104 N.C. App. 724, 411 S.E.2d 193 (1991).

The language of this section differs markedly from the language of U.S. Const., Amend. IV. Nevertheless, this section prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Arrington, 311 N.C. 633, 319 S.E.2d 254 (1984).

Standing to Object to Search. — Burglary defendant had no standing to object to the search of a car from which evidence was taken by the FBI where, although defendant had paid $3,500 of the $4,000 purchase price, the owner of the car dealership retained title and had given his consent to the search. State v. Mandina, 91 N.C. App. 686, 373 S.E.2d 155 (1988).

Stop and Frisk Procedure. — Action of law enforcement agents who entered lounge pursuant to a valid search warrant and frisked defendant for weapons was not unconstitutional, since the North Carolina Supreme Court has upheld the "stop and frisk" procedure, and since there is a specific grant of authority in § 15A-255. State v. Davis, 94 N.C. App. 358, 380 S.E.2d 378 (1989).

It is well within the law to conduct a frisk of a defendant for weapons when strictly limited to a determination of whether defendant was armed. State v. Harris, 95 N.C. App. 691, 384 S.E.2d 50 (1989), aff'd, 326 N.C. 588, 391 S.E.2d 187 (1990).

For case refusing to adopt a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule, see State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 370 S.E.2d 553 (1988).

Applied in State v. Kornegay, 313 N.C. 1, 326 S.E.2d 881 (1985); State v. Bromfield, 332 N.C. 24, 418 S.E.2d 491 (1992).

Cited in State v. Melvin, 86 N.C. App. 291, 357 S.E.2d 379 (1987); State v. Autry, 321 N.C. 392, 364 S.E.2d 341 (1988); State v. Davis, 96 N.C. App. 545, 386 S.E.2d 743 (1989); State v. Sanders, 327 N.C. 319, 395 S.E.2d 412 (1990); State v. Butler, 331 N.C. 227, 415 S.E.2d 719 (1992); State v. Farmer, 333 N.C. 172, 424 S.E.2d 120 (1993); Boesche v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 111 N.C. App. 149, 432 S.E.2d 137 (1993).

II. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES.

Suspicion of Impairment Held Reasonable. — Despite lack of an observed and verifiable traffic code violation by suspect, his driving 20 miles per hour below the speed limit and weaving within his lane were actions sufficient to raise a suspicion of an impaired driver in a reasonable and experienced trooper's mind. State v. Jones, 96 N.C. App. 389, 386 S.E.2d 217 (1989), appeal dismissed, 326 N.C. 366, 389 S.E.2d 809 (1990).

Blood Test on Unconscious Defendant. — In a prosecution for involuntary manslaughter and driving under the influence, the performance of a blood alcohol test on blood seized from an unconscious defendant pursuant to § 20-16.2(b) did not violate defendant's rights under the U.S. Constitution and this section, because of (1) the existence of probable cause to arrest; (2) the limited nature of the intrusion upon the person; and (3) the destructibility of the evidence. State v. Hollingsworth, 77 N.C. App. 36, 334 S.E.2d 463 (1985).

Limitations on Pat-Down Search. — Although a police officer was justified in conducting a limited pat-down of the defendant to determine whether the defendant was armed, once the officer concluded that there was no weapon, he could not continue to search or question the defendant in order to ascertain whether a rolled up plastic bag was contraband. State v. Beveridge, 112 N.C. App. 688, 436 S.E.2d 912 (1993), cert. denied, 335 N.C. 560, 441 S.E.2d 105 (1994).

Validity of Search Where Driver Not Charged with Offense. — Fact that driver was not charged thereafter with a DUI offense was not relevant to the trooper's initial suspicions; therefore, stop and search of car was valid. State v. Jones, 96 N.C. App. 389, 386 S.E.2d 217 (1989), appeal dismissed, 326 N.C. 366, 389 S.E.2d 809 (1990).

Results Not Suppressed Though State Line Crossed. — Neither the federal nor State Constitutions required that evidence of patrolman's detection of alcohol on defendant's breath and the results of a breathalyzer test given him by a Surry County deputy sheriff be suppressed where the arresting officer did not know that defendant crossed the state line into Virginia before stopping his truck. State v. Gwyn, 103 N.C. App. 369, 406 S.E.2d 145, cert. denied, 330 N.C. 199, 410 S.E.2d 498 (1991).

No Legitimate Expectation of Privacy in Conversation with Confederate. — Pre-arrest warrantless recording of defendant's incriminating statements through witness did not violate defendant's right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure under this section, inasmuch as defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy regarding a conversation he voluntarily maintained with a confederate, did not violate defendant's right under N.C. Const., Art. I, § 23, to be free from compulsory self-incrimination because his participation in the conversation was wholly voluntary, albeit ill-advised, and did not violate defendant's right under N.C. Const., Art. I, § 23, to counsel because the conversation in question occurred during the initial investigation of defendant prior to his arrest. State v. Levan, 326 N.C. 155, 388 S.E.2d 429 (1990).

Defendant did not have reasonable expectation of privacy within his jail cell and search during which a letter defendant had written to his brother, asking the brother to commit perjury at his trial, was seized was proper. State v. Martin, 322 N.C. 229, 367 S.E.2d 618 (1988).

Warrantless Search Upheld. —

It was not unreasonable for authorities to strip defendant and comb through his pubic without search warrant after arresting him for first degree sexual assault, kidnapping and sodomy. Arrest was supported by probable cause and evidence could easily have been concealed or destroyed. State v. Norman, 100 N.C. App. 660, 397 S.E.2d 647 (1990).

Where the search involved a motor vehicle in a public area, the only determination left for review was whether deputy had probable cause to search the van; the trial court found as facts that deputy was sufficiently experienced to make a reliable determination that what he smelled was illegal contraband (white liquor), defendant appeared to deputy to be very nervous, and defendant had placed cardboard over a burned-out window on the van after a tire had caught fire; therefore deputy had reasonable grounds to conclude that the van contained contraband, and that he did not need a warrant to search. State v. Corpening, 109 N.C. App. 586, 427 S.E.2d 892 (1993).

Voluntary Consent. — Where defendant gave trooper permission to search the entire contents of defendant's suitcase and did not retract or limit the consent, the trooper had defendant's consent to open package of cocaine contained therein, and the trial court did not err in allowing the contents of the package into evidence at trial. State v. Jones, 96 N.C. App. 389, 386 S.E.2d 217 (1989), appeal dismissed, 326 N.C. 366, 389 S.E.2d 809 (1990).

In appeal from conviction for trafficking based upon drugs found in defendant's car after trooper had stopped car on suspicion that the driver was impaired, fact that trooper's conversation with defendant about driver's identity resulted in defendant giving his voluntary consent to a search of the car did not support defendant's arguments that trooper exceeded the permissible scope of his investigation. State v. Jones, 96 N.C. App. 389, 386 S.E.2d 217 (1989), appeal dismissed, 326 N.C. 366, 389 S.E.2d 809 (1990).

III. SEARCH WARRANTS.

Totality of Circumstances Test Adopted. — For resolving questions arising under this section with regard to the sufficiency of probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant, the Supreme Court of North Carolina adopts the totality of circumstances test of Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983) and Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 104 S. Ct. 2085, 80 L. Ed. 2d 721 (1984) and rejects the two-pronged test of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969). State v. Arrington, 311 N.C. 633, 319 S.E.2d 254 (1984).

Under the totality of circumstances test, the two-pronged prongs of *Aguilar* and *Spinelli* — veracity and basis of knowledge — are still relevant, but are not to be accorded independent status. The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of the reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. State v. Arrington, 311 N.C. 633, 319 S.E.2d 254 (1984).

The North Carolina Supreme Court has adopted the "totality of the circumstances" test to determine the sufficiency of probable cause to issue a warrant under this section. State v. Isleib, 80 N.C. App. 599, 343 S.E.2d 234 (1986), rev'd on other grounds, 319 N.C. 634, 356 S.E.2d 573 (1987).

After-the-Fact Scrutiny of Affidavit Should Not Be De Novo Review. — After-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit in support of a warrant should not take the form of de novo review. State v. Tuggle, 99 N.C. App. 164, 392 S.E.2d 654 (1990).

Severable Provisions. — Provisions of warrant which authorized police to search both for drugs and for "stolen goods" were severable, and the police could constitutionally search for the listed drugs or items of the same class, but the warrant could not authorize a general exploratory search of defendant's home and inventory of its contents. State v. Connard, 81 N.C. App. 327, 344 S.E.2d 568 (1986), aff'd, 319 N.C. 392, 354 S.E.2d 238 (1987).

Withdrawal of a blood sample from a person is a search subject to protection by this section. State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 370 S.E.2d 553 (1988).

Under the State Constitution, a search warrant must be issued before a blood sample can be obtained, unless probable cause and exigent circumstances exist that would justify a warrantless search. State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 370 S.E.2d 553 (1988).

Blood Sample Taken Without Consent or Search Warrant Unconstitutional. — Where defendant was already in custody, obtaining a sample of his blood pursuant to a nontestimonial identification order under Article 14 of Chapter 15A (§ 15A-271, et seq.), absent his consent or a search warrant, violated his rights under this section to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and the evidence should have been suppressed. State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 370 S.E.2d 553 (1988).

Cumulative Evidence Held to Support Determination. — Although no single piece of evidence in the affidavit was conclusive, nevertheless, the information from all three pieces was consistent, and their cumulative evidence supported the determination that there was a "fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime" would be found at the defendant's residence. State v. Tuggle, 99 N.C. App. 164, 392 S.E.2d 654 (1990).

Affidavit Insufficient to Find Probable Cause. — Where the affidavit contained a mere naked assertion that the informant at some time saw a "room full of marijuana" growing in the defendant's house, and the officer affiant made no attempt to corroborate the informant's story, but merely verified that the defendant lived in the house in question, the affidavit did not contain sufficient information on which to find probable cause, nor could the evidence seized as a result of the search be admitted under the "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule in view of the fact that the officer took no reasonable steps to comply with U.S. Const., Amend. IV. State v. Newcomb, 84 N.C. App. 92, 351 S.E.2d 565 (1987).

Sec. 22. Modes of prosecution.

Legal Periodicals. —

For note examining the development of constitutional protections against race and class discrimination in the selection of jurors, and policy considerations associated with extending these principles to foreman selection procedures, in light of State v. Cofield, 77 N.C. App. 699, 336 S.E.2d 439 (1985), see 64 N.C.L. Rev. 1179 (1986).

CASE NOTES

A valid indictment is a condition precedent, etc. —

In accord with third paragraph in the main volume. See State v. Johnson, 77 N.C. App. 583, 335 S.E.2d 770 (1985).

All Essential Elements of Offense, etc. —

In accord with second paragraph in the main volume. See State v. Johnson, 77 N.C. App. 583, 335 S.E.2d 770 (1985).

No Requirement to Instruct Indicting Grand Jury on Elements of Crime. — A court is not required to instruct the indicting grand jury on the elements of the crime in question. State v. Treadwell, 99 N.C. App. 769, 394 S.E.2d 245 (1990).

Cited in State v. Carson, 320 N.C. 328, 357 S.E.2d 662 (1987); State v. Camacho, 329 N.C. 589, 406 S.E.2d 868 (1991); State ex rel. Thornburg v. Lot & Bldgs. at 800 Waughtown St., 107 N.C. App. 559, 421 S.E.2d 374 (1992).

Sec. 23. Rights of accused.

Legal Periodicals. —

For 1984 survey, "When Is a Confession Coerced and When Is It Voluntary," see 63 N.C.L. Rev. 1214 (1985).

CASE NOTES

I. General Consideration.
II. Right to Be Informed of Accusation.
III. Right of Confrontation.
  A. In General.
  B. Illustrative Cases.
IV. Right to Counsel.
  A. In General.
  B. When Right Applies.
V. Self-incrimination.
  A. In General.
  B. Confessions.

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

When a motion to continue is based on a constitutional right, the trial court's ruling becomes a question of law and, upon appeal, it is subject to review by examination of the particular circumstances as presented by the record, and the denial of a motion to continue, regardless of its nature, is grounds for a new trial only upon a showing by defendant that the denial was erroneous and that his case was prejudiced as a result of the error. If the error amounts to a constitutional violation, as is here contended, there is prejudice requiring a new trial unless the State satisfies this court that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Gardner, 322 N.C. 591, 369 S.E.2d 593 (1988).

Error in conducting an informal meeting in chambers to discuss jury instructions, outside the presence of defendant, prior to the formal charge conference held in open court, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Brogden, 329 N.C. 534, 407 S.E.2d 158 (1991).

Bench Conferences. — Where the trial court reconstructed the substance of the bench conferences with the prospective jurors for the record and, before ruling, gave the defendant an opportunity to be heard, these exchanges at the bench which constituted reversible error did not deprive the defendant of his constitutional right to be present at every state of the proceeding. State v. Ali, 329 N.C. 394, 407 S.E.2d 183 (1991).

Although trial court held private, unrecorded, sidebar conferences with a number of jury pool members, because these conferences took place prior to the commencement of defendant's trial, no error, constitutional or otherwise, was committed. State v. Rannels, 333 N.C. 644, 430 S.E.2d 254 (1993).

Judge's Contacts with Jurors. — The transcript lent support to contention that the trial judge did in fact go to the grand jury room to instruct the prospective jurors that they were at break; however, there was no prejudicial error based on this contact. State v. Gay, 334 N.C. 467, 434 S.E.2d 840 (1993).

Denial of access to a witness to a breathalyzer test when the State's sole evidence of the offense of driving while impaired is the personal observations of the authorities would constitute a flagrant violation of defendant's constitutional right to obtain witnesses under this section as a matter of law and would require that the charges be dismissed. State v. Ferguson, 90 N.C. App. 513, 369 S.E.2d 378, cert. denied, 323 N.C. 367, 373 S.E.2d 551 (1988).

Rebuttal of Insanity Defense with Psychiatric Evidence. — A fair opportunity to rebut a defendant's insanity defense may include more than one psychiatric examination of the defendant. State v. Huff, 325 N.C. 1, 381 S.E.2d 635 (1989), vacated and remanded for further consideration at 497 U.S. 1021, 110 S. Ct. 3266, 111 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1990), in light of McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 110 S. Ct. 1227, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1990), death sentence vacated, remanded for new capital sentencing proceeding, State v. Huff, 328 N.C. 532, 402 S.E.2d 577 (1991).

When a defendant relies on the insanity defense and introduces expert testimony on his mental status, the prosecution may introduce expert testimony derived from prior court-ordered psychiatric examinations for the purpose of rebutting that testimony without implicating U.S. Const., Amend. V or this section of the Constitution of North Carolina. State v. Huff, 325 N.C. 1, 381 S.E.2d 635 (1989), vacated and remanded for further consideration at 497 U.S. 1021, 110 S. Ct. 3266, 111 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1990), in light of McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 110 S. Ct. 1227, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1990), death sentence vacated, remanded for new capital sentencing proceeding, State v. Huff, 328 N.C. 532, 402 S.E.2d 577 (1991).

Defendant's absence during the final two hours of jury deliberations, did not result in substantial and irreparable prejudice to her case and was harmless error with regard to denying her the constitutional right to be present at every stage of her trial. State v. Webster, 111 N.C. App. 72, 431 S.E.2d 808, cert. denied, 335 N.C. 180, 438 S.E.2d 206 (1993).

Defendant's right to be present at every stage of the trial was not violated. State v. May, 334 N.C. 609, 434 S.E.2d 180 (1993).

Consent to Statements Made by Attorney. — Where court was unable to discern from the record whether the defendant did in fact consent to the statements of his attorney during closing argument to the jury to the effect that defendant was guilty of involuntary manslaughter rather than second degree murder, the issue was remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the defendant allowed his attorney to make the argument. State v. Baynes, 114 N.C. App. 165, 442 S.E.2d 529 (1994).

Applied in State v. Colbert, 311 N.C. 283, 316 S.E.2d 79 (1984); State v. Matthews, 69 N.C. App. 526, 317 S.E.2d 62 (1984); State v. Hunt, 72 N.C. App. 59, 323 S.E.2d 490 (1984); State v. Richardson, 99 N.C. App. 496, 393 S.E.2d 333 (1990); State v. Eason, 328 N.C. 409, 402 S.E.2d 809 (1991); State v. Monroe, 330 N.C. 846, 412 S.E.2d 652 (1992); State v. Bromfield, 332 N.C. 24, 418 S.E.2d 491 (1992); State v. Crummy, 107 N.C. App. 305, 420 S.E.2d 448 (1992); State v. Cummings, 332 N.C. 487, 422 S.E.2d 692 (1992); State v. Harris, 111 N.C. App. 58, 431 S.E.2d 792 (1993).

Stated in State v. James, 111 N.C. App. 785, 433 S.E.2d 755 (1993).

Cited in State v. Abney, 79 N.C. App. 649, 339 S.E.2d 841 (1986); State v. Kuplen, 316 N.C. 387, 343 S.E.2d 793 (1986); State v. Johnson, 317 N.C. 343, 346 S.E.2d 596 (1986); State v. Worthington, 84 N.C. App. 150, 352 S.E.2d 695 (1987); State v. Kennedy, 320 N.C. 20, 357 S.E.2d 359 (1987); State v. Carson, 320 N.C. 328, 357 S.E.2d 662 (1987); State v. Kerley, 87 N.C. App. 240, 360 S.E.2d 464 (1987); State v. Jones, 322 N.C. 406, 368 S.E.2d 844 (1988); State v. Hope, 96 N.C. App. 498, 386 S.E.2d 224 (1989); State v. Seaberry, 97 N.C. App. 203, 388 S.E.2d 184 (1990); State v. Jones, 97 N.C. App. 189, 388 S.E.2d 213 (1990); State v. Camacho, 329 N.C. 589, 406 S.E.2d 868 (1991); State v. Cunningham, 108 N.C. App. 185, 423 S.E.2d 802 (1992); State v. Medlin, 333 N.C. 280, 426 S.E.2d 402 (1993); State v. Ainsworth, 109 N.C. App. 136, 426 S.E.2d 410 (1993); State v. Rogers, 109 N.C. App. 491, 428 S.E.2d 220 (1993); State v. Harris, 333 N.C. 544, 428 S.E.2d 823 (1993); State v. Minter, 111 N.C. App. 40, 432 S.E.2d 146 (1993); State v. Harrington, 335 N.C. 105, 436 S.E.2d 235 (1993); State v. Lee, 335 N.C. 244, 439 S.E.2d 547 (1994).

II. RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF ACCUSATION.

Form of Bill for Homicide. — This section and § 15A-924(a)(5) did not specifically repeal § 15-144, relating to essentials of a bill for homicide, nor did they repeal it by implication. State v. Avery, 315 N.C. 1, 337 S.E.2d 786 (1985), aff'd, 95 N.C. 572, 383 S.E.2d 224 (1989).

Short-form murder indictment which did not allege premeditation nor the elements of felony murder was held not defective. State v. Harris, 323 N.C. 112, 371 S.E.2d 689 (1988).

III. RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION.

A. In General.

Actual Presence Required. — The essential characteristic of defendant's constitutional right to presence is just that, his actual presence during trial. State v. Buchanan, 330 N.C. 202, 410 S.E.2d 832 (1991).

Under the N.C. State Constitution, defendant's actual presence is required throughout his trial, not just at particularly important junctures. State v. Buchanan, 330 N.C. 202, 410 S.E.2d 832 (1991).

Certain Violations of Right May Be Harmless. — Notwithstanding an accused's right to be present, at all stages of trial, certain violations of this right may be harmless if such appears from the record. State v. Buchanan, 330 N.C. 202, 410 S.E.2d 832 (1991).

Bench Conferences Not Violative of Right to Be Present. — A defendant's state constitutional right to be present at all stages of his capital trial is not violated when, with defendant present in the courtroom, the trial court conducts bench conferences, even though unrecorded, with counsel for both parties. State v. Buchanan, 330 N.C. 202, 410 S.E.2d 832 (1991).

If, however, the subject matter of the conference implicates the defendant's confrontation rights, or is such that the defendant's presence would have a reasonably substantial relation to this opportunity to defend, the defendant would have a constitutional right to be present. State v. Buchanan, 330 N.C. 202, 410 S.E.2d 832 (1991).

Defendant's absence during certain conferences and discussions in his capital trial did not prejudice defendant in any way and was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, where defendant's counsel was present, as was the court reporter, who recorded and transcribed the complete proceedings, the subjects of the conferences and discussions were either points of law, procedural matters, or administrative matters, none of which involved communication with the jury, and no witness gave testimony concerning defendant's guilt. State v. Robinson, 330 N.C. 1, 409 S.E.2d 288 (1991).

Right to Be Present at Every Stage. — This section is the sole source of the criminal defendant's nonwaivable state right to be present at every stage of his capital trial and of the corollary duty imposed on the trial court to insure his presence. State v. Huff, 325 N.C. 1, 381 S.E.2d 635 (1989), vacated and remanded for further consideration at 497 U.S. 1021, 110 S. Ct. 3266, 111 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1990), in light of McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 110 S. Ct. 1227, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1990), death sentence vacated, remanded for new capital sentencing proceeding, State v. Huff, 328 N.C. 532, 402 S.E.2d 577 (1991).

The confrontation clause of the Constitution of North Carolina guarantees the right of the defendant to be present at every stage of the trial. This state constitutional protection afforded to the defendant imposes on the trial court the affirmative duty to insure the defendant's presence at every stage of a capital trial. The defendant's right to be present at every stage of the trial ought to be kept forever sacred and inviolate. In fact, the defendant's right to be present at every stage of his capital trial is not waivable. State v. Moss, 332 N.C. 65, 418 S.E.2d 213 (1992).

Right Does Not Apply to Physical Evidence. — This section only pertains to witnesses, and does not create a constitutional right of confrontation to physical evidence. State v. Alston, 91 N.C. App. 707, 373 S.E.2d 306 (1988).

Absence During Part of Prosecution's Presentation. — Nothing in the record showed that defendant was prejudiced by his absence during part of the presentation of the prosecution's evidence in defendant's capital case where all proceedings took place in open court; everything that took place was reflected in the record, and the record showed that defense counsel were in court and participated throughout defendant's absence to protect his interest, the trial judge told counsel they could confer with defendant as to the possibility of his return at any time, and the trial judge undertook to perform his duty to assure defendant's presence. State v. Huff, 325 N.C. 1, 381 S.E.2d 635 (1989), vacated and remanded for further consideration at 497 U.S. 1021, 110 S. Ct. 3266, 111 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1990), in light of McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 110 S. Ct. 1227, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1990), death sentence vacated, remanded for new capital sentencing proceeding, State v. Huff, 328 N.C. 532, 402 S.E.2d 577 (1991).

Right Not Violated When Court Conducted Bench Conferences With Counsel for Both Parties. — A defendant's state constitutional right to be present at all stages of his capital trial was not violated when the trial court conducted bench conferences with counsel for both parties while the defendant was present in the courtroom. State v. Upchurch, 332 N.C. 439, 421 S.E.2d 577 (1992).

Right Violated by Court's Private Bench Conferences With Jurors. — The fact that the jury recommended and the trial court entered a sentence of life imprisonment did not change the capital nature of that trial or his status as a capital defendant in that trial. Therefore, the unwaiveable requirement of his presence applied at every stage of his trial and was violated by the trial court's private bench conferences with prospective jurors. State v. Johnston, 331 N.C. 680, 417 S.E.2d 228 (1992).

Jury selection is a stage of a capital trial at which the defendant must be present. The trial court erred by conducting bench conferences with prospective jurors out of the hearing of the defendant and his counsel. Therefore, the Supreme Court had to order a new trial. State v. Moss, 332 N.C. 65, 418 S.E.2d 213 (1992).

Exclusion of Defendant from In Camera Hearing with Juror. — Although it is clearly error for the trial court to communicate with a juror in chambers in the absence of defendant, counsel, or a court reporter, not every violation of a constitutional right is prejudicial. Where the record of an in camera hearing attended only by a juror, the trial judge, counsel, and a court reporter reflected the benign substance of the conversation, the juror's growing unease with her ability to impose the death penalty, and where after the hearing the juror was promptly and properly removed for cause, obviating the possibility that anything said to her privately by the trial court might infect the jury as a whole, this action was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Artis, 325

N.C. 278, 384 S.E.2d 470 (1989), sentence vacated and remanded for further consideration at 494 U.S. 1021, 110 S. Ct. 1466, 108 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1990), in light of McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 110 S. Ct. 1227, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1990).

It was error for the trial court to exclude the defendants, their counsel, and the court reporter from its private conversations with prospective jurors prior to excusing those jurors. State v. Johnston, 331 N.C. 680, 417 S.E.2d 228 (1992).

Judge's Ex Parte Communications with Jury Before Verdict Rendered. — Where, during the course of the trial, the presiding trial judge engaged in an ex parte communication with the jury, and prior to reconvening court, the judge entered the jury room where the jurors had gathered and was alone with the jurors, this conduct on the part of the presiding judge violated the defendant's rights under N.C. Const., Art. I, § 23 and this section, and U.S. Const., Amends. VI and XIV. State v. Callahan, 102 N.C. App. 344, 401 S.E.2d 793 (1991).

Assuming arguendo that judge's chance meeting in the corridor with jurors during a recess at which time judge and jurors discussed, inter alia, cameras in the courtroom and selection of a foreman, did constitute a "stage" of a capital proceeding, the error, if any, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where there existed in the record a reconstruction of the ex parte conversations. State v. Hudson, 331 N.C. 122, 415 S.E.2d 732 (1992), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 113 S. Ct. 983, 122 L. Ed. 2d 136, rehearing denied, — U.S. —, 113 S. Ct. 1404, 122 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1993).

Where the court found two prospective jurors were ineligible to serve due to their recent service as prospective jurors, and third prospective juror, who had arranged to be a pallbearer at a funeral, was deferred for a "manifestly unobjectionable" reason, the error of the judge in communicating ex parte with the prospective jurors was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Adams, 335 N.C. 401, 439 S.E.2d 760 (1994).

Ex parte "communication" between judge and jury, wherein the trial judge routinely inquired about any problems individual jurors might have that he needed to know about, did not violate defendant's state and federal constitutional rights to be present during the proceedings against him, where the trial judge's statement indicated that no such problems were either expressed by the jurors or discussed with them by the trial judge. State v. Laws, 325 N.C. 81, 381 S.E.2d 609 (1989), sentence vacated and remanded for further consideration at 494 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 1465, 108 L. Ed. 2d 603 (1990), in light of McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 110 S. Ct. 1227, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1990), death sentence aff'd, State v. Laws, 328 N.C. 550, 402 S.E.2d 573 (1991), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 112 S. Ct. 216, 116 L. Ed. 2d 174, reh'g denied, — U.S. —, 112 S. Ct. 627, 116 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1991).

Private Discussion Between Judge and Jurors Who Had Been Dismissed. — Defendant's State and federal constitutional rights to be present at all stages of his trial were not violated when the trial court talked privately with jurors, since the transcript showed that the trial judge sent all those who still were prospective jurors home and indicated that he was going to talk only to those whom he had dismissed from jury service. State v. Laws, 325 N.C. 81, 381 S.E.2d 609 (1989), sentence vacated and remanded for further consideration at 494 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 1465, 108 L. Ed. 2d 603 (1990), in light of McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 110 St. Ct. 1227, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1990), death sentence aff'd, State v. Laws, 328 N.C. 550, 402 S.E.2d 573 (1991), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 112 S. Ct. 216, 116 L. Ed. 2d 174, reh'g denied, — U.S. —, 112 S. Ct. 627, 116 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1991).

To convict the defendant under the theory of aiding and abetting, the state has the burden of proving, among other things, that the crimes alleged have in fact been committed. Although it is not required that the principal be convicted, the guilt of the principal must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. This burden cannot be carried by testimony concerning judgments rendered in other trials to which the defendant was not a party and not able to cross-examine witnesses. The admission of such evidence violates defendant's right to confrontation under the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of North Carolina. State v. Brown, 319 N.C. 361, 354 S.E.2d 225 (1987), overruling State v. Duncan, 28

N.C. 98 (1846) and State v. Chittem, 13 N.C. 49 (1830).

Where Child Is Victim. — When considering admission of a child victim's statement to a social worker when the child is found to be incompetent as a witness, the confrontation clause and § 8C-1, Rule 803(24) require a case-by-case examination of the facts. State v. Deanes, 323 N.C. 508, 374 S.E.2d 249 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1101, 109 S. Ct. 2455, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1009 (1989).

Statements falling within an exception to the general prohibition against hearsay may be admitted into evidence without violating a defendant's right to confrontation, if the evidence is reliable. State v. Stager, 329 N.C. 278, 406 S.E.2d 876 (1991).

Use of Hearsay in Criminal Trial. — A prosecutor is prohibited by U.S. Const., Amend. VI and this section from introducing any hearsay evidence in a criminal trial unless two requirements are met. The prosecution must show both the necessity for using the hearsay testimony and the inherent trustworthiness of the original declaration. State v. Gregory, 78 N.C. App. 565, 338 S.E.2d 110 (1985), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 316 N.C. 382, 342 S.E.2d 901 (1986).

Rights of Person Accused of Offense, etc. —

Magistrate correctly imposed pretrial release restriction requiring a sober responsible adult to take custody of the defendant pursuant to § 15A-534.2; there was no constitutional violation of defendant's constitutional right to obtain evidence on his own behalf. State v. Bumgarner, 97 N.C. App. 567, 389 S.E.2d 425, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 326 N.C. 599, 393 S.E.2d 873 (1990).

Proper standard for reversal in reviewing violations under this section of defendant's right to be present at all stages of his capital trial is the rigorous standard prescribed for review of violations of defendant's right to be present at trial under the federal Constitution. State v. Huff, 325 N.C. 1, 381 S.E.2d 635 (1989), vacated and remanded for further consideration at 497 U.S. 1021, 110 S. Ct. 3266, 111 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1990), in light of McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 110 S. Ct. 1227, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1990), death sentence vacated, remanded for new capital sentencing proceeding, State v. Huff, 328 N.C. 532, 402 S.E.2d 577 (1991).

The proper standard for reversal in reviewing violations of defendant's state constitutional right to be present at his capital trial is the "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, and not the standard apparently prescribed in § 15A-1443(a). State v. Huff, 325 N.C. 1, 381 S.E.2d 635 (1989), vacated and remanded for further consideration at 497 U.S. 1021, 110 S. Ct. 3266, 111 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1990), in light of McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 110 S. Ct. 1227, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1990), death sentence vacated, remanded for new capital sentencing proceeding, State v. Huff, 328 N.C. 532, 402 S.E.2d 577 (1991).

Waiver of Rights. — For a case in which a defendant was held to have waived his rights under this section through his insufficiently explained absence from trial, see State v. Richardson, 330 N.C. 174, 410 S.E.2d 61 (1991).

B. Illustrative Cases.

The taking of depositions in another state in the absence of the defendant was assumed by the court to be a "stage" of his capital trial. However, it was clear that all of the testimony of the witnesses during the taking of those depositions tended to support mitigating circumstances. The admission of those depositions into evidence during the capital sentencing proceeding, therefore, could not possibly have harmed the defendant. Accordingly, the State bore its burden of showing that any error as a result was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. McCollum, 334 N.C. 208, 433 S.E.2d 144 (1993).

Voir Dire. — The questioning of jurors in defendant's absence erroneously deprived defendant of his right to be present at his trial, but the error was harmless where the court was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's absence during the preliminary questioning of prospective jurors did not result in the rejection of any juror whom defendant was entitled to have on the panel or the seating of any juror whom defendant was entitled to reject either for cause or peremptorily. State v. Payne, 328 N.C. 377, 402 S.E.2d 582 (1991).

This section gives a criminal defendant the right to be present at every stage of her trial. State v. Callahan, 102 N.C. App. 344, 401 S.E.2d 793 (1991).

Trial court's action in excusing prospective jurors as a result of its private unrecorded bench confer-

ences with them violated defendant's state constitutional right to be present at every stage of the trial and violated statutory requirements to make a true, complete and accurate record of the jury selection in a capital trial pursuant to § 15A-1241(a). State v. Smith, 326 N.C. 792, 392 S.E.2d 362 (1990).

Absence of Material Witness. — Trial court did not violate this section by denying a capital murder defendant's motions for a recess or continuance and for a mistrial after an eyewitness could not be located; defendant had the benefit of witness' tape-recorded statements to both the Sheriff's Department and his own counsel, and the evidence indicated the witness had gone into hiding for a long period under circumstances indicating no likelihood of locating him within a reasonable period of time. State v. Roper, 328 N.C. 337, 402 S.E.2d 600, cert. denied, — U.S. —, 112 S. Ct. 280, 116 L. Ed. 2d 232 (1991).

Use of Closed-Circuit Television in Courtroom Held Adequate to Allow Defendant to Cross-Examine Child Victim. — Where, in prosecution for taking indecent liberties with a four-year-old child, during voir dire hearing as to victim's competency as a witness, defendant, although absent from the courtroom, was able to hear all testimony, interact freely with his attorney, and through his attorney confront the victim, thereby accomplishing effective cross-examination, the exclusion of defendant did not violate N.C. Const., Art. I, §§ 18, 19 or 23, as the trial court's use of a closed-circuit television and its act of providing defendant and his attorney adequate opportunity to communicate during the victim's testimony were sufficient to permit defendant to hear the evidence and to refute it. State v. Jones, 89 N.C. App. 584, 367 S.E.2d 139 (1988).

State Fulfilled Confrontation Clause Requirement by Showing Good Faith Attempt. — Where a four-year-old child was unable to answer question put to her regarding sexual abuse due to fear, the judge's declaration that the child "is simply going to be unable to testify," amounted to an implicit declaration of unavailability; the State fulfilled the constitutional requirement of the confrontation clause by showing a good-faith attempt to secure the witness for trial since the State produced the witness and attempted to elicit her testimony. State v. Chandler, 324 N.C. 172, 376 S.E.2d 728 (1989).

Violation of Confrontation Clause Was Not Shown. — Where defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine both witnesses in his murder trial the confrontation clause was not violated as to the victim's grandmother's testimony concerning what she told the defendant and as to the letter written from the victim to the defendant, authenticated by two witnesses. State v. Quick, 323 N.C. 675, 375 S.E.2d 156 (1989).

Unavailable Witness. — Where the record demonstrated the necessity for using hearsay declarations (in this case, unavailability of the witness), and the inherent trustworthiness of the declarations, defendant's confrontation rights were not violated. State v. Deanes, 323 N.C. 508, 374 S.E.2d 249 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1101, 109 S. Ct. 2455, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1009 (1989).

IV. RIGHT TO COUNSEL.

A. In General.

Right to Counsel Guaranteed. — An accused's right to counsel in a criminal prosecution is guaranteed by the U.S. Const., Amend. VI and is applicable to the states through U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, N.C. Const., Art. I, § 19 and this section. State v. Shores, 102 N.C. App. 473, 402 S.E.2d 162 (1991).

A defendant has the constitutional right to be represented by counsel whom he has selected and employed. State v. Gibson, 229 N.C. 497, 50 S.E.2d 520 (1948); State v. Morris, 275 N.C. 50, 165 S.E.2d 245 (1969).

Amount of Preparation Time. — The circumstances surrounding the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to continue did not demonstrate that it was unlikely that the defendant could have received effective assistance of counsel. The defendant failed to offer evidence tending to establish a violation of his constitutional right to a reasonable time to investigate, prepare and present his defense for murder charge and did not show that he had inadequate time to confer with counsel or that counsel had inadequate time to prepare for trial. State v. Tunstall, 334 N.C. 320, 432 S.E.2d 331 (1993).

Test of effective assistance of counsel, etc. — In accord with original. See State v. Scober, 74 N.C. App. 469, 328 S.E.2d 590 (1985).

The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial could not be relied on as having produced a just result. State v. Dockery, 78 N.C. App. 190, 336 S.E.2d 719 (1985).

Breach of Attorneys' Duty Does Not Automatically Require Reversal. — The duties of an attorney representing a criminal defendant include the duty of loyalty, a duty to advocate defendant's cause, and the duty to consult with defendant, investigate defendant's case and keep defendant informed. However, a breach of one of these duties does not automatically require reversal of defendant's conviction. Defendant must also demonstrate that the professionally unreasonable conduct of his counsel resulted in prejudice to defendant. State v. Dockery, 78 N.C. App. 190, 336 S.E.2d 719 (1985).

For case upholding finding of fact that defendant's counsel was not ineffective but that if he was, defendant did not show any prejudice, see State v. Swann, 322 N.C. 666, 370 S.E.2d 533 (1988).

Denial of Continuance to Prepare Closing Argument. — Defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel was not denied when the trial court refused to continue the trial to give the defendant's counsel the weekend to prepare a closing argument for the guilt-innocence determination phase of the trial; defense counsel's closing argument met an objective standard of reasonableness and was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in capital cases. State v. Laws, 325 N.C. 81, 381 S.E.2d 609 (1989), sentence vacated and remanded for further consideration at 494 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 1465, 108 L. Ed. 2d 603 (1990), in light of McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 110 S. Ct. 1227, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1990), death sentence aff'd, State v. Laws, 328 N.C. 550, 402 S.E.2d 573 (1991), reh'g denied, — U.S. —, 112 S. Ct. 627, 116 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1991).

Admission of Testimony of Second Psychiatric Examination. — Defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel was not violated by admission of second treatment team's testimony as to information obtained during second court-ordered psychiatric examination, even though that admission was for the purpose of determining his capacity to proceed, as opposed to his sanity at the time of the crime; defendant had the opportunity to discuss with his lawyer whether or not to submit to the second court-ordered examination and to discuss its scope as well, and the absence of express language in the second order specifying defendant's examination to determine his mental state at the time of the offenses was not significant. State v. Huff, 325 N.C. 1, 381 S.E.2d 635 (1989), vacated and remanded for further consideration at 497 U.S. 1021, 110 S. Ct. 3266, 111 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1990), in light of McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 110 S. Ct. 1227, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1990), death sentence vacated, remanded for new capital sentencing proceeding, State v. Laws, 328 N.C. 550, 402 S.E.2d 573 (1991), reh'g denied, — U.S. —, 112 S. Ct. 627, 116 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1991).

Burden on Defendant to Show Supportable Defense. — In bringing an ineffective assistance claim based on the failure to adequately present a defense, the central question is whether a supportable defense could have been developed. The burden of showing the probability that this defense existed is on the defendant. State v. Dockery, 78 N.C. App. 190, 336 S.E.2d 719 (1985).

Ineffective Representation Shown. — The counsel's substandard performance was prejudicial to the rape defendant, where the defense's failure to produce any evidence to support the theories proffered at the outset of the trial, including consent of the victim and inability of the defendant to perform the alleged acts, formed the basis of one of the principal closing arguments made by the State in favor of conviction. State v. Moorman, 320 N.C. 387, 358 S.E.2d 502 (1987).

Ineffective Representation Not Shown. —

In accord with the first paragraph in the main volume. See State v. Attmore, 92 N.C. App. 385, 374 S.E.2d 649 (1988), cert. denied, 324 N.C. 248, 377 S.E.2d 757 (1989).

But Defendant Need Not Know the Source of the Right Before Waiving It. — The court disagreed with contention by the defendant that in order to waive his right to counsel a defendant must have explained to him his right to counsel under U.S. Const., Amend. VI and under this section. If a defendant is told he has a right to counsel, as the defendant was, he does not have to know the precise source of the right before waiving it. State v. Palmer, 334 N.C. 104, 431 S.E.2d 172 (1993).

B. When Right Applies.

Jury Instructions. — The trial court committed reversible error by administering admonitions to the jurors out of open court and in the absence of the defendant, counsel, or a court reporter. State v. Payne, 320 N.C. 138, 357 S.E.2d 612 (1987); State v. Boyd, 332 N.C. 101, 418 S.E.2d 471 (1992).

V. SELF-INCRIMINATION.

A. In General.

Privilege Protects Against Only Real Dangers. —

In accord with main volume. See Shaw v. Williamson, 75 N.C. App. 604, 331 S.E.2d 203, cert. denied, 314 N.C. 669, 335 S.E.2d 496 (1985).

Civil Actions Involving Arrest, Imprisonment or Execution Against the Person. — The constitutional protection against self-incrimination extends to civil actions that subject one to arrest, imprisonment or execution against the person. Shaw v. Williamson, 75 N.C. App. 604, 331 S.E.2d 203, cert. denied, 314 N.C. 669, 335 S.E.2d 496 (1985).

Refusal to Answer Interrogatories in Civil Action for Punitive Damages. —

In a wrongful death action, defendant faced no peril of being subject to execution against the person for not satisfying a judgment for punitive damages, as there was no allegation in the complaint that would support the required statutory findings for execution against the person. Therefore, there was no basis for defendant declining to answer interrogatories on the grounds of self-incrimination. Shaw v. Williamson, 75 N.C. App. 604, 331 S.E.2d 203, cert. denied, 314 N.C. 669, 335 S.E.2d 496 (1985).

In a wrongful death action, defendant could not have incriminated himself criminally by answering certain interrogatories, because, based on the same incident referred to in the complaint, he was charged with death by vehicle and driving while intoxicated, pled guilty, and complied with the judgments entered on the convictions. Shaw v. Williamson, 75 N.C. App. 604, 331 S.E.2d 203, cert. denied, 314 N.C. 669, 335 S.E.2d 496 (1985).

Necessity of Advising Defendant of Rights Where Significantly Deprived of Freedom. — When an officer told defendant that he would get a warrant for him and would leave an officer at defendant's home until the warrant could be procured, defendant was deprived of his freedom in a significant way; it was therefore necessary to advise him of his rights before his answer to the question as to how long he had been at his home could be introduced into evidence. State v. Hoyle, 325 N.C. 232, 382 S.E.2d 752 (1989).

Adverse comments on defendant's failure to testify are impermissible. Defendant was entitled to a new trial because the trial court erroneously overruled his objection to the prosecution's closing comments about defendant's decision not to testify in trial for felonious breaking or entering. The error was prejudicial and required a new trial. State v. Reid, 334 N.C. 551, 434 S.E.2d 193 (1993).

But, trial court did not err in allowing police officer's comments on murder defendant's decision to exercise her constitutional right to remain silent upon her arrest; the comments were elicited by the defense counsel and defense counsel repeatedly asked officer to explain his answers and did not object to, or move to strike the comments. State v. Jennings, 333 N.C. 579, 430 S.E.2d 188 (1993), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 114 S. Ct. 644, 126 L. Ed. 2d 602 (1994).

Right to Remain Silent Not Violated. — Where the State did not ask detective whether defendant exercised his right to remain silent, he only testified that defendant was read his rights and indicated he understood those rights and no specific inquiry or argument was made about defendant's silence, defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent therefore was not used against him and his constitutional rights were not violated. State v. Carter, 335 N.C. 422, 440 S.E.2d 268 (1994).

Comment on Prior Silence After Defendant Takes Stand. — With or without a *Miranda* warning, a defendant's right to remain silent is guaranteed by U.S. Const., Amend. V, as well as by this section. Any comment upon the exercise of this right, nothing else appearing, is impermissible. However, when a defendant chooses to testify in his own behalf, his U.S. Const., Amend. V right to remain silent must give way to the State's right to seek to determine, by way of impeachment, whether his prior silence is inconsistent with his trial testimony. The test is whether, under the circumstances at the time of arrest, it would have been natural for defendant to have asserted the same defense asserted at trial. State v. McGinnis, 70 N.C. App. 421, 320 S.E.2d 297 (1984).

Argument on Failure to Tell Police of Defense. — District attorney's question and argument to the jury as to defendant's failure to tell the police of his defense were prejudicial errors; since there was no eyewitness to the shooting other than defendant, and since his defense depended on the jury's acceptance of his version of the event, the State failed to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that it was harmless to attack the credibility of his version by improper evidence, which improper evidence was reinforced by jury argument. State v. Hoyle, 325 N.C. 232, 382 S.E.2d 752 (1989).

Chemical analyses of blood or breath are not within the protection of U.S. Const., Amends. V and XIV, or this section, as such chemical analyses are not evidence which is testimonial or communicative in nature. State v. White, 84 N.C. App. 111, 351 S.E.2d 828, cert. denied, 319 N.C. 227, 353 S.E.2d 404, appeal dismissed, 319 N.C. 409, 354 S.E.2d 887 (1987).

Defendant who, prior to his own indictment, gave testimony at codefendant's continuance hearing, placing himself in the company of the prosecuting witness on the evening in question, was not denied his privilege against self-incrimination, even though he was not represented by counsel or informed of his right against compulsory self-incrimination, despite the fact that codefendant's attorney, who had sought his testimony, was acting with the full complicity of the State, as defendant was not compelled to speak to his detriment. State v. Flowers, 318 N.C. 208, 347 S.E.2d 773 (1986).

Pre-arrest warrantless recording of defendant's incriminating statements through witness did not violate defendant's right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure under N.C. Const., Art. I, § 20, inasmuch as defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy regarding a conversation he voluntarily maintained with a confederate; the recording did not violate defendant's right under this section to be free from compulsory self-incrimination because his participation in the conversation was wholly voluntary, albeit ill-advised, and did not violate defendant's right under this section to counsel because the conversation in question occurred during the initial investigation of defendant prior to his arrest. State v. Levan, 326 N.C. 155, 388 S.E.2d 429 (1990).

B. Confessions.

Exclusion of Second Confession after Improper First Confession. — Neither section 19 nor this section of N.C. Const., art. I required the suppression of a defendant's second confession, made after proper warnings and the defendant's voluntary waiver of his constitutional rights, when that confession followed an earlier confession which had to be excluded under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). State v. Hicks, 333 N.C. 467, 428 S.E.2d 167 (1993).

Question of voluntariness must be determined by the total circumstances, etc. —

In accord with first paragraph in the main volume. See State v. Leak, 90 N.C. App. 351, 368 S.E.2d 430 (1988).

In determining whether a defendant's statement was in fact voluntarily and understandingly made, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances of the case and may not rely upon any one circumstance standing alone and in isolation. State v. Richardson, 70 N.C. App. 509, 320 S.E.2d 900 (1985), rev'd on other grounds, 316 N.C. 594, 342 S.E.2d 823 (1986).

Mental Condition as a Factor. — Though defendant's mental condition is a factor to be considered, that factor standing alone will not render an otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible. State v. Leak, 90 N.C. App. 351, 368 S.E.2d 430 (1988).

Where defendant contended that the four and one-half hour delay in taking him before a judicial official after service of warrants was a coercive factor which rendered his confession involuntary, but he did not show any causal connection between the confession and the delay, no constitutional provision required exclusion of his statement on this ground. State v. Leak, 90 N.C. App. 351, 368 S.E.2d 430 (1988).

Intoxication Held Not to Preclude Conclusion of Voluntariness. — Where officers did not begin questioning defendant until some two hours after a blood alcohol test, and one officer explicitly testified that defendant appeared sober during the interview and spoke rationally and coherently, and the trial court specifically found that defendant was not under the influence of alcohol during the interview, the fact that defendant may have experienced some lingering, mild intoxication at the time of the confession did not preclude the conclusion that he confessed voluntarily. State v. McKoy, 323 N.C. 1, 372 S.E.2d 12 (1988), death sentence vacated and remanded on other grounds, 494 U.S. —, 110 S. Ct. 1227, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1990).

Effect of Trial Court's Findings, etc. —

In accord with first paragraph in the main volume. See State v. Leak, 90 N.C. App. 351, 368 S.E.2d 430 (1988).

Sec. 24. Right of jury trial in criminal cases.

CASE NOTES

I. In General.
II. Unanimous Verdict of Twelve.
III. Selection of Jurors.

I. IN GENERAL.

The defendant has an absolute constitutional right to plead not guilty and be tried by a jury. He should not and could not be punished for exercising that right. State v. Langford, 319 N.C. 340, 354 S.E.2d 523 (1987).

Trial as to Each Essential Element. —

It is fundamental that one charged with a crime in this state is entitled, as a matter of right, under both the federal and State Constitutions, to a jury trial as to every essential element of the crime charged. However, the punishment imposed is generally not an element of the crime. State v. Field, 75 N.C. App. 647, 331 S.E.2d 221, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 315 N.C. 186, 337 S.E.2d 582 (1985).

The right to be tried by one's peers of the vicinage is subject to the ability to secure a fair trial; both defendant and the State are entitled to a fair trial, and a fair trial requires an impartial jury; where it appeared necessary to judge to remove the case to some neighboring county in order to secure a fair trial, such removal to a neighboring county did not violate the constitutional prohibition. State v. Chandler, 324 N.C. 172, 376 S.E.2d 728 (1989).

"Open Court" Not Applicable to Civil Proceedings. — This section is directed to an "open court" proceeding during a criminal conviction only, and it is not applicable to civil proceedings. WSOC Television, Inc. v. State ex rel. Att'y Gen., 107 N.C. App. 448, 420 S.E.2d 682, cert. denied, 333 N.C. 168, 424 S.E.2d 905 (1992).

A criminal defendant may not be punished at sentencing for exercising his constitutional right to trial by jury. State v. Cannon, 326 N.C. 37, 387 S.E.2d 450 (1990).

Where it can reasonably be inferred from the language of the trial judge that the sentence was imposed at least in part because defendant did not agree to a plea offer by the State and insisted on a trial by jury, defendant's constitutional right to trial by jury has been abridged, and a new sentencing hearing must result. State v. Cannon, 326 N.C. 37, 387 S.E.2d 450 (1990).

Defendant's Sentence Need Not Be Based on Unanimous Recommendation. — Neither Art. I, § 24, nor any other provision of the North Carolina Constitution requires that a defendant's sentence be based upon a unanimous recommendation of a jury. State v. Baldwin, 330 N.C. 446, 412 S.E.2d 31 (1992).

Jury Request to Review Testimony. — Both this section and § 15A-1233 require the trial court to summon all jurors into the courtroom before hearing and addressing a jury request to review testimony, and to exercise its discretion in denying or granting the request. Failure of the trial court to comply with these mandates entitles defendant to press these points on appeal, notwithstanding his failure to object at trial. State v. Ashe, 314 N.C. 28, 331 S.E.2d 652 (1985).

The trial judge's response to the jury's request to review certain testimony by sending a message to the jury through the bailiff, rather than by addressing the jury as a whole in open court, though erroneous, was not prejudicial to defendant. State v. McLaughlin, 320 N.C. 564, 359 S.E.2d 768 (1987).

Judge's Communication with Jury Via Written Notes. — Judge's communication with jury in the jury room via written notes violated the requirements of § 15A-1233(a); however, where the judge communicated with all jurors, his notes having been delivered to the jury as a whole, there was no violation of the North Carolina Constitution, and defendant failed to show other prejudice. State v. Colvin, 92 N.C. App. 152, 374 S.E.2d 126 (1988), cert. denied, 324 N.C. 249, 377 S.E.2d 758 (1989).

Conversation Between Court and Juror. — Where the record established that the substance of a conversation between a juror and the court related to the juror's having "overheard something about the case," where the court excused the juror, and to insure that "no one should be suspicious" about his ability to be fair and impartial, this juror was removed from the case prior to deliberations, and where no other juror indicated that he or she had overheard anything about the case, the conversation between the court and the juror could not have influenced the verdict. State v. Harrington, 335 N.C. 105, 436 S.E.2d 235 (1993).

Inquiry by Trial Judge as to Jury's Numerical Split. —

In accord with third paragraph in the main volume. See State v. Fowler, 312 N.C. 304, 322 S.E.2d 389 (1984).

Inquiries into the division of the jury are not a per se violation of this section when the trial court makes it clear that it does not desire to know whether the majority is for conviction or acquittal. Such inquiries are not inherently coercive, and without more do not violate the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the North Carolina Constitution. The appropriate standard is whether in the totality of the circumstances the inquiry is coercive. State v. Fowler, 312 N.C. 304, 322 S.E.2d 389 (1984).

Trial judge's questions about the numerical division of a jury do not constitute a per se violation of this section. Rather, the proper analysis is whether, in considering the totality of the circumstances, the inquiry was coercive. State v. Bussey, 321 N.C. 92, 361 S.E.2d 564 (1987).

Judge's Warning to Restrict Public Egress Was Proper. — Where trial judge informed those in the courtroom that he was concerned that the jury would be distracted by the movement of spectators in and out of the room and where he consequently warned them that if they wished to leave the courtroom, they should do so immediately, for they would not be allowed to do so after closing arguments began, barring an emergency, the order was not a denial of a public trial in violation of this section since judge did not vacate the courtroom nor bar the courtroom door without due warning to those within and without, and since the judge was authorized under § 15A-1034(a) to impose reasonable limitations on access to the courtroom. State v. Clark, 324 N.C. 146, 377 S.E.2d 54 (1989).

The bifurcated procedure that the legislature has established for impaired driving cases, with the jury determining whether § 20-138.1 has been violated and the judge determining the length of punishment required under § 20-179, is constitutional. State v. Field, 75 N.C. App. 647, 331 S.E.2d 221, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 315 N.C. 186, 337 S.E.2d 582 (1985).

Because the factors before the trial judge in determining sentencing are not elements of the offense, their consideration for purposes of sentencing is a function of the judge and is not susceptible to constitutional challenge based upon either the right to a jury trial under U.S. Const., Amend. VI or this section. State v. Denning, 316 N.C. 523, 342 S.E.2d 855 (1986), involving sentencing under § 20-179 for impaired driving.

Increase in Punishment Based on Aggravating Factor. — Trial judge's increasing of defendant's punishment under the Safe Roads Act of 1983 after a finding of a grossly aggravating factor, namely, that defendant had a prior conviction for a similar offense within seven years, did not in any way deprive defendant of his right to jury trial. State v. Denning, 76 N.C. App. 156, 332 S.E.2d 203 (1985), modified and aff'd, 316 N.C. 523, 342 S.E.2d 855 (1986).

Determination of Appropriate Sentence. — North Carolina courts have long adhered to the principle forbidding a trial court from improperly considering the defendant's exercise of her rights under this provision of the Constitution as an influential factor in determining the appropriate sentence. State v. Pavone, 104 N.C. App. 442, 410 S.E.2d 1 (1991).

Applied in State v. McEntire, 71 N.C.

App. 720, 323 S.E.2d 439 (1984); State v. Britt, 93 N.C. App. 126, 377 S.E.2d 79 (1989); State v. Patterson, 332 N.C. 409, 420 S.E.2d 98 (1992); State v. Honaker, 111 N.C. App. 216, 431 S.E.2d 869 (1993).

Cited in State v. Avery, 315 N.C. 1, 337 S.E.2d 786 (1985); State v. Gilliam, 317 N.C. 293, 344 S.E.2d 783 (1986); State v. Belton, 318 N.C. 141, 347 S.E.2d 755 (1986); State v. Davis, 86 N.C. App. 25, 356 S.E.2d 607 (1987); State v. Kennedy, 320 N.C. 20, 357 S.E.2d 359 (1987); State v. Mitchell, 321 N.C. 650, 365 S.E.2d 554 (1988); State v. Godwin, 95 N.C. App. 565, 383 S.E.2d 234 (1989); State v. Hope, 96 N.C. App. 498, 386 S.E.2d 224 (1989); Ragan v. County of Alamance, 98 N.C. App. 636, 391 S.E.2d 825 (1990); State v. Thomas, 329 N.C. 423, 407 S.E.2d 141 (1991); In re Alamance County Ct. Facilities, 329 N.C. 84, 405 S.E.2d 125 (1991); State v. Robinson, 330 N.C. 1, 409 S.E.2d 288 (1991); State v. Lyons, 330 N.C. 298, 412 S.E.2d 308 (1991); State v. Ainsworth, 109 N.C. App. 136, 426 S.E.2d 410 (1993); State v. Harris, 333 N.C. 544, 428 S.E.2d 823 (1993); State v. Baynes, 114 N.C. App. 165, 442 S.E.2d 529 (1994).

II. UNANIMOUS VERDICT OF TWELVE.

Verdict Unaffected by Subsequent Change of Mind. — If the jury is unanimous at the time the verdict is returned, the fact that some of them change their minds at any time thereafter is of no consequence; the verdict rendered remains valid and must be upheld. State v. Black, 328 N.C. 191, 400 S.E.2d 398 (1991).

Submission of an issue to the jury in the disjunctive is reversible error if it renders the issue ambiguous and thereby prevents the jury from reaching a unanimous verdict. State v. Diaz, 317 N.C. 545, 346 S.E.2d 488 (1986).

A verdict of guilty following submission in the disjunctive of two or more possible crimes to the jury in a single issue is ambiguous and therefore fatally defective. State v. Diaz, 317 N.C. 545, 346 S.E.2d 488 (1986).

By instructing the jury that it could find defendant guilty of trafficking in marijuana if it found that defendant knowingly possessed or knowingly transported 10,000 pounds or more of marijuana, the trial judge submitted two possible crimes to the jury, as the jury could find defendant guilty if it found that he committed either or both of the crimes submitted to it. Thus, the jury's verdict of guilty was fatally defective because it was ambiguous, depriving defendant of his constitutional right to be convicted by a unanimous jury. State v. Diaz, 317 N.C. 545, 346 S.E.2d 488 (1986).

The trial court committed reversible error in instructing the jury that it could convict the defendant of first degree sex offense if it found that he forced the victim to perform either fellatio or anal intercourse, as defendant had a constitutional right to be convicted by the unanimous verdict of a jury in open court, and under this instruction there was no way to tell whether the defendant was convicted of second degree sexual offense because the jury unanimously agreed that the defendant engaged in fellatio, anal intercourse, both fellatio and anal intercourse, or whether some members of the jury found that he engaged in fellatio but not anal intercourse, and some found that he engaged in anal intercourse but not fellatio. State v. Callahan, 86 N.C. App. 88, 356 S.E.2d 403 (1987), aff'd, 93 N.C. App. 579, 378 S.E.2d 812 (1989).

Instructions in a disjunctive form on the charge of maliciously assaulting in a secret manner were fatally ambiguous, thereby resulting in an uncertain verdict in violation of defendant's right to a unanimous verdict. State v. Lyons, 330 N.C. 298, 410 S.E.2d 906 (1991).

Trial judge correctly instructed jury that it could find immoral, improper, or indecent liberties with a child upon a finding that defendant either improperly touched his son or induced his son to touch him; the instruction did not permit conviction by less than a unanimous verdict. State v. Hartness, 326 N.C. 561, 391 S.E.2d 177 (1990).

Right to Poll Jury. —

The right to a poll of the jury in criminal actions is firmly established by this section and by statute. State v. Black, 328 N.C. 191, 400 S.E.2d 398 (1991).

The predominant purpose of the poll, etc. —

The rationale behind requiring that any polling of the jury be before dispersal is to ensure that nothing extraneous to the jury's deliberations can cause any of the jurors to change their minds. State v. Black, 328 N.C. 191, 400 S.E.2d 398 (1991).

The purpose of polling the jury is to

ensure that the jurors unanimously agree with and consent to the verdict at the time it is rendered. State v. Black, 328 N.C. 191, 400 S.E.2d 398 (1991).

III. SELECTION OF JURORS.

Juror May Still Serve If Juror Can Lay Aside Opinion. — Notwithstanding a juror's opinion as to how a case should be decided, a juror may still serve if the court determines that the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court. State v. Mebane, 106 N.C. App. 516, 418 S.E.2d 245, cert. denied, 332 N.C. 670, 424 S.E.2d 414 (1992).

Petit juries must be drawn from a source fairly representative of the community; however, petit juries actually chosen need not mirror the community nor reflect the various distinctive groups in the population. State v. Davis, 325 N.C. 607, 386 S.E.2d 418 (1989).

Evidence of Racial Exclusion Held Insufficient. —

The defendant failed to make a prima facie case of racially motivated peremptory challenges, where the State was willing to accept 40% of the blacks tendered. State v. Abbott, 320 N.C. 475, 358 S.E.2d 365 (1987).

Defendant found guilty of murder and robbery failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the State's use of its peremptory challenges where the State's questions during voir dire focused on the prospective juror's feelings about capital punishment and the age of the juror, or his or her children, as compared with defendant's age; the venire persons were brought into the courtroom individually, so neither defendant nor the State knew how many black citizens were present in the venire or whether a black citizen would be examined next, and three of the first four jurors seated were black, as were both defendant and the victim, thus diminishing the likelihood that racial issues were inextricably bound up with the conduct of the trial. State v. Davis, 325 N.C. 607, 386 S.E.2d 418 (1989).

A small sample of 40 jurors from the master list of jurors of a county alone was insufficient to establish a systematic exclusion of blacks from the jury pool. State v. McNeill, 326 N.C. 712, 392 S.E.2d 78 (1990).

Challenge of Jurors for Opposition to Death Penalty. —

Death qualification of jurors does not violate this Article. State v. Smith, 320 N.C. 404, 358 S.E.2d 329 (1987).

"Death qualifying" juries in capital cases violates neither the United States Constitution nor the North Carolina Constitution. State v. Strickland, 321 N.C. 31, 361 S.E.2d 882 (1987).

It was not error under N.C. Const., Art. I, § 19 or this section for the prosecution to use its peremptory challenges to excuse veniremen who had qualms about the death penalty but were not excludable pursuant to Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S. Ct. 1770, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776, rehearing denied, 393 U.S. 898, 89 S. Ct. 67, 61 L. Ed. 2d 186 (1968). State v. Allen, 323 N.C. 208, 372 S.E.2d 855 (1988), sentence vacated and remanded for further consideration at 494 U.S. 1021, 110 S. Ct. 1463, 108 L. Ed. 2d 601 (1990), in light of McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 110 S. Ct. 1227, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1990), rehearing denied, — U.S. —, 113 S. Ct. 1885, 123 L. Ed. 2d 503 (1993).

The presence on the jury of a judge who had earlier presided over the defendant's arraignment, granted the defendant time to file motions and initiate discovery, and set the case for trial, violated the defendant's right to trial by a jury of 12, a right which is inalienable in North Carolina, and denied him liberty without due process of law, and the fact that neither party challenged the judge's presence on the jury was irrelevant. Cox v. Turlington, 648 F. Supp. 1553 (E.D.N.C. 1986).

Sec. 25. Right of jury trial in civil cases.

CASE NOTES

I. In General.
II. Specific Proceedings.

I. IN GENERAL.

This Section Applicable to Actions Respecting Property Only. — Though this section contains no such qualifications, it has been construed to apply only to actions respecting property in which the right to a jury trial existed either at common law, or by statute before the 1868 Constitution became operative; for actions created since then, the right to a jury trial depends upon statutory authority. State ex rel. Rhodes v. Simpson, 91 N.C. App. 517, 372 S.E.2d 312 (1988), rev'd on other grounds, 325 N.C. 514, 385 S.E.2d 329 (1989).

Section Compared to N.C. Const., Art. IV, § 13. — There is not a conflict between this section and N.C. Const., Art. IV, § 13, but Art. IV, § 13 is more comprehensive. Faircloth v. Beard, 320 N.C. 505, 358 S.E.2d 512 (1987).

This section and N.C. Const., Art. IV, § 13 must be read in conjunction with one another. N.C. Const., Art. IV, § 13 merely establishes the form and procedure for the trial of all civil actions, including the procedure of having issues of fact decided by a jury in what were formerly equity proceedings; to determine whether there exists a constitutional right to trial by jury of a particular cause of action, one looks to this section, which ensures that there is a right to trial by jury where the underlying cause of action existed at the time of adoption of the 1868 Constitution, regardless of whether the action was formerly a proceeding in equity. Kiser v. Kiser, 325 N.C. 502, 385 S.E.2d 487 (1989).

For examination of historical development of the right to trial by jury, see Kiser v. Kiser, 325 N.C. 502, 385 S.E.2d 487 (1989).

But Only in Certain Cases. —

The right to trial by jury as provided for by this section applies only to cases in which the prerogative existed at common law or was procured by statute at the time the Constitution was adopted. The right does not apply to cases in which a right and remedy were thereafter created by statute. State v. Morris, 103 N.C. App. 246, 405 S.E.2d 351 (1991).

The relevant date for determining the scope of the constitutional right to jury trial, etc.

In accord with the main volume. See State v. Morris, 103 N.C. App. 246, 405 S.E.2d 351 (1991).

Compulsory Reference. —

Although when a court orders a compulsory reference, a party preserves his right to trial by complying with the procedural steps outlined in § 1A-1, Rule 53, the party is entitled to trial by jury only if the evidence before the reference was sufficient to raise an issue of fact. Fauchette v. Zimmerman, 79 N.C. App. 265, 338 S.E.2d 804 (1986).

Admission of hearsay evidence does not violate the confrontation clause when declarant is unavailable to testify and his statement bears adequate indicia of reliability. Thus, in a trial for taking indecent liberties with a four-year-old child, admission of evidence admissible under established exception to the hearsay rule did not violate defendant's right of confrontation under this section. State v. Jones, 89 N.C. App. 584, 367 S.E.2d 139 (1988).

Applied in Williams & Michael, P.A. v. Kennamer, 71 N.C. App. 215, 321 S.E.2d 514 (1984); Jackson v. Lundy Packing Co., 72 N.C. App. 337, 324 S.E.2d 290 (1985); Phillips v. Phillips, 73 N.C. App. 68, 326 S.E.2d 57 (1985); In re McCarroll, 313 N.C. 315, 327 S.E.2d 880 (1985).

Cited in Dowat, Inc. v. Tiffany Corp., 83 N.C. App. 207, 349 S.E.2d 610 (1986); Ragan v. County of Alamance, 98 N.C. App. 636, 391 S.E.2d 825 (1990); In re Alamance County Ct. Facilities, 329 N.C. 84, 405 S.E.2d 125 (1991).

II. SPECIFIC PROCEEDINGS.

Injunction Action Under CAMA and Dredge and Fill Act. — Trial court erred in granting defendant's demand for a jury trial in state-initiated proceeding seeking mandatory injunctive relief under Coastal Area Management Act (CAMA) and the Dredge and Fill Act for the removal of fill material on defendant's property; an action such as this neither existed at common law nor by statute at the time of the adoption of the Constitution of 1868; therefore, this section did not apply. State ex rel. Rhodes v. Simpson, 325 N.C. 514, 385 S.E.2d 329 (1989).

Actions under ERISA. — Preemptive effect of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., does not abridge the right to a jury trial under this section in an action to recover benefits due under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). Overcash v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 94 N.C. App. 602, 381 S.E.2d 330 (1989).

The right to a jury trial under the law

of this State does not conflict with any of the substantive provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act; therefore, State law would control and plaintiff was entitled to have factual controversy in his action for benefits due under an insurance contract submitted to a jury. Overcash v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 94 N.C. App. 602, 381 S.E.2d 330 (1989).

Equitable Distribution Action. — No right to bring an action for equitable distribution of marital property existed prior to the adoption of the equitable distribution statutes, §§ 50-20 and 50-21, and the language of the statutes themselves create no new right to trial by jury; therefore, there is no right to trial by jury for such an action under the Constitution of North Carolina. Kiser v. Kiser, 325 N.C. 502, 385 S.E.2d 487 (1989).

Appraisal. — Plaintiff's right under the North Carolina Constitution to trial by jury was not abridged by the appraisal clause. Bentley v. North Carolina Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 107 N.C. App. 1, 418 S.E.2d 705 (1992).

Notwithstanding this provision, the North Carolina Supreme Court has repeatedly approved appraisal as a means of settling the single issue of amount of loss sustained by an insured. Bentley v. North Carolina Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 107 N.C. App. 1, 418 S.E.2d 705 (1992).

Shareholder's Derivative Actions. — Although a litigant's right to have a jury try issues of fact concerning the merits of the action initiated by the filing of a derivative suit complaint is guaranteed by the Constitution of North Carolina, the procedure required by former § 55-55(c) (see now subsection (d) of § 55-7-40) did not exist before the adoption of the Constitution of 1868, and therefore no State constitutional right exists to a trial by jury of factual issues that might arise during the course of the proceedings required under this section. Alford v. Shaw, 327 N.C. 526, 398 S.E.2d 445 (1990).

No Right to Jury Trial Under Coastal Area Management Act. — In an action brought by State seeking preliminary injunction to require removal of sign and compliance with Coastal Area Management Act (CAMA), sign company was not entitled to trial by jury since it had not asserted "right and remedy" existing when State Constitution was adopted and since CAMA did not provide statutory right to jury trial. State ex rel. Rhodes v. Givens, 101 N.C. App. 695, 400 S.E.2d 745 (1991).

Section 18B-504 does not preserve the right to trial by jury. State v. Morris, 103 N.C. App. 246, 405 S.E.2d 351 (1991).

Neither § 90-112 nor § 90-112.1 creates a right to trial by jury. State v. Morris, 103 N.C. App. 246, 405 S.E.2d 351 (1991).

An action under § 90-112.1 is in the nature of an action for replevin and is in essence a civil action; as such, the right to a jury trial, if any, is governed by this section of the Constitution, and thus, defendant was not entitled to a trial by jury for her remission action. State v. Honaker, 111 N.C. App. 216, 431 S.E.2d 869 (1993).

Sec. 26. Jury service.

Legal Periodicals. — For article, "Race-Based Peremptories No Longer Permitted in Civil Trials: Jackson v. Housing Authority of High Point," see 67 N.C.L. Rev. 1262 (1989).

CASE NOTES

Intent of Section. — This section is intended to protect the integrity of the judicial system, not just the reliability of the conviction obtained in a particular case. State v. Cofield, 320 N.C. 297, 357 S.E.2d 622 (1987).

This section does more than protect individuals from unequal treatment; the people of this State have declared in this provision that they will not tolerate the corruption of their juries by racism, sexism, and similar forms of irrational prejudice. State v. Cofield, 320 N.C. 297, 357 S.E.2d 622 (1987).

The spirit of this section requires that all grand jurors be considered for appointment as grand jury foreman. State v. Cofield, 324 N.C. 452, 379 S.E.2d 834 (1989).

Selection of Grand Jury Foreman Must Meet Racially Neutral Standard. — A method of selecting a grand jury foreman that meets the racially neutral standard must ensure that all grand jurors are considered by the presiding judge for his selection and that his selection be made on a racially neutral basis. State v. Cofield, 324 N.C. 452, 379 S.E.2d 834 (1989), holding, however, that this holding applies only to the case at hand and cases in which the indicting grand jury's foreman is selected after the certification date of the opinion of the case at hand.

Racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury foreman from a panel of grand jurors selected in a nondiscriminatory manner violates this section and N.C. Const., Art. I, § 19. State v. Cofield, 320 N.C. 297, 357 S.E.2d 622 (1987).

A black defendant may make out a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the grand jury foreman's selection by showing either (1) that the selection procedure itself was not racially neutral, or (2) that for a substantial period in the past, relatively few blacks have served in the position of foreman even though a substantial number have been selected to serve as members of grand juries. The State may rebut such a prima facie case on remand by offering evidence that the process used in selecting the grand jury foreman was in fact racially neutral. State v. Cofield, 320 N.C. 297, 357 S.E.2d 622 (1987).

Circumstances Collectively Showed Discrimination. — After a black woman was seated for examination during voir dire, the prosecutor asked the clerk if there was a white male out there?; the prosecutor briefly questioned the woman and then peremptorily challenged her; the woman was excused and a white man was called for examination and later became the jury foreperson. Standing alone, the prosecutor's peremptory challenge of the black woman would not amount to a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination. The prosecutor's question of the clerk prior to his examination of the black woman, however, is a relevant circumstance which, when combined with the prosecutor's subsequent peremptory challenge of the black woman, raises an inference of purposeful discrimination on the prosecutor's part thereby establishing a prima facie showing. State v. Hall, 104 N.C. App. 375, 410 S.E.2d 76 (1991).

Peremptory Challenges Based on Race Proscribed. — This section proscribes peremptory challenges to jurors in civil cases as well as criminal cases on the basis of race. Jackson v. Housing Auth., 321 N.C. 584, 364 S.E.2d 416 (1988).

Peremptory Challenges Upheld. — In a capital case, peremptory challenges to 5 of 6 potential black jurors were upheld where the State met its burden of coming forward with neutral, nonracial explanations for each peremptory challenge. State v. Robinson, 330 N.C. 1, 409 S.E.2d 288 (1991).

No purposeful racial discrimination occurred in the peremptory challenges of black jurors where trial court's ruling was supported by the trial court's findings of fact, which were supported by the record. State v. Thomas, 329 N.C. 423, 407 S.E.2d 141 (1991).

The defendant did not make a prima facie showing of racially motivated peremptory challenges where the State accepted seven of the 17 black veniremen tendered and the majority of the jury which tried the defendant was black. State v. Allen, 323 N.C. 208, 372 S.E.2d 855 (1988), sentence vacated and remanded for further consideration at 494 U.S. 1021, 110 S. Ct. 1463, 108 L. Ed. 2d 601 (1990), in light of McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 110 S. Ct. 1227, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1990), rehearing denied, — U.S. —, 113 S. Ct. 1885, 123 L. Ed. 2d 503 (1993).

Defendant, found guilty of murder and robbery, failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the State's use of its peremptory challenges, where the State's questions during voir dire focused on the prospective juror's feelings about capital punishment and the age of the juror, or his or her children, as compared with defendant's age; the venire persons were brought into the courtroom individually, so neither defendant nor the State knew how many black citizens were present in the venire or whether a black citizen would be examined next; and three of the first four jurors seated were black, as were both defendant and the victim, thus diminishing the likelihood that racial issues were inextricably bound up with the conduct of the trial. State v. Davis, 325 N.C. 607, 386 S.E.2d 418 (1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 905, 110 S. Ct. 2587, 110 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1990).

Opposition to Capital Punishment on Religious Grounds. — Where the record established beyond a doubt that juror was excused, not because of his choice of religion, but because of his inability to follow the law regarding his duties as a juror, the fact that the prospective juror's religion provided the basis for his views in opposition to the death penalty did not alter the propriety of excluding him for cause. State v. Davis, 325 N.C. 607, 386 S.E.2d 418 (1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 905, 110 S. Ct. 2587, 110 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1990).

Violation of Defendant's Rights Was Not Shown. — Where, although the State did not outline a profile or criteria for selecting jurors, it was obvious from the record that it would strike jurors who had connections to the defendants or to a principal State's witness or whom it believed would be prejudicial against the State, the record did not reflect that the assistant district attorney made any comments indicating a purpose to discriminate, and there was no transcript of the jury's voir dire and there was incomplete information on the racial composition of the jury venire and the jury, the defendants did not show that the trial judge violated defendant's rights under either the federal or State constitutions by overruling their objections to the State's use of peremptory challenges. State v. Cannon, 92 N.C. App. 246, 374 S.E.2d 604 (1988), rev'd on other grounds, 326 N.C. 37, 387 S.E.2d 450 (1989).

Applied in State v. Wiggins, 334 N.C. 18, 431 S.E.2d 755 (1993).

Stated in State v. Crandell, 322 N.C. 487, 369 S.E.2d 579 (1988); State v. Smith, 328 N.C. 99, 400 S.E.2d 712 (1991); State v. Glenn, 333 N.C. 296, 425 S.E.2d 688 (1993).

Cited in State v. Agudelo, 89 N.C. App. 640, 366 S.E.2d 921 (1988); State v. Payne, 327 N.C. 194, 394 S.E.2d 158 (1990).

Sec. 27. Bail, fines, and punishments.

CASE NOTES

I. In General.
II. Particular Statutes.
III. Illustrative Cases.

I. IN GENERAL.

The Department of Correction has a duty to provide adequate medical care to inmates in its custody, and that duty is of such great importance that the state cannot avoid liability by contracting with someone else to perform it. Medley v. North Carolina Dep't of Cor., 330 N.C. 837, 412 S.E.2d 654 (1992).

Peremptory instruction on nonstatutory mitigating circumstances which required the jury to find both that the circumstances existed and that the circumstances had mitigating value did not preclude the sentencer from considering relevant mitigating evidence in violation of the Constitution; the Constitution does not require that the sentencing jury "find" each circumstance which the court submits as potentially mitigating, but requires only that the sentencer be permitted to consider any relevant mitigating evidence. State v. Huff, 325 N.C. 1, 381 S.E.2d 635 (1989), vacated and remanded for further consideration at 497 U.S. 1021, 110 S. Ct. 3266, 111 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1990) in light of McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 110 S. Ct. 1227, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1990), death sentence vacated, remanded for new capital sentencing proceeding, State v. Huff, 328 N.C. 532, 402 S.E.2d 577 (1991).

Applied in State v. Ford, 71 N.C. App. 748, 323 S.E.2d 358 (1984).

Quoted in State v. O'Neal, 108 N.C. App. 661, 424 S.E.2d 680 (1993).

Cited in Cinema I Video, Inc. v. Thornburg, 83 N.C. App. 544, 351 S.E.2d 305 (1986); State v. Robbins, 319 N.C. App. 465, 356 S.E.2d 279 (1987); State v. Green, 321 N.C. 594, 365 S.E.2d 587 (1988); State v. Degree, 322 N.C. 302, 367 S.E.2d 679 (1988); State v. Artis, 325 N.C. 278, 384 S.E.2d 470 (1989); Hawkins v. Hawkins, 101 N.C. App. 529, 400 S.E.2d 472 (1991); State v. Robinson, 330 N.C. 1, 409 S.E.2d 288 (1991); State v. Jennings, 333 N.C. 579, 430 S.E.2d 188 (1993).

II. PARTICULAR STATUTES.

Death Penalty. — The State Supreme Court reaffirmed its position that the death penalty statute does not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and N.C. Const., Art. I, § 19 and this section. State v. McHone, 334 N.C. 627, 435 S.E.2d 296 (1993), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 114 S. Ct. 1577, 128 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1994).

Sections 14-190.1, 14-190.13, 14-190.16 and 14-190.17 are constitutional as drawn; while potentially beyond constitutional bounds if improperly applied, these sections are not so substantially overbroad as to require constitutional invalidation on their face. Cinema I Video, Inc. v. Thornburg, 320 N.C. 485, 358 S.E.2d 383 (1987).

III. ILLUSTRATIVE CASES.

Imposition of two consecutive life sentences did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the State Constitution, where the defendant was convicted of four first-degree burglaries, three first-degree rapes, and eight first-degree sexual offenses. The sentence imposed was authorized under the statutes, and the sentence was not disproportionate to the crimes committed. State v. Woodard, 102 N.C. App. 687, 404 S.E.2d 6 (1990), cert. denied, 329 N.C. 504, 407 S.E.2d 550 (1991).

Mandatory Life Sentence. — Mandatory life sentence for first degree sexual offense does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the State or federal Constitution. Supreme Court of North Carolina has repeatedly rejected argument that a life sentence for first degree sexual offense is cruel and unusual punishment. State v. Norman, 100 N.C. App. 660, 397 S.E.2d 647 (1990).

Referral of Bail Setting to Another Judicial Officer Not Wrongful Confinement. — Where the defendant was taken before a judicial officer for the setting of bail within a reasonable time, although the magistrate may have erred at that point by referring the defendant's case to another judicial officer for the setting of bail rather than setting reasonable bail himself, the error did not make the defendant's temporary further confinement an unreasonable seizure or "wrongful confinement" in any constitutional sense so as to necessitate suppression of his confession. State v. Simpson, 320 N.C. 313, 357 S.E.2d 332 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 963, 108 S. Ct. 1230, 99 L. Ed. 2d 430 (1988).

Sec. 28. Imprisonment for debt.

CASE NOTES

I. In General.

I. IN GENERAL.

For an order of restitution to be valid it must be related to the criminal act for which defendant was convicted, or else the provision may run afoul of the constitutional provision prohibiting imprisonment for debt. State v. Froneberger, 81 N.C. App. 398, 344 S.E.2d 344 (1986).

Cited in Alexander v. Johnson, 742 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1984).

Sec. 32. Exclusive emoluments.

Legal Periodicals. — For note on the six year statutory bar to products liability actions, in light of Tetterton v. Long Manufacturing Co., 314 N.C. 44, 332 S.E.2d 67 (1985), see 64 N.C.L. Rev. 1157 (1986).

For note, "Municipal Ownership of Cable Television Systems: Madison Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Morganton," see 68 N.C.L. Rev. 1295 (1990).

CASE NOTES

The purpose of this constitutional provision was not to prevent the community from exercising legislatively authorized powers to operate public enterprises, but to prevent the community from surrendering its power to another person or set of persons by grant of exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges unless they were granted in consideration of public services; it is not retention of powers, but alienation of powers, that is prohibited. Madison Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Morganton, 325 N.C. 634, 386 S.E.2d 200 (1989).

Statutes Which Confer Benefits on a Particular Group of Persons. — A statute which confers an exemption that benefits a particular group of persons is not an exclusive emolument or privilege within the meaning of this section, if: (1) the exemption is intended to promote the general welfare rather than the benefit of the individual, and (2) there is a reasonable basis for the legislature to conclude the granting of the exemption serves the public interest. Town of Emerald Isle ex rel. Smith v. State, 320 N.C. 640, 360 S.E.2d 756 (1987).

Statutes of Limitations. — Section 1-50(6) does not grant "exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges" to the persons it protects in violation of this section. Tetterton v. Long Mfg. Co., 314 N.C. 44, 332 S.E.2d 67 (1985).

Validity of § 24-5. — The Legislature could reasonably have concluded that the classification scheme established by § 24-5 would best serve to further important and legitimate public purposes, including compensation of a plaintiff for the loss-of-use value of a damage award, the prevention of unjust enrichment to liability insurers who are required by law to maintain claim reserves on which interest is earned, and the promotion of settlement by these insurers, who unlike self-insurers, have as their primary business the insuring, investigation, defense and settlement of claims. The Legislature could have reasonably concluded that the distinction between defendants with liability insurance and those without was a valid one, and that the public welfare would be best served by such a classification. Therefore, § 24-5 does not create a special emolument or privilege within the meaning of this section. Lowe v. Tarble, 312 N.C. 467, 323 S.E.2d 19 (1984), aff'd on rehearing, 313 N.C. 460, 329 S.E.2d 648 (1985).

Section 24-5 does not violate N.C. Const., Art. I, §§ 19 and 32 or the equal protection and due process clauses of U.S. Const., Amend. XIV. Harris v. Scotland Neck Rescue Squad, Inc., 75 N.C. App. 444, 331 S.E.2d 695, cert. denied, 314 N.C. 329, 333 S.E.2d 486 (1985).

Section 53-229, relating to the acquisition and control of certain nonbank banking institutions, does not violate the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution, nor the equal protection, exclusion emoluments and antimonopoly provisions of N.C. Const., Art. I, §§ 19, 32 and 34. Citicorp v. Currie, 75 N.C. App. 312, 330 S.E.2d 635, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 314 N.C. 537, 538, 335 S.E.2d 15, 16 (1985).

City's refusal to grant cable television franchises to private applicants did not violate the exclusive emoluments and monopoly clauses of this section and N.C. Const., Art. I, § 34, or the anti-monopoly and unfair trade practices of Chapter 75. Madison Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Morganton, 325 N.C. 634, 386 S.E.2d 200 (1989).

Severance Pay. — Proposed payment of "severance pay" to county manager upon his voluntary resignation did not violate N.C. Const., Art. I, § 32. Leete v. County of Warren, 114 N.C. App. 755, 443 S.E.2d 98 (1994).

Restrictions on vehicular traffic contained in Session Laws 1983, Chapter 539 were intended to promote the general welfare of the public and were reasonably based to further that intent. Thus, those restrictions do not violate this section. Town of Emerald Isle ex rel. Smith v. State, 320 N.C. 640, 360 S.E.2d 756 (1987).

Applied in State v. Stanley, 79 N.C. App. 379, 339 S.E.2d 668 (1986); State ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 325 N.C. 438, 385 S.E.2d 473 (1989).

Cited in State ex rel. Banking Comm'n v. Citicorp Sav. Indus. Bank, 74 N.C. App. 474, 328 S.E.2d 895 (1985); Town of Emerald Isle v. State, 78 N.C. App. 736, 338 S.E.2d 581 (1986); Empire Distribs. of N.C., Inc. v. Schieffelin & Co., 677 F. Supp. 847 (W.D.N.C. 1988).

Sec. 34. Perpetuities and monopolies.

Legal Periodicals. — For article, "A Proposal for a Simple and Socially Effective Rule Against Perpetuities," see 66 N.C.L. Rev. 545 (1988).

For article, "Does the Fee Tail Exist in North Carolina?," see 23 Wake Forest L. Rev. 767 (1988).

CASE NOTES

The distinctive characteristics of a monopoly are (1) control of so large a portion of the market of a certain commodity that (2) competition is stifled, (3) freedom of commerce is restricted and (4) the monopolist controls prices. American Motors Sales Corp. v. Peters, 311 N.C. 311, 317 S.E.2d 351 (1984).

City's refusal to grant cable television franchises to private applicants did not violate the exclusive emoluments and monopoly clauses of N.C. Const., Art. I, § 32 and this section, or the antimonopoly and unfair trade practices of Chapter 75. Madison Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Morganton, 325 N.C. 634, 386 S.E.2d 200 (1989).

Section 53-229, relating to the acquisition and control of certain nonbank banking institutions, does not violate the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution, nor the equal protection, exclusion emoluments and antimonopoly provisions of the State Constitution. Citicorp v. Currie, 75 N.C. App. 312, 330 S.E.2d 635, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 314 N.C. 537, 538, 335 S.E.2d 15, 16 (1985).

Cited in State ex rel. Banking Comm'n v. Citicorp Sav. Indus. Bank, 74 N.C. App. 474, 328 S.E.2d 895 (1985); Coastal Neuro-Psychiatric Assocs. v. Onslow Mem. Hosp., 795 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1986); Jetstream Aero Servs., Inc. v. New Hanover County, 672 F. Supp. 879 (E.D.N.C. 1987); Empire Distribs. of N.C., Inc. v. Schieffelin & Co., 677 F. Supp. 847 (W.D.N.C. 1988).

Sec. 35. Recurrence to fundamental principles.

Legal Periodicals. — For an essay, "On the Significance of Constitutional Spirit," see 70 N.C.L. Rev. 1803 (1992).

CASE NOTES

Quoted in Treants Enters., Inc. v. Onslow County, 83 N.C. App. 345, 350 S.E.2d 365 (1986); Corum v. University of N.C. ex rel. Bd. of Governors, 330 N.C. 761, 413 S.E.2d 276 (1992).

Cited in State v. Avery, 315 N.C. 1, 337 S.E.2d 786 (1985); Corum v. University of N.C., 97 N.C. App. 527, 389 S.E.2d 596 (1990); Boesche v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 111 N.C. App. 149, 432 S.E.2d 137 (1993).

Sec. 36. Other rights of the people.

CASE NOTES

Cited in Boesche v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 111 N.C. App. 149, 432 S.E.2d 137 (1993).

ARTICLE II

LEGISLATIVE

Sec. 1. Legislative power.

CASE NOTES

The Power to Zone, etc. —

Power to zone real property is vested in the General Assembly by this section. Chrismon v. Guilford County, 322 N.C. 611, 370 S.E.2d 579 (1988).

Discretion to Determine Whether Commissioners Should Be Elected or Appointed. — Discretion provided by § 156-81(a) and (i) to the clerks of superior court to determine whether drainage commissioners should be elected or appointed is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers. Northampton County Drainage Dist. Number One v. Bailey, 326 N.C. 742, 392 S.E.2d 352 (1990).

Cited in State v. Gravette, 327 N.C. 114, 393 S.E.2d 856 (1990).

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Delay of Rules by Review Commission. — An act vesting in the Administrative Rules Review Commission (ARRC), a commission appointed by the General Assembly, the power to delay indefinitely the effective date of duly adopted agency rules which it deems in excess of statutory authority would likely be held to violate this section by vesting the ARRC with judicial powers reserved to the court and with supreme legislative powers reserved to the General Assembly. See opinion of Attorney General to Henson P. Barnes, President Pro Tempore, Senate, — N.C.A.G. — (February 25, 1991).

Sec. 2. Number of Senators.

Defeated Amendment Proposals. —

An amendment proposed by Session Laws 1985, c. 768, s. 11, and defeated at the primary election held on May 6, 1986, would have added "Except that there shall be no election in 1988, and elections shall be conducted in 1989 and biennially thereafter" at the end of the section.

Sec. 3. Senate districts; apportionment of Senators.

Legal Periodicals. — For article, "Political Gerrymandering After Davis v. Bandemer," see 9 Campbell L. Rev. 207 (1987).

For article, "Racial Gerrymandering and the Voting Rights Act in North Carolina," see 9 Campbell L. Rev. 255 (1987).

CASE NOTES

Cited in State ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 325 N.C. 438, 385 S.E.2d 473 (1989).

Sec. 4. Number of Representatives.

Defeated Amendment Proposals. —
An amendment proposed by Session Laws 1985, c. 768, s. 11, and defeated at the primary election held on May 6, 1986, would have added "Except that there shall be no election in 1988, and elections shall be conducted in 1989 and biennially thereafter" at the end of the section.

Sec. 5. Representative districts; apportionment of Representatives.

Legal Periodicals. — For article, "Political Gerrymandering After Davis v. Bandemer," see 9 Campbell L. Rev. 207 (1987).

For article, "Racial Gerrymandering and the Voting Rights Act in North Carolina," see 9 Campbell L. Rev. 255 (1987).

CASE NOTES

Cited in State ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 325 N.C. 438, 385 S.E.2d 473 (1989).

Sec. 8. Elections.

Defeated Amendment Proposals. —
An amendment proposed by Session Laws 1985, c. 768, s. 1, and defeated at the primary election held on May 6, 1986, would have amended this section by deleting "1972 and every two years thereafter" and substituting "1986, and in 1989 and every two years thereafter."

Sec. 11. Sessions.

Defeated Amendment Proposals. — An amendment proposed by Session Laws 1985, c. 768, s. 12, and defeated at the primary election held on May 6, 1986, would have amended this section by substituting "1987, and in 1990 and every two years thereafter" for "1973 and every two years thereafter" in subsection (1).

CASE NOTES

Quoted in Newsome v. North Carolina State Bd. of Elections, 105 N.C. App. 499, 415 S.E.2d 201 (1992).

Sec. 23. Revenue bills.

CASE NOTES

I. General Consideration.

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

Article II, § 14 of the 1868 Constitution is substantially the same as this section. North Carolina E. Mun. Power v. Wake County, 100 N.C. App. 693, 398 S.E.2d 486 (1990), cert. denied, 329 N.C. 270, 407 S.E.2d 838 (1991).

Applicability of This Section to Statutes Imposing a Tax. — It is well established law in this State that when determining the constitutional validity of a statute, if the meaning is clear from reading the words of the Constitution, courts should not search for a meaning elsewhere. The language of this section is clear in that it applies to statutes enacted to impose a tax. North Carolina E. Mun. Power v. Wake County, 100 N.C. App. 693, 398 S.E.2d 486 (1990), cert. denied, 329 N.C. 270, 407 S.E.2d 838 (1991).

Inapplicability to Session Laws 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), Chapter 1052. — There is no doubt that the effect of Chapter 1052 of Session Laws 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988) imposed a greater tax burden on plaintiff for 1988. However, this section focuses on the purpose of the statute (to impose a tax) and not the result of the statute (an increased tax burden). Chapter 1052 of Session Laws 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988) neither imposes a tax nor authorizes its imposition, and therefore, this section does not apply. North Carolina E. Mun. Power v. Wake County, 100 N.C. App. 693, 398 S.E.2d 486 (1990), cert. denied, 329 N.C. 270, 407 S.E.2d 838 (1991).

If an act is not a revenue or tax act from the outset, it does not matter if the act is retroactive or prospective in its application. North Carolina E. Mun. Power v. Wake County, 100 N.C. App. 693, 398 S.E.2d 486 (1990), cert. denied, 329 N.C. 270, 407 S.E.2d 838 (1991).

A bailment surcharge imposed on each case of distilled spirits shipped from ABC warehouse to ABC stores is not a tax; the cost of liquor enforcement is a burden incident to the privilege of buying spirituous liquors in the state and such a surcharge is not unconstitutional as a tax imposed in violation of this section or of N.C. Const., Art. V, § 2. North Carolina Ass'n of ABC Bds. v. Hunt, 76 N.C. App. 290, 332 S.E.2d 693, cert. denied, 314 N.C. 667, 336 S.E.2d 400 (1985).

Sec. 24. Limitations on local, private, and special legislation.

Legal Periodicals. —

As to comment discussing beach access legislation as unconstitutional local legislation, see 64 N.C.L. Rev. 159 (1985).

For article, "The Battle to Preserve North Carolina's Estuarine Marshes: The 1985 Legislation, Private Claims to Estuarine Marshes, Denial of Permits to Fill, and the Public Trust," see 64 N.C.L. Rev. 565 (1986).

For note, "Town of Emerald Isle v. State of North Carolina: A New Test for Distinguishing Between General Laws and Local Legislation," see 66 N.C.L. Rev. 1096 (1988).

CASE NOTES

I. General Consideration.
II. Health, Sanitation and Nuisances.
IV. Highways, Streets and Alleys.
VII. Regulation of Trade.

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

Purpose of Section. —

In accord with fourth paragraph in main volume. See Town of Emerald Isle ex rel. Smith v. State, 320 N.C. 640, 360 S.E.2d 756 (1987).

Prospective Effect of Statute's Unconstitutionality. — Where defendants reasonably relied on invalid statute and acted in good faith in carrying out the mandate of the General Assembly, the trial court did not err by directing the effect of the statute's unconstitutionality to have only a prospective application. City of New Bern v. New Bern-Craven County Bd. of Educ., 113 N.C. App. 98, 437 S.E.2d 655 (1993).

Annexation Provisions. — Sections 160A-45 et seq. do not violate this section, which prohibits the General Assembly from enacting "any local, private, or special act or resolution" in regard to certain enumerated subjects. This constitutional provision does not apply to annexation proceedings by municipalities, since N.C. Const., Art. VII, § 1 authorizes the General Assembly "except as otherwise prohibited by this

Constitution" to "give such powers and duties to counties, cities, and towns and other governmental subdivisions as it may deem advisable," and no other provision of the Constitution prohibits the General Assembly from enacting special legislation for the annexation of areas by municipalities. Campbell v. City of Greensboro, 70 N.C. App. 252, 319 S.E.2d 323, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 312 N.C. 492, 322 S.E.2d 553 (1984).

Applied in Floyd v. Lumberton City Bd. of Educ., 71 N.C. App. 670, 324 S.E.2d 18 (1984).

Cited in Clark v. Craven Regional Medical Auth., 326 N.C. 15, 387 S.E.2d 168 (1990).

II. HEALTH, SANITATION AND NUISANCES.

Local Health and Sanitation Acts. — Acts held to be "local," and related to "health" and "sanitation," were prohibited subjects of legislation and therefore unconstitutional. City of New Bern v. New Bern-Craven County Bd. of Educ., 113 N.C. App. 98, 437 S.E.2d 655 (1993).

Local Annexation Statute. — As § 160A-49.3 provides for solid waste collection to newly annexed areas of cities under the general law providing for annexation, and as the General Assembly made § 160A-49.3 applicable to the annexation of certain land to the City of Greensboro by Session Laws 1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 818, s. 3, that act was not a local act in violation of this section, since it did not subject the annexed area to a different treatment than it would have faced if the city had annexed the area under the general annexation law, but assured that it would receive the same treatment. Piedmont Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. City of Greensboro, 324 N.C. 499, 380 S.E.2d 107 (1989).

IV. HIGHWAYS, STREETS AND ALLEYS.

Limitations of Vehicular Access on Public Streets in Town. — The case annotated under this catchline in the main volume has been reversed. See Town of Emerald Isle ex rel. Smith v. State, 320 N.C. 640, 360 S.E.2d 756 (1987).

State Law to Establish Access Facilities to Beaches Is a General Law. — Session Laws 1983, Chapter 539, the purpose of which is to establish pedestrian beach access facilities for general public use in the vicinity of Bogue Inlet, is a general law and not a local act. Town of Emerald Isle ex rel. Smith v. State, 320 N.C. 640, 360 S.E.2d 756 (1987).

VII. REGULATION OF TRADE.

Section 160A-273, which permits municipalities to convey air rights over streets or other property, is not a special act and does not violate subdivision (1)(j). Cheape v. Town of Chapel Hill, 320 N.C. 549, 359 S.E.2d 792 (1987).

A local act which merely declared that the town had the capacity to engage in economic development projects, with or without private parties, did not "regulate" trade and therefore did not violate subdivision (1)(j). Cheape v. Town of Chapel Hill, 320 N.C. 549, 359 S.E.2d 792 (1987).

ARTICLE III

EXECUTIVE

Sec. 1. Executive power.

Legal Periodicals. — For note on the separation of powers and the power to appoint, see 66 N.C.L. Rev. 1109 (1988).

CASE NOTES

"Executive Power" Defined. — "Executive power" means the power of executing laws. The appointment of someone to execute the laws does not require the appointing party to execute the laws. State ex rel. Martin v. Melott, 320 N.C. 518, 359 S.E.2d 783 (1987).

The duty of the attorney general to

appear for the state in any court proceeding in which the state may be a party, as provided in § 114-2(1), does not violate this section. Martin v. Thornburg, 320 N.C. 533, 359 S.E.2d 472 (1987).

Sec. 2. Governor and Lieutenant Governor: election, term, and qualifications.

Editor's Note. — Session Laws 1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 1010, repealed Session Laws 1985, c. 61, which had proposed to amend this section by rewriting the last sentence of subsection (2).

Defeated Amendment Proposals. —

An amendment proposed by Session Laws 1985, c. 768, ss. 2, 3 and 9.1(1), and defeated at the primary election held on May 6, 1986, would have amended this section by substituting "1988, and in 1993 and every four years thereafter" for "1972 and every four years thereafter" in the first sentence of subsection (1), by adding "except in 1988 at the same time and places as members of the United States House of Representatives are elected" at the end of the first sentence of subsection (1), and by adding "except that the term of office of those elected in 1988 shall be for five years" at the end of subsection (1).

Sec. 5. Duties of Governor.

CASE NOTES

Power of Appointment. — The Governor has the power to appoint an officer of the State with the advice and consent of a majority of the Senators, unless there is some other provision for the appointment. State ex rel. Martin v. Melott, 320 N.C. 518, 359 S.E.2d 783 (1987).

Appointment by Chief Justice of Supreme Court. — It is not a violation of the separation of powers provision of the Constitution for the General Assembly to provide that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall appoint the Director of the Office of Administrative Hearings. State ex rel. Martin v. Melott, 320 N.C. App. 518, 359 S.E.2d 783 (1987).

Sec. 7. Other elective officers.

(1) *Officers.* A Secretary of State, an Auditor, a Treasurer, a Superintendent of Public Instruction, an Attorney General, a Commissioner of Agriculture, a Commissioner of Labor, and a Commissioner of Insurance shall be elected by the qualified voters of the State in 1972 and every four years thereafter, at the same time and places as members of the General Assembly are elected. Their term of office shall be four years and shall commence on the first day of January next after their election and continue until their successors are elected and qualified.

(2) *Duties.* Their respective duties shall be prescribed by law.

(3) *Vacancies.* If the office of any of these officers is vacated by death, resignation, or otherwise, it shall be the duty of the Governor to appoint another to serve until his successor is elected and qualified. Every such vacancy shall be filled by election at the first election for members of the General Assembly that occurs more than 60 days after the vacancy has taken place, and the person chosen shall hold the office for the remainder of the unexpired term fixed in this Section. When a vacancy occurs in the office of any of the officers named in this Section and the term expires on the first day of January succeeding the next election for members of the

General Assembly, the Governor shall appoint to fill the vacancy for the unexpired term of the office.

(4) *Interim officers.* Upon the occurrence of a vacancy in the office of any one of these officers for any of the causes stated in the preceding paragraph, the Governor may appoint an interim officer to perform the duties of that office until a person is appointed or elected pursuant to this Section to fill the vacancy and is qualified.

(5) *Acting officers.* During the physical or mental incapacity of any one of these officers to perform the duties of his office, as determined pursuant to this Section, the duties of his office shall be performed by an acting officer who shall be appointed by the Governor.

(6) *Determination of incapacity.* The General Assembly shall by law prescribe with respect to those officers, other than the Governor, whose offices are created by this Article, procedures for determining the physical or mental incapacity of any officer to perform the duties of his office, and for determining whether an officer who has been temporarily incapacitated has sufficiently recovered his physical or mental capacity to perform the duties of his office. Removal of those officers from office for any other cause shall be by impeachment.

(7) *Special Qualifications for Attorney General.* Only persons duly authorized to practice law in the courts of this State shall be eligible for appointment or election as Attorney General. (1983, c. 298, s. 1; 1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 920, s. 1.)

Effect of Amendments. — The amendment adopted by vote of the people at the general election held Nov. 6, 1984, effective January 1, 1985, added subsection (7).

The amendment adopted by vote of the people at the general election held Nov. 4, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987, substituted "60 days" for "30 days" in the second sentence of subsection (3).

Defeated Amendment Proposals. —

An amendment proposed by Session Laws 1985, c. 768, ss. 4, 5 and 9.1(1), and defeated at the primary election held on May 6, 1986, would have amended this section by substituting "1988, and in 1993 and every four years thereafter" for "1972 and every four years thereafter" in the first sentence of subsection (1), by adding "except in 1988 at the same time and places as members of the United States House of Representatives are elected" at the end of the first sentence of subsection (1), and by adding "except that the term of office of those elected in 1988 shall be for five years" at the end of subsection (1).

Legal Periodicals. —

For article, "Changes In the State's Law Firm: The Powers, Duties and Operations of the Office of the Attorney General," see 12 Campbell L. Rev. 343 (1990).

CASE NOTES

Duty of Attorney General. — The Attorney General of North Carolina is a constitutional officer, and he is required to take an oath which among other things binds him to "support, maintain and defend the Constitution of North Carolina not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States ...." It is but a small step from the language of this oath to the proposition asserted by the Attorney General, that his duty includes the defense of statutes of this State against charges of unconstitutionality. Hendon v. North Carolina State Bd. of Elections, 633 F. Supp. 454 (W.D.N.C. 1986).

Sole Discretion of Attorney General. — In passing § 114-11.6, the General Assembly made it clear that even upon a proper request and authorization by a district attorney, the Special Prosecution Division is to participate in criminal prosecutions only if the Attorney General, in his sole discretion as an independent constitutional officer, approves. Thus trial court exceeded its authority when it ordered that "the Attorney General's Office shall immediately assume the prosecution of" a capital case. State v. Camacho, 329 N.C. 589, 406 S.E.2d 868 (1991).

Applied in Martin v. Thornburg, 320 N.C. App. 533, 359 S.E.2d 472 (1987).

Cited in North Carolina ex rel. Long v. Alexander & Alexander Servs., Inc., 711 F. Supp. 257 (E.D.N.C. 1989).

Sec. 8. Council of State.

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Delegation of Power to Attend Meetings. — Those members of the Council of State who have statutory authority to delegate duties may, in conformity with such statutes, attend and vote at meetings of Boards of which they are ex officio members through delegates or designated subordinates. The remaining members of the Council of State may make similar delegations or designations where, in the member's judgment, other duties necessitate his absence and the statute creating his ex officio membership does not express or clearly imply an intent of the General Assembly that the powers of such membership be exercised personally. See opinion of Attorney General to the honorable James E. Long, Commissioner of Insurance, 55 N.C.A.G. 116 (1986).

ARTICLE IV

JUDICIAL

Section 1. Judicial power.

CASE NOTES

Judicial Power Vested in General Court of Justice. —

The judicial power of this state is "vested in a Court for the Trial of Impeachments and a General Court of Justice," and the latter constitutes "a unified judicial system for purposes of jurisdiction, operation, and administration," and includes a Superior Court Division. In re Alamance County Ct. Facilities, 329 N.C. 84, 405 S.E.2d 125 (1991).

The General Assembly shall have no power to deprive the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction that rightfully pertains to it as a co-ordinate department of the government. In re Alamance County Ct. Facilities, 329 N.C. 84, 405 S.E.2d 125 (1991).

Reconciliation with Need for Administrative Expertise. — A major purpose of N.C. Const., Art. IV, § 3, is to reconcile the retention of judicial power in the judicial branch required by this section, with the recognized need to utilize administrative expertise in implementing complicated regulatory schemes such as the Sedimentation Pollution Control Act. In re Appeal from Civil Penalty Assessed for Violations of Sedimentation Pollution Control Act, 92 N.C. App. 1, 373 S.E.2d 572 (1988), rev'd on other grounds, 324 N.C. 373, 379 S.E.2d 30 (1989).

Limitation on Power of Legislature to Alter Judicial Result. — The doctrine of separation of powers precludes the legislature from enacting a statute which alters a result obtained by a final judicial decision before the date of the statute's enactment. Hogan v. Cone Mills Corp., 315 N.C. 127, 337 S.E.2d 477 (1985).

The inherent power of the Supreme Court has not been limited by the Constitution; on the contrary, the Constitution protects such power. Beard v. North Carolina State Bar, 320 N.C. 126, 357 S.E.2d 694 (1987).

The existence of inherent judicial power is not dependent upon legislative action; the General Assembly has recognized the existence of the inherent power of the court and cannot abridge that power. Beard v. North Carolina State Bar, 320 N.C. 126, 357 S.E.2d 694 (1987).

When the jurisdiction of a particular court, etc. —

In accord with second paragraph in the main volume. See Hogan v. Cone Mills Corp., 315 N.C. 127, 337 S.E.2d 477 (1985).

The General Assembly has no authority to deprive the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction that rightfully pertains to it as a coordinate department of the government. Beard v. North Carolina State Bar, 320 N.C. 126, 357 S.E.2d 694 (1987).

In Personam Orders. — By virtue of their being "a co-ordinate department of the government," courts of this state are empowered "to issue in personam orders requiring public officials to act in compliance with their ... public duties." In re Alamance County Ct. Facilities, 329 N.C. 84, 405 S.E.2d 125 (1991).

The order of the Supreme Court establishing the Client Security Fund and requiring annual payments by attorneys to the fund was essential corollary to the court's function, was required for the proper administration of justice, and did not violate the Constitution. Beard v. North Carolina State Bar, 320 N.C. 126, 357 S.E.2d 694 (1987).

Assessment of Penalty Held Unconstitutional. — Where the DMV assessed a penalty for operating a vehicle on the highways with a gross weight in excess of that allowed under the license obtained pursuant to § 20-96, but not in excess of the maximum axle weight limits, and such penalty was not authorized by § 20-118, such penalty violated this section and N.C. Const., Art. IV, § 3 since there was no reasonable necessity for conferring absolute judicial discretion in the DMV. Young's Sheet Metal & Roofing, Inc. v. Wilkins, 77 N.C. App. 180, 334 S.E.2d 419 (1985), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 316 N.C. 202, 341 S.E.2d 574 (1986), decided prior to the 1985 amendment to § 20-96.

Cited in In re Appeal from Civil Penalty Assessed for Violations of Sedimentation Pollution Control Act, 324 N.C. 373, 379 S.E.2d 30 (1989).

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Delay of Rules by Review Commission. — An act vesting in the Administrative Rules Review Commission (ARRC), a commission appointed by the General Assembly, the power to delay indefinitely the effective date of duly adopted agency rules which it deems in excess of statutory authority would likely be held to violate this section by vesting the ARRC with judicial powers reserved to the court and with supreme legislative powers reserved to the General Assembly. See opinion of Attorney General to Henson P. Barnes, President Pro Tempore, Senate, 60 N.C.A.G. 70 (1991).

Sec. 2. General Court of Justice.

Legal Periodicals. — For article, "Constitutional Rights of Students, Their Families, and Teachers in the Public Schools," see 10 Campbell L. Rev. 353 (1988).

CASE NOTES

Cited in State v. Pennington, 327 N.C. 89, 393 S.E.2d 847 (1990); Ocean Hill Joint Venture v. North Carolina Dep't of Environment, Health & Natural Resources, 333 N.C. 318, 426 S.E.2d 274 (1993).

Sec. 3. Judicial powers of administrative agencies.

CASE NOTES

Purpose. — A major purpose of this section is to reconcile the retention of judicial power in the judicial branch required by N.C. Const., Art. IV, § 1, with the recognized need to utilize administrative expertise in implementing complicated regulatory schemes such as the Sedimentation Pollution Control Act. In re Appeal from Civil Penalty Assessed for Violations of Sedimentation Pollution Control Act, 92 N.C. App. 1, 373 S.E.2d 572 (1988), rev'd on other grounds, 324 N.C. 373, 379 S.E.2d 30 (1989).

The application of this section requires three questions be answered: (1) For what purposes was the agency created?; (2) which peculiarly "judicial" power has the General Assembly attempted to vest in the agency?, and (3) is the Legislature's grant of such judicial power reasonably necessary as an incident to the accomplishment of the purposes for which the agency was created? In re Appeal from Civil Penalty Assessed for Violations of Sedimentation Pollution Control Act, 92 N.C. App. 1, 373 S.E.2d 572 (1988), rev'd on other grounds, 324 N.C. 373, 379 S.E.2d 30 (1989).

Considerations Irrelevant to Determination of Whether Judicial Power Properly Conferred. — Considerations such as the maximum size of the civil penalty and the availability of alternative enforcement sanctions are irrelevant to the question of whether a civil penalty is a peculiarly "judicial" power reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of an agency's purposes; since the judiciary does not possess the power to enact specific civil penalties or other alternative enforcement sanctions, these legislative choices are not at issue in determining whether the Legislature has usurped a judicial power which may not be conferred under this section. In re Appeal from Civil Penalty Assessed for Violations of Sedimentation Pollution Control Act, 92 N.C. App. 1, 373 S.E.2d 572 (1988), rev'd on other grounds, 324 N.C. 373, 379 S.E.2d 30 (1989).

Limitation on Power of Legislature to Alter Judicial Result. — The doctrine of separation of powers precludes the legislature from enacting a statute which alters a result obtained by final judicial decision before the date of the statute's enactment. Hogan v. Cone Mills Corp., 315 N.C. 127, 337 S.E.2d 477 (1985).

Presumption of Propriety in Official Acts. — There is a rebuttable presumption that an administrative agency has properly performed its official duties; while arbitrary and capricious agency action is itself prohibited by federal and state due process, any assertion of arbitrary agency action does not necessarily require the agency's action be reviewed for compliance with every other requirement under the State and federal Constitutions. In re Appeal from Civil Penalty Assessed for Violations of Sedimentation Pollution Control Act, 92 N.C. App. 1, 373 S.E.2d 572 (1988), rev'd on other grounds, 324 N.C. 373, 379 S.E.2d 30 (1989).

This section does not prohibit the legislature from conferring the power on administrative agencies to assess civil penalties. In re Appeal from Civil Penalty Assessed for Violations of Sedimentation Pollution Control Act, 324 N.C. 373, 379 S.E.2d 30 (1989).

Civil Penalty Power Was Necessary to Accomplish Agency's Purpose. — This section contemplates that discretionary judicial authority may be granted to an agency when reasonably necessary to accomplish the agency's purposes; civil penalty power was reasonably necessary to the purposes for which North Carolina Department of Natural Resources and Community Development (NRCD) (now the Department of Environment, Health, and Natural Resources) was established. In re Appeal from Civil Penalty Assessed for Violations of Sedimentation Pollution Control Act, 324 N.C. 373, 379 S.E.2d 30 (1989).

This section does not prohibit the legislature from conferring on administrative agencies the power to exercise discretion in determining civil penalties within an authorized range, provided that adequate guiding standards accompany that discretion. In re Appeal from Civil Penalty Assessed for Violations of Sedimentation Pollution Control Act, 324 N.C. 373, 379 S.E.2d 30 (1989).

Assessment of Civil Penalties Must

Be Reasonably Necessary. — Administrative agencies are not constitutionally barred from assessing civil penalties. All administrative civil penalties are not per se in violation of the State Constitution, rather, the granting of the judicial power to assess a civil penalty must be "reasonably necessary" to the purposes for which the agency was created and with appropriate guidelines for the exercise of the discretion. North Carolina Private Protective Servs. Bd. v. Gray, Inc., 87 N.C. App. 143, 360 S.E.2d 135 (1987).

Assessment of Penalty Held Constitutional. — The authority of the Private Protective Services Board under subsection (c) of § 74C-17 to assess a civil penalty of up to two thousand dollars ($2,000) in lieu of revocation or suspension of a license is not an unconstitutional attempt to confer a judicial power on a state agency; the provision authorizing civil penalties is reasonably necessary to the Board in fulfilling its duties to require that those who hold themselves out as providing private protective services to citizens must meet high standards of training and professionalism. North Carolina Private Protective Servs. Bd. v. Gray, Inc., 87 N.C. App. 143, 360 S.E.2d 135 (1987).

This section did not prohibit the legislature from conferring on the North Carolina Department of Natural Resources and Community Development (NRCD) (now the Department of Environment, Health, and Natural Resources) the power to exercise discretion in determining civil penalties within an authorized range; plenary guiding standards existed to check the exercise of NRCD discretion in its assessment of civil penalties in varying amounts, commensurate with the seriousness of the violations of the Sedimentation Pollution Control Act. In re Appeal from Civil Penalty Assessed for Violations of Sedimentation Pollution Control Act, 324 N.C. 373, 379 S.E.2d 30 (1989).

Assessment of Penalty Held Unconstitutional. — Where the DMV assessed a penalty for operating a vehicle on the highways with a gross weight in excess of that allowed under the license obtained pursuant to § 20-96, but not in excess of the maximum axle weight limits, and such penalty was not authorized by § 20-118, such penalty violated N.C. Const., Art. IV, § 1 and this section since there was no reasonable necessity for conferring absolute judicial discretion in the DMV. Young's Sheet Metal & Roofing, Inc. v. Wilkins, 77 N.C. App. 180, 334 S.E.2d 419 (1985), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 316 N.C. 202, 341 S.E.2d 574 (1986), decided prior to the 1985 amendment to § 20-96.

Stated in Ocean Hill Joint Venture v. North Carolina Dep't of Environment, Health & Natural Resources, 333 N.C. 318, 426 S.E.2d 274 (1993).

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Delay of Rules by Review Commission. — An act vesting in the Administrative Rules Review Commission (ARRC), a commission appointed by the General Assembly, the power to delay indefinitely the effective date of duly adopted agency rules which it deems in excess of statutory authority would likely be held to violate this section by vesting the ARRC with judicial powers reserved to the court and with supreme legislative powers reserved to the General Assembly. See opinion of Attorney General to Henson P. Barnes, President Pro Tempore, Senate, — N.C.A.G. — (February 25, 1991).

Sec. 7. Court of Appeals.

CASE NOTES

Cited in In re Doe, 329 N.C. 743, 407 S.E.2d 798 (1991).

Sec. 8. Retirement of Justices and Judges.

Legal Periodicals. — For note entitled, "Gregory v. Ashcroft: The Plain Statement Rule and Judicial Supervision of Federal-State Relations," see 70 N.C.L. Rev. 1563 (1992).

CASE NOTES

Intent of Amendment. — The language employed in the amendment to this section is a clear indication of the people's intent to empower the legislature to interrupt judicial terms of office with an age limit on active service. Martin v. State, 330 N.C.412, 410 S.E.2d 474 (1991).

Interpretation of "For Service." — The words, "for service," as used in the amendment to this section refers exclusively to the time during which an individual justice or judge is eligible to serve notwithstanding the length of his or her term of office. The words, "for service," as used in this section therefore, evince an intent to empower the legislature to render particular justices or judges ineligible for active service because of age notwithstanding that time may remain in their terms of office. Martin v. State, 330 N.C.412, 410 S.E.2d 474 (1991).

Stated in In re City of Durham Annexation Ordinance Numbered 5991 for Area A, 69 N.C. App. 77, 316 S.E.2d 649 (1984).

Sec. 9. Superior Courts.

Defeated Amendment Proposals. — An amendment proposed by Session Laws 1981, c. 504, and defeated at the general election held in 1982, would have substituted "at the places and on the day prescribed by law" for "at the same time and places as members of the General Assembly are elected" at the end of the first sentence of subsection (3).

An amendment proposed by Session Laws 1985, c. 768, s. 9, and defeated at the primary election held on May 6, 1986, would have amended this section by adding "except that those elected in 1986 and 1988 shall serve for a term of five years" at the end of the first sentence of subsection (3).

An amendment proposed by Session Laws 1985, c. 768, s. 9.1(1), and defeated at the primary election held on May 6, 1986, would have amended this section by adding "except in 1988 at the same time and place as members of the United States House of Representatives are elected" at the end of the first sentence of subsection (3).

CASE NOTES

The issuance of a commission by the chief justice assigning a superior court judge to preside over a session of superior court does not endow the judge with jurisdiction, power, or authority to act as a superior court judge; the commission so issued merely manifests that such judge has been duly assigned pursuant to the Constitution to preside over such session of court. The judge's jurisdiction, power, and authority as a superior court judge flow from the Constitution of North Carolina and his appointment and commission by the Governor as a superior court judge. State v. Eley, 326 N.C. 759, 392 S.E.2d 394 (1990).

Applied in State ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 325 N.C. 438, 385 S.E.2d 473 (1989).

Quoted in Republican Party v. Hunt, 841 F. Supp. 722 (E.D.N.C. 1994).

Cited in Bradshaw v. Administrative Office of Courts, 320 N.C. 132, 357 S.E.2d 370 (1987); Republican Party v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1992); Capital Outdoor Adv., Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 109 N.C. App. 399, 427 S.E.2d 154 (1993).

Sec. 10. District Courts.

Defeated Amendment Proposals. — An amendment proposed by Session Laws 1985, c. 768, s. 8, and defeated at the primary election held on May 6, 1986, would have amended this section by adding "except that those elected in 1986 and 1988 shall serve for a term of five years" at the end of the second sentence.

Legal Periodicals. — For comment on changing North Carolina's method of judicial selection, see 25 Wake Forest L. Rev. 253 (1990).

CASE NOTES

Preference May Be Given to Political Party of Vacating Judge. — The General Assembly may require that, in the interim appointment of a district court judge, preference must be given to a member of the same political party as the vacating judge. Baker v. Martin, 330 N.C. 331, 410 S.E.2d 887 (1991).

Section 7A-142, which provides that candidates for a vacancy in the office of a district judge shall be members of the same political party as the vacating judge does not violate the Constitution of North Carolina. Baker v. Martin, 330 N.C. 331, 410 S.E.2d 887 (1991).

Applied in State ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 325 N.C. 438, 385 S.E.2d 473 (1989).

Cited in Bradshaw v. Administrative Office of Courts, 320 N.C. 132, 357 S.E.2d 370 (1987); In re Doe, 329 N.C. 743, 407 S.E.2d 798 (1991); Republican Party v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1992).

Sec. 11. Assignment of Judges.

CASE NOTES

The issuance of a nunc pro tunc commission was unquestionably lawful and in full accord with the Constitution of North Carolina. State v. Eley, 326 N.C. 759, 392 S.E.2d 394 (1990).

The issuance of a commission by the Chief Justice assigning a superior court judge to preside over a session of superior court does not endow the judge with jurisdiction, power, or authority to act as a superior court judge; the commission so issued merely manifests that such judge has been duly assigned pursuant to the Constitution to preside over such session of court. The judge's jurisdiction, power, and authority as a superior court judge flow from the Constitution of North Carolina and his appointment and commission by the Governor as a superior court judge. State v. Eley, 326 N.C. 759, 392 S.E.2d 394 (1990).

Quoted in Republican Party v. Hunt, 841 F. Supp. 722 (E.D.N.C. 1994).

Cited in Republican Party v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1992).

Sec. 12. Jurisdiction of the General Court of Justice.

Legal Periodicals. —
For comment, "The Advisory Opinion in North Carolina: 1947 to 1991," see 70 N.C.L. Rev. 1853 (1992).

CASE NOTES

I. General Consideration.
II. Supreme Court.
  A. In General.

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

The subject matter jurisdiction of the clerks of the superior court can only be conferred by statute. In re Locklear, 314 N.C. 412, 334 S.E.2d 46 (1985).

Applied in State v. Freeman, 319 N.C. 609, 356 S.E.2d 765 (1987); State v. Dudley, 319 N.C. 656, 356 S.E.2d 361 (1987); Crist v. Moffatt, 326 N.C. 326, 389 S.E.2d 41 (1990); Travco Hotels, Inc. v. Piedmont Natural Gas Co., 332 N.C. 288, 420 S.E.2d 426 (1992).

Cited in State ex rel. Edmisten v. Tucker, 312 N.C. 326, 323 S.E.2d 294 (1984); L. Harvey & Son Co. v. Harman, 76 N.C. App. 191, 333 S.E.2d 47 (1985); State v. Bolt, 81 N.C. App. 133, 344 S.E.2d 51 (1986); Lea Co. v. North Carolina Bd. of Transp., 317 N.C. 254, 345 S.E.2d 355 (1986); State v. Mitchell, 325 N.C. 539, 385 S.E.2d 324 (1989); In re Doe, 329 N.C. 743, 407 S.E.2d 798 (1991); In re Alamance County Ct. Facilities, 329 N.C. 84, 405 S.E.2d 125 (1991); Republican Party v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1992).

II. SUPREME COURT.

A. In General.

Issuance of Remedial Writs, etc. — A judge of the superior court has no authority or jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus or prohibition to a district court judge. Those remedies are reserved by subdivision (1) of this section to the Supreme Court. In re Redwine, 312 N.C. 482, 322 S.E.2d 769 (1984).

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Authority of Magistrate to Hear Summary Judgment Action Involving Residential Rental Property. — A magistrate does not have the authority to hear a summary ejectment action involving residential rental property in another county if the landlord and the tenant so provide in the lease. See opinion of Attorney General to Hon. James E. Lanning, Chief District Court Judge, 26th Judicial District, 60 N.C.A.G. 26 (1990).

Sec. 13. Forms of action; rules of procedure.

CASE NOTES

I. General Consideration.
II. Civil Actions.
IV. Rules of Procedure.

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

No procedure or practice of the courts, even those exercised pursuant to their inherent powers, may abridge a person's substantive rights. In re Alamance County Ct. Facilities, 329 N.C. 84, 405 S.E.2d 125 (1991).

Section Compared to N.C. Const., Art. I, § 25. — There is not a conflict between this section and N.C. Const., Art. I, § 25, but this section is more comprehensive. Faircloth v. Beard, 320 N.C. 505, 358 S.E.2d 512 (1987).

N.C. Const., Art. I, § 25 and this section must be read in conjunction with one another. This section merely establishes the form and procedure for the trial of all civil actions, including the procedure of having issues of fact decided by a jury in what were formerly equity proceedings; to determine whether there exists a constitutional right to trial by jury of a particular cause of action, one looks to N.C. Const., Art. I, § 25, which ensures that there is a right to trial by jury where the underlying cause of action existed at the time of adoption of the 1868 Constitution, regardless of whether the action was formerly a proceeding in equity. Kiser v. Kiser, 325 N.C. 502, 385 S.E.2d 487 (1989).

For examination of historical de-

velopment of the right to trial by jury, see Kiser v. Kiser, 325 N.C. 502, 385 S.E.2d 487 (1989).

Cited in State v. Hudson, 331 N.C. 122, 415 S.E.2d 732 (1992).

II. CIVIL ACTIONS.

No Right to Jury Trial in Equitable Distribution Action. — No right to bring an action for equitable distribution of marital property existed prior to the adoption of the equitable distribution statutes, §§ 50-20 and 50-21, and the language of the statutes themselves create no new right to trial by jury; therefore, there is no right to trial by jury for such an action under the Constitution of North Carolina. Kiser v. Kiser, 325 N.C. 502, 385 S.E.2d 487 (1989).

Stockholders' Derivative Actions. — Although stockholders' derivative actions may be equitable actions, they are actions to protect private rights and to redress private wrongs; therefore they are civil actions under this section which guarantees that parties to such actions may have questions of fact tried by juries. Faircloth v. Beard, 320 N.C. 505, 358 S.E.2d 512 (1987).

IV. RULES OF PROCEDURE.

The General Assembly was without authority, etc. —

In accord with the main volume. See State v. O'Neal, 77 N.C. App. 600, 335 S.E.2d 920 (1985).

Sec. 15. Administration.

CASE NOTES

Cited in In re Doe, 329 N.C. 743, 407 S.E.2d 798 (1991).

Sec. 16. Terms of office and election of Justices of the Supreme Court, Judges of the Court of Appeals, and Judges of the Superior Court.

Defeated Amendment Proposals. — An amendment proposed by Session Laws 1985, c. 768, s. 6 and defeated at the primary election held on May 6, 1986, would have amended this section by adding "except that those elected in 1982, 1984, 1986, and 1988 shall hold office for terms of nine years" at the end of the first sentence.

Legal Periodicals. — For comment on changing North Carolina's method of judicial selection, see 25 Wake Forest L. Rev. 253 (1990).

For article, "Tuesday, February 11, 1868: The Day North Carolina Chose Direct Election of Judges," see 70 N.C.L. Rev. 1825 (1992).

CASE NOTES

Election to Fill Unexpired Judicial Term of Office. — Section 162-9, insofar as it provides for elections of judges to fill only the unexpired portions of eight-year terms, is authorized by N.C. Const., Art. IV, § 19; therefore, it does not violate this section, providing that judges "shall be elected ... and shall hold office for terms of eight years." Brannon v. North Carolina State Bd. of Elections, 331 N.C. 335, 416 S.E.2d 390 (1992).

Session Laws 1987, c. 509, which amended § 7A-41, did not deny certain citizens their "fundamental right" under this section to vote for judges at the expiration of their eight-year terms of office; the right to vote per se is not a fundamental right under North Carolina's Constitution; instead, once the right to vote is conferred, the equal right to vote is a fundamental right. State ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 325 N.C. 438, 385 S.E.2d 473 (1989).

By enacting Session Laws 1987, c. 509, the legislature eliminated staggered terms within multi-seat judicial districts by creating a one-time interim or hiatus between certain terms of office; as the Constitution anticipates such "hold over" situations by providing that elected judges remain in office "until their successors are elected and qualified," the act was not unconstitutional. State ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 325 N.C. 438, 385 S.E.2d 473 (1989).

Quoted in Republican Party v. Hunt, 841 F. Supp. 722 (E.D.N.C. 1994).

Cited in Republican Party v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1992).

Sec. 17. Removal of Judges, Magistrates and Clerks.

CASE NOTES

Cited in In re Doe, 329 N.C. 743, 407 S.E.2d 798 (1991).

Sec. 18. District Attorney and prosecutorial districts.

(1) *District Attorneys.* The General Assembly shall, from time to time, divide the State into a convenient number of prosecutorial districts, for each of which a District Attorney shall be chosen for a term of four years by the qualified voters thereof, at the same time and places as members of the General Assembly are elected. Only persons duly authorized to practice law in the courts of this State shall be eligible for election or appointment as a District Attorney. The District Attorney shall advise the officers of justice in his district, be responsible for the prosecution on behalf of the State of all criminal actions in the Superior Courts of his district, perform such duties related to appeals therefrom as the Attorney General may require, and perform such other duties as the General Assembly may prescribe.

(2) *Prosecution in District Court Division.* Criminal actions in the District Court Division shall be prosecuted in such manner as the General Assembly may prescribe by general law uniformly applicable in every local court district of the State. (1973, c. 394, s. 1; 1983, c. 298, s. 2.)

Effect of Amendments. — The amendment adopted by vote of the people at the general election held Nov. 6, 1984, effective January 1, 1985, inserted the present second sentence of subsection (1).

Defeated Amendment Proposals. —

An amendment proposed by Session Laws 1985, c. 768, s. 7, and defeated at the primary election held on May 6, 1986, would have amended this section by adding "except that those elected in 1986 and 1988 shall serve for a term of five years" at the end of the first sentence of subsection (1).

An amendment proposed by Session Laws 1985, c. 768, s. 9.1(1), and defeated at the primary election held on May 6, 1986, would have amended this section by adding "except in 1988 at the same time and places as members of the United States House of Representatives are elected" at the end of the first sentence of subsection (1).

CASE NOTES

The clear mandate of this section is that the responsibility and authority to prosecute all criminal actions in the superior courts is vested solely in the several district attorneys of the State. State v. Camacho, 329 N.C. 589, 406 S.E.2d 868 (1991).

Delegation of Prosecutorial Function. — The elected district attorney may, in his or her discretion and where otherwise permitted by law, delegate the prosecutorial function to others. State v. Camacho, 329 N.C. 589, 406 S.E.2d 868 (1991).

Authority of Trial Court Exceeded. — The trial court exceeded its authority and invaded the province of an independent constitutional officer when it ordered the district attorney to request that the Attorney General prosecute defendant in a capital case. State v. Camacho, 329 N.C. 589, 406 S.E.2d 868 (1991).

The trial court exceeded its authority by ordering that in order to avoid the possibility or impression of any conflict of interest, the district attorney and his entire staff must withdraw from a capital case and have no further participation either directly or indirectly with regard to the case. State v. Camacho, 329 N.C. 589, 406 S.E.2d 868 (1991).

When § 114-11.6 is read in pari materia with this section, it is apparent that our Constitution and statutes give the district attorneys of the State the exclusive discretion and authority to determine whether to request, and thus permit, the prosecution of any individual case by the Special Prosecution Division. State v. Camacho, 329 N.C. 589, 406 S.E.2d 868 (1991).

Section 114-11.6 authorizes the several elected district attorneys of the State to permit the Special Prosecution Division of the Office of the Attorney General to prosecute individual criminal cases in their prosecutorial districts. State v. Camacho, 329 N.C. 589, 406 S.E.2d 868 (1991).

Standing to Challenge District Attorney's Participation Lacking. — Magistrate did not have standing to challenge involvement of the District Attorney in magistrate's removal proceeding, where, had trial court the inherent authority to appoint an independent counsel, magistrate could not show that a different result would have occurred. In re Ezzell, 113 N.C. App. 388, 438 S.E.2d 482 (1994).

Cited in State v. Rogers, 68 N.C. App. 358, 315 S.E.2d 492 (1984).

Sec. 19. Vacancies.

Unless otherwise provided in this Article, all vacancies occurring in the offices provided for by this Article shall be filled by appointment of the Governor, and the appointees shall hold their places until the next election for members of the General Assembly that is held more than 60 days after the vacancy occurs, when elections shall be held to fill the offices. When the unexpired term of any of the offices named in this Article of the Constitution in which a vacancy has occurred, and in which it is herein provided that the Governor shall fill the vacancy, expires on the first day of January succeeding the next election for members of the General Assembly, the Governor shall appoint to fill that vacancy for the unexpired term of the office. If any person elected or appointed to any of these offices shall fail to qualify, the office shall be appointed to, held, and filled as provided in case of vacancies occurring therein. All incumbents of these offices shall hold until their successors are qualified. (1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 920, s. 2.)

Effect of Amendments. — The amendment adopted by vote of the people at the general election held Nov. 4, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987, substituted "60 days" for "30 days" in the first sentence.

CASE NOTES

Nonexclusive Provision. — This section does not exclusively govern the appointment of district court judges. Baker v. Martin, 330 N.C. 331, 410 S.E.2d 887 (1991).

Preference May Be Given to Political Party of Vacating Judge. — The General Assembly may require that in the interim appointment of a district court judge preference must be given to a member of the same political party as the vacating judge. Baker v. Martin, 330 N.C. 331, 410 S.E.2d 887 (1991).

Section 7A-142, which provides that candidates for a vacancy in the office of a district judge shall be members of the same political party as the vacating judge does not violate the Constitution of North Carolina. Baker v. Martin, 330 N.C. 331, 410 S.E.2d 887 (1991).

Election to Fill Unexpired Judicial Term of Office. — Section 162-9, insofar as it provides for elections of judges to fill only the unexpired portions of eight-year terms, is authorized by this section; therefore, it does not violate N.C. Const., Art. IV, § 16, providing that judges "shall be elected ... and shall hold office for terms of eight years." Brannon v. North Carolina State Bd. of Elections, 331 N.C. 335, 416 S.E.2d 390 (1992).

Applied in State ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 325 N.C. 438, 385 S.E.2d 473 (1989).

Sec. 22. Qualification of Justices and Judges.

CASE NOTES

Cited in Baker v. Martin, 330 N.C. 331, 410 S.E.2d 887 (1991).

ARTICLE V

FINANCE

Sec. 1. No capitation tax to be levied.

CASE NOTES

Article V prohibits the judiciary from taking public moneys without statutory authorization. In re Alamance County Ct. Facilities, 329 N.C. 84, 405 S.E.2d 125 (1991).

Sec. 2. State and local taxation.

Cross References. — For provisions authorizing counties and cities to contract with and appropriate money to private entities in order to carry out any authorized public purpose, see §§ 153A-449 and 160A-20.1, respectively.

Legal Periodicals. —

For article, "All the News That's Fit to Tax: First Amendment Limitations on State and Local Taxation of the Press," see 21 Wake Forest L. Rev. 59 (1985).

For note on the North Carolina sales and use tax exemption for newspapers, in light of In re Village Publishing Corp., 312 N.C. 211, 322 S.E.2d 155 (1984), appeal dismissed, 472 U.S. 1001, 105 S. Ct. 2693, 86 L. Ed. 2d 710 (1985), see 21 Wake Forest L. Rev. 145 (1985).

For article on mail-order ministries under the § 170 charitable contribution deduction, see 11 Campbell L. Rev. 1 (1988).

For note, "Municipal Ownership of Cable Television Systems: Madison Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Morganton," see 68 N.C.L. Rev. 1295 (1990).

For note, "State v. Whittle Communications: Allowing Local School Boards

To Turn On 'Channel One'," see 70 N.C.L. Rev. 1929 (1992).

CASE NOTES

I. General Consideration.
II. Power of Taxation.
III. Public Purposes.
  B. Illustrative Cases.
IV. Classification.
  A. In General.
  B. Illustrative Cases.

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

Laches as Bar to Constitutional Challenge to 1970 Amendments. — Where more than 18 years elapsed between the 1970 ballot and the defendants' claim of unconstitutionality of the 1970 amendments and where taxpayer stated that he did not recognize the effects of the amendment until his taxes rose in 1985, he did not claim that he was precluded from ascertaining the import of the amendment or the constitutionality of its passage before 1985, or until January 8, 1989, when he filed his answer, a county was materially prejudiced by the defendants' delay because the passage of time prevented the county from presenting evidence supporting the fact that the ballot was understandable to voters. Franklin County v. Burdick, 103 N.C. App. 496, 405 S.E.2d 783 (1991).

While the mere passage of years does not in itself entitle the plaintiff to the bar of laches, an unreasonable length of time resulting in prejudice to the opposing party does so entitle the plaintiff. Franklin County v. Burdick, 103 N.C. App. 496, 405 S.E.2d 783 (1991).

Drainage district assessments are not taxes. Northampton County Drainage Dist. Number One v. Bailey, 326 N.C. 742, 392 S.E.2d 352 (1990).

The North Carolina Sales and Use Tax Act does not violate the equal protection clause of U.S. Const., Amend. XIV or the principle of equitable taxation found in this section. In re Assessment of Additional N.C. & Orange County Use Taxes, 312 N.C. 211, 322 S.E.2d 155 (1984), appeal dismissed, 472 U.S. 1001, 105 S. Ct. 2693, 86 L. Ed. 2d 710 (1985).

A bailment surcharge imposed on each case of distilled spirits shipped from ABC warehouse to ABC stores is not a tax; the cost of liquor enforcement is a burden incident to the privilege of buying spirituous liquors in the State and such a surcharge is not unconstitutional as a tax imposed in violation of N.C. Const., Art. II, § 23 or of this section. North Carolina Ass'n of ABC Bds. v. Hunt, 76 N.C. App. 290, 332 S.E.2d 693, cert. denied, 314 N.C. 667, 336 S.E.2d 400 (1985).

Council Could Not Be Estopped From Terminating Unauthorized Payments Without Notice. — Where a town's resolution appropriating a certain percentage of its alcoholic beverage control revenue to county school board was outside the authority of the town council, the town council could not be estopped from terminating the unauthorized payments without notice. Watauga County Bd. of Educ. v. Town of Boone, 106 N.C. App. 270, 416 S.E.2d 411 (1992).

Applied in State v. Whittle Communications, 328 N.C. 456, 402 S.E.2d 556 (1991).

Quoted in In re City of Durham Annexation Ordinance Numbered 5991 for Area A, 69 N.C. App. 77, 316 S.E.2d 649 (1984).

Stated in Hed, Inc. v. Powers, 84 N.C. App. 292, 352 S.E.2d 265 (1987).

Cited in Cheape v. Town of Chapel Hill, 320 N.C. 549, 359 S.E.2d 792 (1987); Barnhill San. Serv., Inc. v. Gaston County, 87 N.C. App. 532, 362 S.E.2d 161 (1987); In re Worley, 93 N.C. App. 191, 377 S.E.2d 270 (1989); In re Moravian Home, Inc., 95 N.C. App. 324, 382 S.E.2d 772 (1989); Thrash v. City of Asheville, 95 N.C. App. 457, 383 S.E.2d 657 (1989).

II. POWER OF TAXATION.

Application of § 105-116 to Electric Cooperative Did Not Violate Rights. — Section 105-116 taxes billings for electrical service rendered by cooperatives in the same manner as billings for service rendered by investor-owned utilities; therefore, application of the section to an electric cooperative did not violate that entity's right under N.C. Const., Art. I, § 19, this section, or N.C. Const., Art. V, § 3. Four County Elec. Membership Corp. v. Powers, 96 N.C. App. 417, 386 S.E.2d 107 (1989), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 326 N.C. 799, 393 S.E.2d 894 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040, 111 S. Ct. 711, 112 L. Ed. 2d 700 (1991).

III. PUBLIC PURPOSES.

B. Illustrative Cases.

Cable Television System as Public Purpose. — The provisions of Chapter 160A, Article 16, Part 1, which authorize cities to finance, acquire, construct, own, and operate a cable television system do not violate the "public purpose" clause of this section. Madison Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Morganton, 325 N.C. 634, 386 S.E.2d 200 (1989).

The establishment, financing, construction, operation, and maintenance of a cable television system by a municipality as authorized by Chapter 160A, Article 16, Part 1 involved a reasonable connection with the convenience and necessity of the city and benefited the public generally, as opposed to special interests or persons, and thus constituted a "public purpose" within the meaning of subsection (1) of this section. Madison Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Morganton, 325 N.C. 634, 386 S.E.2d 200 (1989).

IV. CLASSIFICATION.

A. In General.

Requirement of Uniformity Extends, etc. —

Although the uniformity requirement is literally confined to taxes on property, it extends to license, franchise and other taxes. First Carolina Investors v. Lynch, 78 N.C. App. 583, 337 S.E.2d 691 (1985).

Discretion in Classification. — The power to classify subjects of taxation carries with it the discretion to select them, and a wide latitude is accorded taxing authorities. In re Champion Int'l Corp., 74 N.C. App. 639, 329 S.E.2d 691, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 314 N.C. 540, 335 S.E.2d 15 (1985).

Reasonableness of Classification. —

The only limitation upon the power of classification is that the classification be founded upon reasonable, and not arbitrary, distinctions. In re Champion Int'l Corp., 74 N.C. App. 639, 329 S.E.2d 691, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 314 N.C. 540, 335 S.E.2d 15 (1985).

A classification will be upheld if it is reasonable and not arbitrary and rests upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced will be treated alike. First Carolina Investors v. Lynch, 78 N.C. App. 583, 337 S.E.2d 691 (1985).

On review, wide latitude is accorded the General Assembly; the only limitation on its power is that the classification must be founded upon reasonable, and not arbitrary, distinctions. State v. Rippy, 80 N.C. App. 232, 341 S.E.2d 98 (1986).

Courts to Determine Validity of Classifications. — The uniformity rule of this section requires the courts, when the validity of a tax statute is challenged on the ground of discrimination, to ascertain if in fact there is a difference in the classes taxed. First Carolina Investors v. Lynch, 78 N.C. App. 583, 337 S.E.2d 691 (1985).

Contention that § 105-282.7 was invalid because its effect was to tax only the appellant was without merit, as on its face § 105-282.7 uniformly operates without discrimination or distinction upon all persons composing the described class, and as even appellant's own evidence did not show that the law applied only to appellant, but merely established that no one knew whether the statute had been applied to other taxpayers during the one year it had been in effect. In re Champion Int'l Corp., 74 N.C. App. 639, 329 S.E.2d 691, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 314 N.C. 540, 335 S.E.2d 15 (1985).

Subsection (32) of § 105-275 does not discriminate against individual property owners who own their property for residential purposes in violation of the rule of uniformity in taxation established under this Article. In re Barbour, 112 N.C. App. 368, 436 S.E.2d 169 (1993).

B. Illustrative Cases.

Assessment of tax under § 105-114 against a business trust did not violate the uniformity requirement of this section on grounds that it was similar to a limited partnership, which is not subject to the franchise tax. First Carolina Investors v. Lynch, 78 N.C. App. 583, 337 S.E.2d 691 (1985).

Leasehold Interests in Govern-

ment Owned Croplands and Forestlands. — Classifying for taxation under § 105-282.7 leasehold interests in government owned croplands and forestlands that are used in connection with a business conducted for profit seems eminently reasonable. In re Champion Int'l Corp., 74 N.C. App. 639, 329 S.E.2d 691, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 314 N.C. 540, 335 S.E.2d 15 (1985).

Subsections (1) and (2) of this section, which require that taxation be done in a just and equitable manner and that no class of property be taxed except by uniform rule and that every classification be made by general law, are no bar to taxing lessee and users in forest lands owned by the State, under § 105-282.7, "to the same extent as if the lessee or user owned the property," while other leasehold interests are taxed at true value. In re Champion Int'l Corp., 74 N.C. App. 639, 329 S.E.2d 691, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 314 N.C. 540, 335 S.E.2d 15 (1985).

Section 113-156.1, requiring managers of ocean fishing piers to obtain a license, satisfies the requirements of uniformity, equal protection and due process under both the State and federal Constitutions, as the opportunity to establish an exclusive zone around ocean piers, pursuant to § 113-185(a), and the cost to the State of enforcing this zone, distinguishes ocean piers from other piers and provides reasonable grounds for their separate license tax classification. State v. Rippy, 80 N.C. App. 232, 341 S.E.2d 98 (1986).

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Appropriation for a water project which would provide a private industry with fire protection and a private water supplier and town with increased water service was for a public purpose in compliance with this section. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. Steve B. Settlemeyer, City Attorney, 59 N.C.A.G. 12 (1989).

Local School Administrative Unit Levying Taxes at Local Level. — The legislature may by statute, consistently with the Constitution, provide that a local school administrative unit may levy taxes at the local level but such taxing authority must be conferred either by a general law, applicable statewide, or by local act subject to a vote of those persons affected. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. John B. Dunn, Superintendent, Edenton-Chowan Schools, 60 N.C.A.G. 17 (1990).

Sec. 3. Limitations upon the increase of State debt.

CASE NOTES

I. In General.

I. IN GENERAL.

Application of § 105-116 to Electric Cooperative Did Not Violate Rights. — Section 105-116 taxes billings for electrical service rendered by cooperatives in the same manner as billings for service rendered by investor-owned utilities; therefore, application of the section to an electric cooperative did not violate that an entity's right under N.C. Const., Art. I, § 19, this section or N.C. Const., Art. V, § 2. Four County Elec. Membership Corp. v. Powers, 96 N.C. App. 417, 386 S.E.2d 107 (1989), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 326 N.C. 799, 393 S.E.2d 894 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040, 111 S. Ct. 711, 112 L. Ed. 2d 700 (1991).

Sec. 4. Limitations upon the increase of local government debt.

CASE NOTES

I. Decisions under Current Section.

I. DECISIONS UNDER CURRENT SECTION.

Sections 159-72 and 159-78, which allow municipalities to issue general obligation refunding bonds in an amount greater than the bonds to be refunded, without a vote of the people, do not violate this section. City of Concord v. All Owners of Taxable Property, 330 N.C. 429, 410 S.E.2d 482 (1991).

Refund of Valid Existing Debt. — Subdivision (2)(a) of this section provides that voter approval is not required if a municipality's purpose for contracting a debt is to refund a valid existing debt; there is no requirement that the refunding indebtedness be less than or equal to the outstanding indebtedness. City of Concord v. All Owners of Taxable Property, 330 N.C. 429, 410 S.E.2d 482 (1991).

Contract Granting Security Interest in Real Property Subject to Improvement. — Section 160A-20, which authorizes a local government unit to enter into a contract granting a security interest in real property subject to improvement, does not contravene this section. Wayne County Citizens v. Wayne County Bd. of Comm'rs, 328 N.C. 24, 399 S.E.2d 311 (1991).

Sec. 5. Acts levying taxes to state objects.

CASE NOTES

Section 113-156.1 does not violate this section, which provides that every act of the General Assembly levying a tax shall state the special object to which it is to be applied and that it shall be applied to no other purpose, as it is part of Subchapter IV of Chapter 113, the special purpose of which is the conservation of marine and estuarine and wildlife resources, and it is evident that the license tax is levied and applied for this purpose. State v. Rippy, 80 N.C. App. 232, 341 S.E.2d 98 (1986).

Sec. 10. Joint ownership of generation and transmission facilities.

CASE NOTES

Cited in State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Carolina Util. Customers Ass'n, 314 N.C. 171, 333 S.E.2d 259 (1985); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Eddleman, 320 N.C. 344, 358 S.E.2d 339 (1987).

Sec. 11. Capital projects for agriculture.

Editor's Note. —
Session Laws 1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 814, s. 1 and c. 933, s. 1 both added new sections to N.C. Const., Art. V. These amendments were adopted by vote of the people at the election held Nov. 4, 1986, and have been designated N.C. Const., Art. V, §§ 12 and 13 at the direction of the Revisor of Statutes.

Sec. 12. Higher education facilities.

Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Constitution, the General Assembly may enact general laws to authorize the State or any State entity to issue revenue bonds to finance and refinance the cost of acquiring, constructing, and financing higher education facilities to be operated to serve and benefit the public for any nonprofit private corporation, regardless of any church or religious relationship provided no cost incurred earlier than five years prior to the effective date of this section shall be refinanced. Such bonds shall be payable from any revenues or assets of any such nonprofit private corporation pledged therefor, shall not be secured by a pledge of the full faith and credit of the State or such State entity or deemed to create an indebtedness requiring voter approval of the State or such entity, and, where the title to such facilities is vested in the State or any State entity, may be secured by an agreement which may provide for the conveyance of title to, with or without consideration, such facilities to the nonprofit private corporation. The power of eminent domain shall not be used pursuant hereto. (1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 814.)

Cross References. — For the Higher Educational Facilities Finance Act, see § 115E-1 et seq.

Editor's Note. — This section was added by constitutional amendment adopted by vote of the people at the election held Nov. 4, 1986, and became effective November 25, 1986.

Sec. 13. Seaport and airport facilities.

(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution, the General Assembly may enact general laws to grant to the State, counties, municipalities, and other State and local governmental entities all powers useful in connection with the development of new and existing seaports and airports, and to authorize such public bodies:

(a) To acquire, construct, own, own jointly with public and private parties, lease as lessee, mortgage, sell, lease as lessor, or otherwise dispose of lands and facilities and improvements, including undivided interests therein;

(b) To finance and refinance for public and private parties seaport and airport facilities and improvements which relate to, develop or further waterborne or airborne commerce and cargo and passenger traffic, including commercial, industrial, manufacturing, processing, mining, transportation, distribution, storage, marine, aviation and environmental facilities and improvements; and

(c) To secure any such financing or refinancing by all or any portion of their revenues, income or assets or other available monies associated with any of their seaport or airport facilities and with the facilities and improvements to be financed or refinanced, and by foreclosable liens on all or any part of their properties associated with any of their seaport or airport facilities and with the facilities and improvements to be financed or refinanced, but in no event to create a debt secured by a pledge of the faith and credit of the State or any other public body in the State. (1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 933, s. 1.)

Cross References. — As to specific powers of municipalities, see § 63-53. For the North Carolina Global TransPark Authority Act, see § 63A-1 et seq.

Editor's Note. — This section was added by constitutional amendment adopted by vote of the people at the election held Nov. 4, 1986, and became effective November 25, 1986.

As enacted and adopted, this section contained the designation "(1)," but no designation "(2)."

Sec. 14. Not in effect.

Defeated Amendment Proposal. — An amendment proposed by Session Laws 1993, c. 497, s. 1, and defeated at the election held November 2, 1993, would have added a new § 14 relating to the authority of any county, city or town to borrow money, without the need of voter approval, and issue financing bonds to be used to finance public activities associated with private economic development projects.

ARTICLE VI

SUFFRAGE AND ELIGIBILITY TO OFFICE

Sec. 2. Qualifications of voter.

CASE NOTES

Stated in United States v. McLean, 904 F.2d 216 (4th Cir.)

Cited in Farnsworth v. Jones, 114 N.C. App. 182, 441 S.E.2d 597 (1994).

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Nolo Contendere Plea Brings No Forfeiture of Rights. — At least under the wording of N.C. Const., Art. VI, § 2, a plea of nolo contendere or "no contest" to a felony charge would not result in the forfeiture of any rights of citizenship, including the right to vote. See opinion of Attorney General to Ms. Bessie J. Cherry, Clerk of Court, Washington, North Carolina, 49 N.C.A.G. 134 (1980).

Sec. 6. Eligibility to elective office.

Legal Periodicals. — For note, "Baker v. Martin and the Constitutionality of Partisan Qualifications for Appointment to District Courts," see 70 N.C.L. Rev. 1916 (1992).

CASE NOTES

The words "by the people" make it clear the section refers to the process of election. Baker v. Martin, 330 N.C. 331, 410 S.E.2d 887 (1991).

Section Refers to Election to Office. — The history of this section supports the conclusion that it is meant to refer to an "election to office" situation rather than to appointment to an "elective office." Baker v. Martin, 330 N.C. 331, 410 S.E.2d 887 (1991).

Subsection (a) of this section imposes an unconstitutional additional qualification for election to office, contrary to the provisions of this section. Moore v. Knightdale Bd. of Elections, 331 N.C. 1, 413 S.E.2d 541 (1992).

Preference May Be Given to Political Party of Vacating Judge. — Section 7A-142, which provides that candidates for a vacancy in the office of a district judge shall be members of the same political party as the vacating judge, does not violate the Constitution of North Carolina. Baker v. Martin, 330 N.C. 331, 410 S.E.2d 887 (1991).

Sec. 8. Disqualifications for office.

Legal Periodicals. — For essay, "Something There Is That Doesn't Love a Wall: Reflections on the History of North Carolina's Religious Test for Public Office," see 64 N.C.L. Rev. 1071 (1986).

CASE NOTES

Additional Disqualifications. — The wording of this section does not necessarily imply that additional disqualifications cannot be added by the General Assembly for those persons not elected by the people. Instead this section merely enumerates three disqualifications, one of which applies only to offices filled by election by the people. Baker v. Martin, 330 N.C. 331, 410 S.E.2d 887 (1991).

Stated in United States v. McLean, 904 F.2d 216 (4th Cir.)

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Nolo Contendere Plea Brings No Forfeiture of Rights. — At least under the wording of N.C. Const., Art. VI, § 2, a plea of nolo contendere or "no contest" to a felony charge would not result in the forfeiture of any rights of citizenship, including the right to vote. See opinion of Attorney General to Ms. Bessie J. Cherry, Clerk of Court, Washington, North Carolina, 49 N.C.A.G. 134 (1980).

Sec. 9. Dual office holding.

CASE NOTES

Effect of Local Law. — Chapter 129 of the 1983 N.C. Laws, insofar as it provides for dual office holding in a local law, is unconstitutional. Ratcliff v. County of Buncombe, 663 F. Supp. 1003 (W.D.N.C. 1987).

Quoted in Moore v. Knightdale Bd. of Elections, 331 N.C. 1, 413 S.E.2d 541 (1992).

Cited in Ratcliff v. County of Buncombe, 759 F.2d 1183 (4th Cir. 1985).

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Police Officer Holding Position as Elected Officer. — A person holding an appointive office as a police officer can concurrently hold a position as an elected officer in either State or local government, including as a school board member. See opinion of Attorney General to Captain Bobby Kilgore, Monroe Public Safety Department, 55 N.C.A.G. 34 (1985).

Service of County Commissioner or Board or Commission. — Under § 128-1.2, whenever a board of county commissioners appoints one of its own members to another board or commission, the county commissioner so appointed is considered to be serving on such board or commission as a part of his or her office as a county commissioner. See opinion of Attorney General to C. Preston Cornelius, Senior Resident, Superior Court Judge, 60 N.C.A.G. 50 (1990).

Sec. 10. Continuation in office.

CASE NOTES

Quoted in Moore v. Knightdale Bd. of Elections, 331 N.C. 1, 413 S.E.2d 541 (1992).

ARTICLE VII

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Section 1. General Assembly to provide for local government.

Legal Periodicals. — For 1984 survey, "Competitive Annexation Among Municipalities: North Carolina Adopts the Prior Jurisdiction Rule," see 63 N.C.L. Rev. 1260 (1985).

CASE NOTES

Counties, Cities and Towns, etc. — This section gives the General Assembly the authority to provide for the organization and government of counties, including the granting of such powers and duties to the counties as it deems advisable. As an agent of the State, a county has no inherent power, but may exercise only those powers prescribed by statute and those necessarily implied by law. In re Easement of Right of Way, 90 N.C. App. 303, 368 S.E.2d 639 (1988).

Council Could Not Be Estopped From Terminating Unauthorized Payments Without Notice. — Where a town's resolution appropriating a certain percentage of its alcoholic beverage control revenue to county school board was outside the authority of the town council, the town council could not be estopped from terminating the unauthorized payments without notice. Watauga County Bd. of Educ. v. Town of Boone, 106 N.C. App. 270, 416 S.E.2d 411 (1992).

Annexation Provisions Not Invalid as Special Legislation. — Sections 160A-45 et seq. do not violate N.C. Const., Art. II, § 24, which prohibits the General Assembly from enacting "any local, private, or special act or resolution" in regard to certain enumerated subjects. This constitutional provision does not apply to annexation proceedings by municipalities, since this section authorizes the General Assembly "except as otherwise prohibited by this Constitution" to "give such powers and duties to counties, cities, and towns and other governmental subdivisions as it may deem advisable," and no other provision of the Constitution prohibits the General Assembly from enacting special legislation for the annexation of areas by municipalities. Campbell v. City of Greensboro, 70 N.C. App. 252, 319 S.E.2d 323, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 312 N.C. 492, 322 S.E.2d 553 (1984).

Annexation of Land Without Annexing Similar Land. — It is not a denial of the equal protection of the law for a city to annex land without annexing other land similarly situated. Piedmont Ford Truck Sale, Inc. v. City of Greensboro, 324 N.C. 499, 380 S.E.2d 107 (1989).

Quoted in In re City of Durham Annexation Ordinance Numbered 5991 for Area A, 69 N.C. App. 77, 316 S.E.2d 649 (1984).

Cited in Piedmont Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. City of Greensboro, 90 N.C. App. 692, 370 S.E.2d 262 (1988).

Sec. 2. Sheriffs.

Defeated Amendment Proposal. — An amendment proposed by Session Laws 1985, c. 768, ss. 9.1(2) and (10), and defeated at the primary election held on May 6, 1986, would have amended this section by inserting "except in 1988 at the same time and places as members of the United States House of Representatives are elected" following "General Assembly are enacted," and by adding "except that those elected in 1986 or 1988 shall serve for terms of five years" at the end of the section.

CASE NOTES

Sheriffs Are Local Officers. — In providing for the organization of local governments, the N.C. Constitution does not make sheriffs state rather than local officers; therefore, Industrial Commission did not have jurisdiction to hear claims of negligence against county sheriffs. Hull v. Oldham, 104 N.C. App. 29, 407 S.E.2d 611, cert. denied, 330 N.C. 441, 412 S.E.2d 72 (1991).

Cited in Messick v. Catawba County, 110 N.C. App. 707, 431 S.E.2d 489 (1993); Durham Herald Co. v. County of Durham, 334 N.C. 677, 435 S.E.2d 317 (1993).

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Confiscated Drugs. — If federal authorities confiscate drug related property and thereafter return a part of it to local authorities for law enforcement purposes, the North Carolina Constitution and laws do not require these funds to go to the local school board as forfeited property and they may be used by local law enforcement. See opinion of the Attorney General to Mr. Aubrey S. Tomlinson, Jr., Attorney for Franklin County, 58 N.C.A.G. 51 (1988).

ARTICLE VIII

CORPORATIONS

Section 1. Corporate charters.

CASE NOTES

Cited in In re City of Durham Annexation Ordinance Numbered 5991 for Area A, 69 N.C. App. 77, 316 S.E.2d 649 (1984).

ARTICLE IX

EDUCATION

Section 1. Education encouraged.

Legal Periodicals. —

For note, "Delconte v. State: Some Thoughts on Home Education," see 64 N.C.L. Rev. 1302 (1986).

CASE NOTES

Education is a governmental function so fundamental in this state that our constitution contains a separate article entitled "Education." Rowan County Bd. of Educ. v. United States Gypsum Co., 332 N.C. 1, 418 S.E.2d 648 (1992).

Quoted in Faulkner v. New Bern-Craven County Bd. of Educ., 311 N.C. 42, 316 S.E.2d 281 (1984).

Cited in Guilford County Bd. of Educ. v. Guilford County Bd. of Elections, 110 N.C. App. 506, 430 S.E.2d 681 (1993).

Sec. 2. Uniform system of schools.

Legal Periodicals. —

For note, "State v. Whittle Communications: Allowing Local School Boards to Turn on 'Channel One'," see 70 N.C.L. Rev. 1929 (1992).

CASE NOTES

Intent. — By mandating equal opportunities for all students, the framers of the Constitution and the voters that adopted it were emphasizing that the days of "separate but equal" education in this State were over, and that the people of this State were committed to providing all students with equal access to full participation in public schools, regardless of race or other classification. Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 86 N.C. App. 282, 357 S.E.2d 432, appeal dismissed, 320 N.C. 790, 361 S.E.2d 71 (1987).

Equal access to participation in the public school system is a fundamental right, etc. —

The fundamental right that is guaranteed by the Constitution is equal access to public schools; that is, every child has a fundamental right to receive an education in public schools. Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 86 N.C. App. 282, 357 S.E.2d 432, appeal dismissed, 320 N.C. 790, 361 S.E.2d 71 (1987).

A student's right to an education may be constitutionally denied when it is outweighed by the school's interest in protecting other students, teachers, and school property, and in preventing the disruption of the educational system. In re Jackson, 84 N.C. App. 167, 352 S.E.2d 449 (1987).

As a general rule, a student may be constitutionally suspended or expelled for misconduct, whenever the conduct is of a type the school may legitimately prohibit, and procedural due process is provided. In re Jackson, 84 N.C. App. 167, 352 S.E.2d 449 (1987).

State Has Responsibility for Overseeing Public Schools. — Under the Constitution, the State is given responsibility for overseeing the public schools of this State in order to ensure that every student in the State receives the education to which he or she is entitled. Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 86 N.C. App. 282, 357 S.E.2d 432, appeal dismissed, 320 N.C. 790, 361 S.E.2d 71 (1987).

Contract for Current Affairs Video Not Unconstitutional. — A local school board's contract with the developer of a short current affairs video did not violate this section; students were not required to watch the program and therefore were not being made to pay for the contract with the time they spent watching it. State v. Whittle Communications, 328 N.C. 456, 402 S.E.2d 556 (1991).

Distribution of Funds. —

Action for declaratory and injunctive relief brought by minors who were, or would be in the future, enrolled in public schools in the county, and their parents or legal guardians, alleging that the present statutory system of financing public schools in this State resulted in inequities in educational programs and facilities between the public schools within that county, which had a relatively low tax base from which to draw funds, and those in other counties with relatively high tax bases, and that the operation of five separate school systems in that county prohibited effective use of facilities and staff and promoted inequitable use of state and local funds, thus depriving them of equal opportunity to a free public school education in violation of subsection (1) of this section, and N.C.

Const., Art. I, §§ 1, 15 and 19, failed to allege facts entitling them to relief or conferring jurisdiction on the courts of this State. Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 86 N.C. App. 282, 357 S.E.2d 432, appeal dismissed, 320 N.C. 790, 361 S.E.2d 71 (1987).

Consolidation Upheld. — Act to consolidate existing school administrative units did not violate subdivision (1) of this section of the Constitution. Guilford County Bd. of Educ. v. Guilford County Bd. of Elections, 110 N.C. App. 506, 430 S.E.2d 681 (1993).

Minimum funding requirement of act to consolidate existing school administrative units did not violate subsection (2) of this section. Guilford County Bd. of Educ. v. Guilford County Bd. of Elections, 110 N.C. App. 506, 430 S.E.2d 681 (1993).

Quoted in Rowan County Bd. of Educ. v. United States Gypsum Co., 332 N.C. 1, 418 S.E.2d 648 (1992).

Cited in Moore v. Wykle, 107 N.C. App. 120, 419 S.E.2d 164 (1992).

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

As to the rights of a student to attend the school system in which he, his parents or legal guardian are domiciled, and the duty and authority of local boards of education concerning the enrollment of students who are and are not domiciled in their school systems, see opinion of Attorney General to Mr. C. Wade Mobley, Superintendent, Rowan County Schools, 55 N.C.A.G. 61 (1985).

Sec. 3. School attendance.

Legal Periodicals. —

For note, "Delconte v. State: Some Thoughts on Home Education," see 64 N.C.L. Rev. 1302 (1986).

CASE NOTES

"Educated by other means". — The North Carolina Constitution requires the General Assembly to permit children of this State to be "educated by other means" than in the public schools. Delconte v. State, 313 N.C. 384, 329 S.E.2d 636 (1985).

Sec. 5. Powers and duties of Board.

Legal Periodicals. —

For article, "The Pearl in the Oyster: The Public Trust Doctrine in North Carolina," see 12 Campbell L. Rev. 23 (1989).

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Establishing Certified Employees' Salaries and Amount of Work. — N.C. Const., Art. IX, § 5 and §§ 115C-12(9), 115C-272(a), 115C-284(c), 115C-296 and 115C-315(d) give the State Board of Education the authority to establish salary schedules for all certified employees and to establish the amount of work required to earn those salaries. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. James O. Barber, Controller, State Board of Education, 55 N.C.A.G. 1 (1985).

Sec. 6. State school fund.

CASE NOTES

Quoted in Rowan County Bd. of Educ. v. United States Gypsum Co., 87 N.C. App. 106, 359 S.E.2d 814 (1987); Rowan County Bd. of Educ. v. United States Gypsum Co., 332 N.C. 1, 418 S.E.2d 648 (1992).

Sec. 7. County school fund.

Cross References. — As to allocation of revenues to local school administrative units, and definition of "clear proceeds," as referred to in this section, see § 115C-437.

Legal Periodicals. — For article, "Fines, Penalties, and Forfeitures: An Historical and Comparative Analysis," see 65 N.C.L. Rev. 49 (1986).

CASE NOTES

The term "penal laws," as used in the context of this section, means laws that impose a monetary payment for their violation. The payment is punitive rather than remedial in nature and is intended to penalize the wrongdoer rather than to compensate a particular party. Mussallam v. Mussallam, 321 N.C. 504, 364 S.E.2d 364, rehearing denied, 321 N.C. 116, 367 S.E.2d 915 (1988).

Two Funds for Public Schools. — The provisions of this section relating to the clear proceeds from penalties, forfeitures and fines identify two distinct funds for the public schools. These are (1) the clear proceeds of all penalties and forfeitures in all cases, regardless of their nature, so long as they accrue to the state, and (2) the clear proceeds of all fines collected for any breach of the criminal laws. Mussallam v. Mussallam, 321 N.C. 504, 364 S.E.2d 364, rehearing denied, 321 N.C. 116, 367 S.E.2d 915 (1988).

This section establishes two funds for public schools: (1) the clear proceeds of all penalties and forfeitures in all cases, regardless of their nature, so long as they accrue to the state; and (2) the clear proceeds of all fines collected for any breach of the criminal laws. United States v. Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Bd. of Educ., 902 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1990).

Bond Proceeds Held Payable to Board of Education. — In custody case in which wife sought to regain custody of child who had been removed outside the country, bond set by superior court judge was to ensure husband's appearance, as the punishment for his failure to so appear would be immediate forfeiture of the bond, and since the terms of the bond specifically made its proceeds payable to the state of North Carolina should it be forfeited, such bond was penal in nature and accrued to the Board of Education. Mussallam v. Mussallam, 321 N.C. 504, 364 S.E.2d 364, rehearing denied, 321 N.C. 116, 367 S.E.2d 915 (1988).

The 1985 amendment to § 115C-437, defining "clear proceeds," could only be effective as to monies collected because of traffic violations occurring on and after July 17, 1985. Cauble v. City of Asheville, 314 N.C. 598, 336 S.E.2d 59 (1985).

Disposition of Parking Fines. — The money penalty collected by a city from a motorist who violates its ordinance prohibiting overtime parking constitutes a penalty or fine collected for the breach of a state penal law, even if the motorist has not been convicted of violating § 14-4. Cauble v. City of Asheville, 314 N.C. 598, 336 S.E.2d 59 (1985).

The "clear proceeds" of a forfeiture, etc. — Reasonable costs of collection constitutionally may be deducted from the gross proceeds of the fines collected by a city for overtime parking. Cauble v. City of Asheville, 314 N.C. 598, 336 S.E.2d 59 (1985).

Applicable Forfeitures. — This section applies only to forfeitures that result from a breach of North Carolina penal law and not to forfeitures initiated by a federal agency because of a violation of federal law. United States v.

Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Bd. of Educ., 902 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1990).

A forfeiture initiated by federal authorities and arising from violations of federal law is not controlled by this section. United States v. Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Bd. of Educ., 902 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1990).

RICO Forfeitures. — Since the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) provides that the proceeds from the sale of RICO forfeited property accrue to the State, such proceeds must therefore be paid to the public school fund pursuant to this section. State ex rel. Thornburg v. 532 "B" Street, 334 N.C. 290, 432 S.E.2d 684 (1993).

Forfeitures of § 90-112(d1) Compared. — The plain language of this section limits its application to forfeitures resulting from a "breach of the penal laws of the State" and § 90-112(d1) of the North Carolina Act refers only to forfeitures "pursuant to this section." United States v. Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Bd. of Educ., 902 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1990).

The test for determining permissible deductions, etc. —

In accord with the main volume. See Harrell v. Harriet & Henderson Yarns, 314 N.C. 566, 336 S.E.2d 47 (1985), decided prior to 1985 amendment to § 115C-437 defining "clear proceeds."

The costs of collection do not include the costs associated with enforcing the ordinance, but are limited to the administrative costs of collecting the funds. Cauble v. City of Asheville, 314 N.C. 598, 336 S.E.2d 59 (1985).

Use of Penal Fines. — This section provides that the fines collected for any breach of the penal laws shall be used exclusively for the benefit of the public schools. Any judgment of a trial judge which seeks to direct payment of a fine anywhere other than to the counties for the use of the public schools is unconstitutional. Florence v. Hiatt, 101 N.C. App. 539, 400 S.E.2d 118 (1991).

Federal Forfeiture Law Held Applicable. — Where city police seized cash from a drug dealer, the city police could share in the proceeds according to federal forfeiture law. Federal and state forfeiture laws did not conflict, as this section applies only to forfeitures resulting from a breach of the penal laws of North Carolina, and the cash in question was forfeited because it was used in violation of a federal law. United States v. Alston, 717 F. Supp. 378 (M.D.N.C. 1989), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Bd. of Educ., 902 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1990).

Quoted in Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 86 N.C. App. 282, 357 S.E.2d 432 (1987).

Cited in State ex rel. Thornburg v. Currency in Amount of $52,029.00, 324 N.C. 276, 378 S.E.2d 1 (1989).

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Confiscated Drugs. — If federal authorities confiscate drug related property and thereafter return a part of it to local authorities for law enforcement purposes, the North Carolina Constitution and laws do not require these funds to go to the local school board as forfeited property and they may be used by local law enforcement. See opinion of the Attorney General to Mr. Aubrey S. Tomlinson, Jr., Attorney for Franklin County, 57 N.C.A.G. 51 (1988).

Counties do not have a sound legal basis for contesting the action of the United States Attorney in confiscating drug related property where all aspects of the investigation, search, arrest and seizure are handled by State law enforcement officials and all criminal charges are in State court. Where federal agents participate in the investigation, arrest or seizure the county has no legal standing. See opinion of the Attorney General to Mr. Aubrey S. Tomlinson, Jr., Attorney for Franklin County, 57 N.C.A.G. 51 (1988).

Sec. 8. Higher education.

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

TACIT Program Upheld. — The TACIT Program, offered by North Carolina State University's Department of Urban Affairs to units of local government to educate employees with respect to selecting appropriate computer equipment, does not violate the provisions of § 66-58. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. George E. Tatum, Register of Deeds, Cumberland County, 55 N.C.A.G. 101 (1986).

Sec. 9. Benefits of public institutions of higher education.

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Local School Administrative Unit Levying Taxes at Local Level. — The legislature may by statute, consistently with the Constitution, provide that a local school administrative unit may levy taxes at the local level but such taxing authority must be conferred either by a general law, applicable statewide, or by local act subject to a vote of those persons affected. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. John B. Dunn, Superintendent, Edenton-Chowan Schools, — N.C.A.G. — (April 24, 1990).

TACIT Program Upheld. — The TACIT Program, offered by North Carolina State University's Department of Urban Affairs to units of local government to educate employees with respect to selecting appropriate computer equipment, does not violate the provisions of § 66-58. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. George E. Tatum, Register of Deeds, Cumberland County, 55 N.C.A.G. 101 (1986).

ARTICLE X

HOMESTEADS AND EXEMPTIONS

Section 1. Personal property exemptions.

CASE NOTES

Section 1C-1601(c) and Section 1C-1603(e)(2) are Unconstitutional. — Section 1C-1601(c) and section 1C-1603(e)(2), as they attempt to limit the claiming of constitutional exemptions to 20 days after notice to designate is served, are unconstitutional. HFC v. Ellis, 107 N.C. App. 262, 419 S.E.2d 592 (1992), cert. granted, 333 N.C. 167, 424 S.E.2d 909 (1992).

Neither this section nor § 1C-1601(a) confers any property exemptions on past residents of this State. Indeed, the constitutional and statutory provisions both contemplate the possibility that changes in the debtor's residency or other changing circumstances may warrant subsequent modification of the debtor's right to constitutional or statutory exemptions. First Union Nat'l Bank v. Rolfe, 90 N.C. App. 85, 367 S.E.2d 367 (1988).

Residency. — Irrespective of defendant's resident status previously, the trial court correctly determined defendant's residency based upon the evidence at the 1987 hearing. First Union Nat'l Bank v. Rolfe, 90 N.C. App. 85, 367 S.E.2d 367 (1988).

Where the only evidence supporting defendant's contention of residency was her statement that she "hoped" to return to this state as soon as her sister's estate in Ireland was settled, this general declaration did not of itself defeat the trial court's findings of nonresidency, in light of the other facts of the case, especially the undisputed evidence that defendant had moved to Ireland (her place of citizenship) at least one year previously, had no dwelling in this state, and offered no definite plan to return. First Union Nat'l Bank v. Rolfe, 90 N.C. App. 85, 367 S.E.2d 367 (1988).

Cited in In re Mims, 49 Bankr. 283 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. 1985); First Union Nat'l Bank v. Rolfe, 83 N.C. App. 625, 351 S.E.2d 117 (1986).

Sec. 2. Homestead exemptions.

CASE NOTES

I. Homestead Exemption Generally.

I. HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION GENERALLY.

Cited in In re Mims, 49 Bankr. 283 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1985).

Sec. 3. Mechanics' and laborers' liens.

Legal Periodicals. — For article on "North Carolina Construction Law Survey II," see 22 Wake Forest L. Rev. 481 (1987).

Sec. 4. Property of married women secured to them.

CASE NOTES

Purpose to Give Wives Same Rights as Husbands. — The historical context of this Article makes clear that wives were simply accorded rights in their property similar to those rights husbands already enjoyed in their own property. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 85 N.C. App. 93, 354 S.E.2d 350 (1987), rev'd on other grounds, 322 N.C. 396, 368 S.E.2d 595 (1988).

Section Subject to Limitation Prescribed by General Assembly. — Whatever the remedial purpose of this section, it is by its own terms subject to limitations prescribed by the General Assembly, including any statutory classification and distribution of property under the Equitable Distribution Act. Under § 50-20(b) of that Act, military retirement pay is treated no differently, whether its recipient is male or female. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 85 N.C. App. 93, 354 S.E.2d 350 (1987), rev'd on other grounds, 322 N.C. 396, 368 S.E.2d 595 (1988).

Stated in White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 324 S.E.2d 829 (1985).

Cited in Armstrong v. Armstrong, 322 N.C. 396, 368 S.E.2d 595 (1988); Dunn v. Pate, 334 N.C. 115, 431 S.E.2d 178 (1993).

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

The requirement that an equitable distribution of property must follow a decree of absolute divorce is statutory and not constitutional. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Henson P. Barnes, North Carolina Senate, 57 N.C.A.G. 30 (1987).

Sec. 5. Insurance.

CASE NOTES

Treatment of Insurance Proceeds When Received by Beneficiary. — Upon filing a bankruptcy petition, a debtor can claim as exempt the value of life insurance policy. There is no provision, however, that extends the protection of the life insurance exemption to the beneficiary of the policy once the proceeds are in the beneficiary's hands. The proceeds are treated like any other asset of the beneficiary and are available to his creditors, except to the extent that an exemption or other protection is available to the beneficiary in his own right under applicable law. The result is no different where the beneficiary is the codebtor of the insured in a joint bankruptcy case. Butler v. Sharik, 41 Bankr. 388 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1984).

Cited in In re Ragan, 64 Bankr. 384 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986); HFC v. Ellis, 107 N.C. App. 262, 419 S.E.2d 592 (1992), cert. granted, 333 N.C. 167, 424 S.E.2d 909 (1992).

ARTICLE XI

PUNISHMENTS, CORRECTIONS, AND CHARITIES

Section 1. Punishments.

CASE NOTES

Fines as Constitutional Punishment. — Fines are a pecuniary punishment extracted by the State. They are a permitted form of punishment under the state constitution. Florence v. Hiatt, 101 N.C. App. 539, 400 S.E.2d 118 (1991).

Quoted in Henry v. Edmisten, 315 N.C. 474, 340 S.E.2d 720 (1986).

Sec. 2. Death punishment.

Legal Periodicals. — For symposium address on the death penalty in North Carolina, see 8 Campbell L. Rev. 1 (1985).

For article, "Prosecutorial Abuse of Peremptory Challenges in Death Penalty Litigation: Some Constitutional and Ethical Considerations," see 8 Campbell L. Rev. 71 (1985).

Sec. 3. Charitable and correctional institutions and agencies.

CASE NOTES

Obligation of County to Pay for Health Care of Indigent Sick. — A county does not have an obligation, under this section and N.C. Const., Art. XI, § 4, to pay for hospital care for its indigent residents. In the absence of a delegation by the State to the counties of the obligation to pay the costs of medical care of the indigent sick, such obligation is that of the State. Craven County Hosp. Corp. v. Lenoir County, 75 N.C. App. 453, 331 S.E.2d 690, cert. denied, 314 N.C. 663, 336 S.E.2d 620 (1985).

Sec. 4. Welfare policy; board of public welfare.

Legal Periodicals. — For article, "The Obligation of North Carolina Municipalities and Hospital Authorities to Provide Uncompensated Hospital Care to the Medically Indigent," see 20 Wake Forest L. Rev. 317 (1984).

CASE NOTES

Obligation of County to Pay for Health Care of Indigent Sick. — A county does not have an obligation, under N.C. Const., Art. XI, § 3 and this section, to pay for hospital care to its indigent residents. In the absence of a delegation by the State to the counties of the obligation to pay the costs of medical care of the indigent sick, such obligation is that of the State. Craven County Hosp. Corp. v. Lenoir County, 75 N.C. App. 453, 331 S.E.2d 690, cert. denied, 314 N.C. 663, 336 S.E.2d 620 (1985).

ARTICLE XIV

MISCELLANEOUS

Sec. 3. General laws defined.

Legal Periodicals. — For note, "Town of Emerald Isle v. State of North Carolina: A New Test for Distinguishing Between General Laws and Local Legislation," see 66 N.C.L. Rev. 1096 (1988).

CASE NOTES

Dual Office Holding in Local Law Prohibited. — Chapter 129 of Session Laws 1983, insofar as it provides for dual office holding in a local law, is unconstitutional. Ratcliff v. County of Buncombe, 663 F. Supp. 1003 (W.D.N.C. 1987).

The purpose of Session Laws 1983, Chapter 539 was to establish pedestrian beach access facilities for general public use in the vicinity of Bogue Inlet, and it was a general law, not a local act. Town of Emerald Isle ex rel. Smith v. State, 320 N.C. 640, 360 S.E.2d 756 (1987).

Applied in In re City of Durham Annexation Ordinance Numbered 5991 for Area A, 69 N.C. App. 77, 316 S.E.2d 649 (1984); Floyd v. Lumberton City Bd. of Educ., 71 N.C. App. 670, 324 S.E.2d 18 (1984).

Cited in Town of Emerald Isle v. State, 78 N.C. App. 736, 338 S.E.2d 581 (1986); Piedmont Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. City of Greensboro, 90 N.C. App. 692, 370 S.E.2d 262 (1988); Clark v. Craven Regional Medical Auth., 326 N.C. 15, 387 S.E.2d 168 (1990).

Sec. 5. Conservation of natural resources.

Cross References. — As to the Coastal Reserve Program, see § 113A-129.2.

Legal Periodicals. — For article, "The Pearl in the Oyster: The Public Trust Doctrine in North Carolina," see 12 Campbell L. Rev. 23 (1989).

CASE NOTES

Stated in State ex rel. Rohrer v. Credle, 322 N.C. 522, 369 S.E.2d 825 (1988).

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Three-Fifths Vote Not Necessary for Flowage Easement. — Dedication of Umstead State Park to the State Nature and Historic Preserve as authorized by this section does not require a vote of three-fifths of the members of each House of the General Assembly before a flowage easement may be granted to Wake County for flood control purposes. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. Charles L. Holliday, State Building Division, 55 N.C.A.G. 105 (1986).

Constitution of the United States

AMENDMENTS.

AMENDMENT XXVII.

No law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have intervened.

Editor's Note. — Amendment XXVII was certified by the Administrator of General Services on May 18, 1992, to have been ratified by three-fourths of the whole number of states and to have become valid as a part of the Constitution of the United States.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

Department of Justice

Raleigh, North Carolina

October 1, 1994

I, Michael F. Easley, Attorney General of North Carolina, do hereby certify that the foregoing 1994 Cumulative Supplement to the General Statutes of North Carolina was prepared and published by the Michie Company under the supervision of the Department of Justice of the State of North Carolina.

Michael F. Easley
Attorney General of North Carolina

TABLE OF LAWS CODIFIED SUBSEQUENT TO 1919

This table indicates the original codification of Session Laws in the General Statutes of North Carolina. This table does not reflect the repeal or renumbering of sections of the General Statutes since the original codification of a particular Session Law or section thereof.

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In instances where the effective date of an act has been postponed beyond January 1, 1995, the effective date of such act is indicated in the right-hand column.

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7A-572	Amended	27	3	
7A-577	Amended	27	1	
7A-601	Amended	22	28	
7A-602	Amended	24	14(c)	
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7A-609	Amended	22	26	
7A-610	Amended	22	27	
7A-675	Amended	7	1	
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14-2.5	Amended	24	14(b)	
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14-3	Amended	14	2	
14-3	Amended	24	14(b)	
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14-17	Amended	22	4	
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14-18	Amended	24	14(c)	
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14-20	Amended	22	5	
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14-31	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-32	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-32.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-32.2	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-33	Amended	14	3	
14-33	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-34	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-34.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-34.2	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-34.3	Amended	24	14(c)	
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14-43.2	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-43.3	Amended	24	14(c)	
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14-56.2	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-56.3	Amended	24	14(c)	
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14-58	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-59	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-60	Amended	24	14(c)	
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14-62	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-62.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-67.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-68	Amended	24	14(c)	
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14-69.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
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14-93	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-95	Repealed	14	71(6)	
14-97	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-99	Amended	24	14(c)	
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14-111.3	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-112	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-113	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-113.6	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-113.17	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-114	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-115	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-116	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-117	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-117.1	Repealed	14	72(5)	
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14-118.2	Amended	24	14(c)	
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14-122.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-127	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-128	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-129	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-130	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-131	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-132	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-132.2	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-133	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-134.2	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-134.3	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-135	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-136	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-137	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-138	Repealed	14	72(6)	
14-140	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-141	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-142	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-144	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-145	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-146	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-147	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-148	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-151	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-151.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-152	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-153	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-154	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-155	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-156	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-157	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-158	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-159	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-159.1	Amended	24	14(c)	

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14-159.2	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-159.6	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-159.8	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-159.12	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-159.13	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-159.21	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-159.22	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-160	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-160.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-161	Repealed	14	72(7)	
14-162	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-163.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-164	Repealed	14	72(8)	
14-165	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-166	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-167	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-168	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-168.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-168.4	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-169	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-175	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-176	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-177	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-178	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-179	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-183	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-184	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-186	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-188	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-190.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-190.4	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-190.5	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-190.8	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-190.9	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-190.14	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-190.15	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-190.16	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-190.17	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-190.17A	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-190.18	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-190.19	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-195	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-196	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-197	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-199	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-200	Repealed	14	72(9)	
14-201	Repealed	14	72(10)	
14-202	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-202.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-202.12	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-204.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-208	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-209	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-210	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-211	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-212	Repealed	14	71(7)	
14-212	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-217	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-218	Amended	24	14(c)	

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14-220	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-221	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-222	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-223	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-225	Amended	23	1	
14-225	Amended	23	2	
14-225	Amended	23	3	
14-225	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-225.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-225.2	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-226	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-226.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-227	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-227.3	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-228	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-230	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-231	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-232	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-233	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-234	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-234.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-235	Repealed	14	72(11)	
14-236	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-237	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-238	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-239	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-241	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-242	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-243	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-244	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-246	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-251	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-253	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-254	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-255	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-256	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-257	Repealed	14	72(12)	
14-258	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-258.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-258.2	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-258.3	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-259	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-268	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-269	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-269.1	Amended	16	2	
14-269.1	Amended	22	23	
14-269.2	Amended	14	4(b)	
14-269.2	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-269.3	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-269.4	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-269.6	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-269.7	Amended	14	5	
14-270	Repealed	14	72(13)	
14-271	Repealed	14	72(14)	
14-275.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-276.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-277	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-277.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-277.2	Amended	24	14(c)	

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14-277.3	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-277.4	Amended	14	6	
14-278	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-279	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-279.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-280	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-281	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-281.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-282	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-283	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-284	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-284.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-284.2	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-285	Repealed	14	72(15)	
14-286	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-286.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-286.2	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-287	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-288	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-288.2	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-288.4	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-288.5	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-288.6	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-288.7	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-288.8	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-288.9	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-288.12	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-288.13	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-288.14	Amended	14	7	
14-288.14	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-288.15	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-288.19	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-288.20	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-289	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-290	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-291	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-291.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-291.2	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-292	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-293	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-294	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-295	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-297	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-300	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-303	Amended	14	8(b)	
14-303	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-309	Amended	14	9(b)	
14-309	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-309.5	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-309.11	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-309.14	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-309.15	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-311	Amended	14	10	
14-313	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-315	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-315.1	Amended	14	11	
14-315.2	Amended	14	12	
14-316	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-316.1	Amended	24	14(c)	

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14-317	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-318	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-318.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-318.2	Amended	14	13	
14-318.2	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-318.4	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-320.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-321	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-322	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-326.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-329	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-342	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-343	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-344	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-345	Repealed	14	72(16)	
14-346	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-346.1	Repealed	14	72(17)	
14-346.2	Repealed	14	72(18)	
14-353	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-355	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-356	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-357	Repealed	14	72(19)	
14-358	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-359	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-360	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-361	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-361.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-362	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-362.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-363	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-363.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-366	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-367	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-368	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-369	Repealed	14	72(20)	
14-370	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-371	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-372	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-373	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-374	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-377	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-380.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-380.2	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-381	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-382	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-383	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-384	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-385	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-386	Repealed	14	72(21)	
14-389	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-391	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-394	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-395	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-395.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-396	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-397	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-398	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-399	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-399.2	Amended	24	14(c)	

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14-400	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-401	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-401.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-401.2	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-401.3	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-401.4	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-401.5	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-401.6	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-401.7	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-401.8	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-401.9	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-401.10	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-401.11	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-401.12	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-401.13	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-401.14	Amended	14	14(b)	
14-401.14	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-402	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-408	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-409	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-409.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-409.8	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-409.9	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-415	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-415.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-415.3	Added	13	1	
14-422	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-424	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-437	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-444	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-454	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-455	Amended	24	14(c)	
14-456	Amended	24	14(c)	
15-11.1	Amended	16	1	
15-176	Amended	24	14(c)	
15A-261	Amended	24	14(c)	
15A-266.11	Amended	14	15	
15A-343	Amended	24	14(c)	
15A-502	Amended	24	14(c)	
15A-505	Amended	26	1	
15A-541	Amended	24	14(c)	
15A-542	Amended	24	14(c)	
15A-543	Amended	14	16(b)	
15A-543	Amended	24	14(c)	
15A-615	Amended	8	1	
15A-731	Amended	24	14(c)	
15A-932	Amended	2	1	
15A-1022	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1301	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1331	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1331A	Added	20	1	
15A-1331A	Amended	20	5	
15A-1332	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1340.1	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1340.2	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1340.3	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1340.4	Amended	7	4	
15A-1340.4	Amended	22	21	
15A-1340.4	Amended	24	14(b)	

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15A-1340.5	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1340.6	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1340.7	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1340.10	Amended	22	35	
15A-1340.10	Amended	24	14(a)	
15A-1340.10	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1340.11	Amended	14	17	
15A-1340.11	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1340.12	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1340.13	Amended	14	18	
15A-1340.13	Amended	14	18.1	
15A-1340.13	Amended	14	19	
15A-1340.13	Amended	22	9	
15A-1340.13	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1340.14	Amended	22	10	
15A-1340.14	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1340.15	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1340.16	Amended	7	6	
15A-1340.16	Amended	22	22	
15A-1340.16	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1340.16A	Added	22	20	
15A-1340.17	Amended	14	20	
15A-1340.17	Amended	14	21	
15A-1340.17	Amended	22	7	
15A-1340.17	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1340.18	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1340.19	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1340.20	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1340.21	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1340.22	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1340.23	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1341	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1343	Amended	9	1	
15A-1343	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1343.1	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1343.2	Amended	14	22	
15A-1343.2	Amended	19	3	
15A-1343.2	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1344	Amended	19	2	
15A-1344	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1351	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1352	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1354	Amended	14	23	
15A-1355	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1368	Amended	14	24	
15A-1368	Amended	14	25	
15A-1368	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1368.1	Amended	14	26	
15A-1368.1	Amended	22	8	
15A-1368.1	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1368.2	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1368.3	Amended	14	27	
15A-1368.3	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1368.4	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1368.5	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1368.6	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1370.1	Amended	21	2	
15A-1370.1	Amended	22	33	
15A-1370.1	Amended	22	34	

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15A-1370.1	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1371	Amended	21	3	
15A-1371	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1371	Amended	25	1	
15A-1371	Amended	25	2	
15A-1372	Amended	21	4	
15A-1372	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1373	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1374	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1376	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1380.1	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1380.2	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1380.5	Added	21	7	
15A-1415	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1442	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1444	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-1445	Amended	14	28	
15A-1445	Amended	24	14(b)	
15A-2000	Amended	7	5	
15A-2002	Amended	21	5	
15A-2002	Amended	24	14(b)	
15B-7	Amended	24	14(c)	
15B-11	Amended	3	1	
16-4	Amended	24	14(c)	
16-5	Amended	24	14(c)	
17-25	Amended	24	14(c)	
17-27	Amended	24	14(c)	
17-28	Amended	24	14(c)	
17C-6	Amended	18	2	
17D-4	Amended	24	14(c)	
18B-102	Amended	14	29	
18B-102	Amended	24	14(c)	
18B-302	Amended	24	14(c)	
18B-401	Amended	24	14(c)	
18B-502	Amended	24	14(c)	
19A-13	Amended	24	14(c)	
19A-33	Amended	24	14(c)	
19A-34	Amended	24	14(c)	
19A-36	Amended	24	14(c)	
19A-48	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-11	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-15.1	Added	20	2	
20-28	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-29	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-30	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-31	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-34.1	Amended	14	30(b)	
20-34.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-35	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-37.6	Amended	14	31	
20-37.7	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-37.8	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-37.21	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-39	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-45	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-47	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-52.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-59	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-63	Amended	24	14(c)	

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20-71	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-71.4	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-72	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-73	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-74	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-75	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-77	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-79	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-94	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-96	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-102.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-106	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-106.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-106.2	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-107	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-108	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-109	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-109.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-111	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-112	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-115.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-116	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-118.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-119	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-120	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-124	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-127	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-130.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-135.2A	Amended	5	1	
20-136	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-137.2	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-138.2	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-138.3	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-138.5	Amended	14	32	
20-138.5	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-140	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-141	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-141.3	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-141.4	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-157	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-166	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-166.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-167.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-176	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-179.3	Amended	20	3	
20-183.11	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-215.4	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-217	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-219.2	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-279.31	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-284	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-308	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-310	Amended	14	33	
20-312	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-313	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-313.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-327	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-350	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-371	Amended	24	14(c)	

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20-390	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-395	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-396	Amended	24	14(c)	
20-397	Amended	24	14(c)	
23-9	Amended	14	34	
23-9	Amended	24	14(c)	
23-12	Amended	24	14(c)	
23-43	Amended	24	14(c)	
23-47	Amended	24	14(c)	
24-17	Amended	24	14(c)	
34-13	Amended	24	14(c)	
42-11	Amended	24	14(c)	
42-13	Amended	24	14(c)	
42-22	Amended	24	14(c)	
42-22.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
44A-24	Amended	24	14(c)	
44A-32	Amended	24	14(c)	
47-32.2	Amended	24	14(c)	
47-112	Amended	24	14(c)	
48-3	Amended	24	14(c)	
48-25	Amended	24	14(c)	
48-37	Amended	24	14(c)	
48-38	Amended	24	14(c)	
49-2	Amended	24	14(c)	
49-8	Amended	14	35	
50B-2	Amended	4	1	
50B-3	Amended	4	2	
50B-4	Amended	4	3	
51-7	Amended	24	14(c)	
51-13	Amended	24	14(c)	
51-15	Amended	24	14(c)	
53-63	Amended	24	14(c)	
53-86	Amended	24	14(c)	
53-124	Amended	24	14(c)	
53-125	Amended	24	14(c)	
53-126	Amended	24	14(c)	
53-127	Amended	24	14(c)	
53-128	Amended	24	14(c)	
53-129	Amended	24	14(c)	
53-130	Amended	24	14(c)	
53-131	Amended	24	14(c)	
53-132	Amended	24	14(c)	
53-134	Amended	24	14(c)	
53-166	Amended	24	14(c)	
53-208	Amended	24	14(c)	
53-247	Amended	24	14(c)	
54-109.5	Amended	24	14(c)	
54-109.105	Amended	24	14(c)	
54-157	Amended	24	14(c)	
54B-56	Amended	24	14(c)	
54B-66	Amended	24	14(c)	
54B-78	Amended	24	14(c)	
54C-54	Amended	24	14(c)	
54C-64	Amended	24	14(c)	
54C-79	Amended	24	14(c)	
55-1-29	Amended	24	14(c)	
55-1-32	Amended	24	14(c)	
55A-1-29	Amended	14	36	
55A-1-32	Amended	14	37	

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55A-80	Amended	24	14(c)	
57C-1-29	Amended	14	38	
57C-1-32	Amended	14	39	
58-1-25	Amended	24	14(c)	
58-1-30	Amended	24	14(c)	
58-1-35	Amended	24	14(c)	
58-2-200	Amended	24	14(c)	
58-3-60	Amended	24	14(c)	
58-3-85	Amended	24	14(c)	
58-3-130	Amended	24	14(c)	
58-7-50	Amended	24	14(c)	
58-16-20	Amended	24	14(c)	
58-19-50	Amended	24	14(c)	
58-21-105	Amended	24	14(c)	
58-24-180	Amended	24	14(c)	
58-25-70	Amended	24	14(c)	
58-27-5	Amended	24	14(c)	
58-28-45	Amended	24	14(c)	
58-30-12	Amended	24	14(c)	
58-31-60	Amended	24	14(c)	
58-33-95	Amended	24	14(c)	
58-33-100	Amended	24	14(c)	
58-33-105	Amended	24	14(c)	
58-33-110	Amended	24	14(c)	
58-33-115	Amended	24	14(c)	
58-33-120	Amended	24	14(c)	
58-35-30	Amended	24	14(c)	
58-35-90	Amended	24	14(c)	
58-39-115	Amended	24	14(c)	
58-43-35	Amended	24	14(c)	
58-50-40	Amended	24	14(c)	
58-50-70	Amended	24	14(c)	
58-57-80	Amended	24	14(c)	
58-64-75	Amended	24	14(c)	
58-67-165	Amended	24	14(c)	
58-69-35	Amended	24	14(c)	
58-70-1	Amended	24	14(c)	
58-71-165	Amended	24	14(c)	
58-71-185	Amended	24	14(c)	
58-81-5	Amended	24	14(c)	
58-81-10	Amended	24	14(c)	
58-82-1	Amended	24	14(c)	
62-144	Amended	24	14(c)	
62-150	Amended	24	14(c)	
62-221	Amended	24	14(c)	
62-224	Amended	24	14(c)	
62-226	Amended	24	14(c)	
62-229	Amended	24	14(c)	
62-273	Amended	24	14(c)	
62-313	Amended	24	14(c)	
62-318	Amended	24	14(c)	
62-319	Amended	24	14(c)	
62-320	Amended	24	14(c)	
62-322	Amended	24	14(c)	
62-323	Amended	24	14(c)	
62-325	Amended	24	14(c)	
62-326	Amended	24	14(c)	
62-327	Amended	24	14(c)	
62A-12	Amended	24	14(c)	

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63-18	Amended	24	14(c)	
63-23	Amended	24	14(c)	
63-25	Amended	24	14(c)	
63-26	Amended	24	14(c)	
63-26.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
63-27	Amended	24	14(c)	
63-28	Amended	24	14(c)	
63-35	Amended	24	14(c)	
63A-7	Amended	24	14(c)	
65-57	Amended	24	14(c)	
65-71	Amended	24	14(c)	
65-72	Amended	24	14(c)	
66-4	Amended	24	14(c)	
66-10	Amended	24	14(c)	
66-11	Amended	14	40(b)	
66-11	Amended	14	40(c)	
66-11	Amended	24	14(c)	
66-11.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
66-16	Amended	24	14(c)	
66-22	Amended	24	14(c)	
66-27	Amended	24	14(c)	
66-27.3	Amended	24	14(c)	
66-27.5	Amended	24	14(c)	
66-34	Amended	24	14(c)	
66-58	Amended	24	14(c)	
66-64	Amended	24	14(c)	
66-66	Amended	24	14(c)	
66-67.2	Amended	24	14(c)	
66-71	Amended	24	14(c)	
66-75	Amended	24	14(c)	
66-81	Amended	24	14(c)	
66-86	Amended	24	14(c)	
66-97	Amended	24	14(c)	
66-108	Amended	24	14(c)	
66-109	Amended	24	14(c)	
66-135	Amended	24	14(c)	
66-145	Amended	24	14(c)	
66-167	Amended	24	14(c)	
66-169	Amended	24	14(c)	
66-172	Amended	24	14(c)	
66-173	Amended	24	14(c)	
66-225	Amended	24	14(c)	
67-2	Amended	24	14(c)	
67-3	Amended	24	14(c)	
67-4	Amended	24	14(c)	
67-4.2	Amended	24	14(c)	
67-4.3	Amended	24	14(c)	
67-12	Amended	24	14(c)	
67-16	Amended	24	14(c)	
68-16	Amended	24	14(c)	
68-21	Amended	24	14(c)	
68-22	Amended	24	14(c)	
68-24	Amended	24	14(c)	
68-25	Amended	24	14(c)	
68-44	Amended	24	14(c)	
70-4	Amended	24	14(c)	
70-40	Amended	24	14(c)	
72-7.1	Amended	14	41	
72-7.1	Amended	14	42	

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72-7.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
72-30	Amended	24	14(c)	
72-37	Amended	24	14(c)	
72-38	Amended	24	14(c)	
72-43	Amended	24	14(c)	
72-44	Amended	24	14(c)	
72-51	Amended	24	14(c)	
73-4	Amended	24	14(c)	
74-24.14	Amended	24	14(c)	
74-30	Amended	24	14(c)	
74-64	Amended	24	14(c)	
74-87	Amended	24	14(c)	
74C-17	Amended	24	14(c)	
74D-11	Amended	24	14(c)	
75-6	Amended	24	14(c)	
75-12	Amended	24	14(c)	
75-28	Amended	14	43	
75-28	Amended	24	14(c)	
75-30	Amended	24	14(c)	
75A-5	Amended	24	14(c)	
75A-5.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
75A-6.1	Amended	14	44	
75A-18	Amended	24	14(c)	
75A-47	Amended	24	14(c)	
75A-48	Amended	24	14(c)	
75D-6	Amended	24	14(c)	
75D-7	Amended	24	14(c)	
76-40	Amended	24	14(c)	
76-41	Amended	24	14(c)	
76-42	Amended	24	14(c)	
76-43	Amended	24	14(c)	
76-47	Amended	24	14(c)	
76-57	Amended	24	14(c)	
76-58	Amended	24	14(c)	
76A-16	Amended	24	14(c)	
76A-46	Amended	14	45	
76A-46	Amended	24	14(c)	
77-7	Amended	24	14(c)	
77-12	Amended	24	14(c)	
77-13	Amended	24	14(c)	
77-14	Amended	24	14(c)	
77-37	Amended	24	14(c)	
78C-78	Amended	24	14(c)	
80-20	Amended	24	14(c)	
80-22	Amended	24	14(c)	
80-23	Amended	24	14(c)	
80-40	Amended	24	14(c)	
80-41	Amended	24	14(c)	
80-42	Amended	24	14(c)	
80-43	Amended	24	14(c)	
80-44	Amended	24	14(c)	
80-66	Amended	24	14(c)	
81A-29	Amended	24	14(c)	
81A-80	Amended	24	14(c)	
83A-16	Amended	24	14(c)	
84-2	Amended	24	14(c)	
84-8	Amended	24	14(c)	
84-10	Amended	24	14(c)	
84-38	Amended	24	14(c)	

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85B-9	Amended	24	14(c)	
86A-20	Amended	24	14(c)	
87-13	Amended	24	14(c)	
87-14	Amended	24	14(c)	
87-25	Amended	24	14(c)	
87-42	Amended	24	14(c)	
87-48	Amended	24	14(c)	
87-61	Amended	24	14(c)	
88-28	Amended	24	14(c)	
88A-4	Amended	24	14(c)	
89A-8	Amended	24	14(c)	
89B-15	Amended	24	14(c)	
89C-23	Amended	24	14(c)	
89E-22	Amended	24	14(c)	
90-12	Amended	24	14(c)	
90-18	Amended	24	14(c)	
90-27	Amended	24	14(c)	
90-29.2	Amended	24	14(c)	
90-40	Amended	24	14(c)	
90-48	Amended	24	14(c)	
90-85.40	Amended	24	14(c)	
90-95	Amended	11	1	
90-95	Amended	14	46	
90-95	Amended	14	47	
90-95	Amended	24	14(b)	
90-95	Amended	24	14(c)	
90-96	Amended	11	1.1	
90-108	Amended	24	14(c)	
90-113.13	Amended	24	14(c)	
90-113.22	Amended	24	14(c)	
90-113.23	Amended	24	14(c)	
90-113.24	Amended	24	14(c)	
90-117.4	Amended	24	14(c)	
90-118.11	Amended	24	14(c)	
90-124	Amended	24	14(c)	
90-136	Amended	24	14(c)	
90-147	Amended	24	14(c)	
90-171.45	Amended	24	14(c)	
90-178.7	Amended	24	14(c)	
90-187.6	Amended	24	14(c)	
90-187.12	Amended	24	14(c)	
90-202.3	Amended	24	14(c)	
90-210.25	Amended	24	14(c)	
90-210.43	Amended	24	14(c)	
90-210.50	Amended	24	14(c)	
90-220.12	Amended	24	14(c)	
90-233.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
90-251	Amended	24	14(c)	
90-252	Amended	24	14(c)	
90-255.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
90-270.17	Amended	24	14(c)	
90-270.35	Amended	24	14(c)	
90-270.79	Amended	24	14(c)	
90-288	Amended	24	14(c)	
90-306	Amended	24	14(c)	
90-341	Amended	24	14(c)	
90-366	Amended	24	14(c)	
90-452	Amended	14	48	
90A-66	Amended	24	14(c)	

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90B-12	Amended	24	14(c)	
91A-11	Amended	24	14(c)	
93-13	Amended	24	14(c)	
93A-8	Amended	24	14(c)	
93A-56	Amended	24	14(c)	
93A-58	Amended	24	14(c)	
93A-81	Amended	24	14(c)	
93D-15	Amended	24	14(c)	
93E-1-13	Amended	14	49	
95-25.21	Amended	24	14(c)	
95-28	Amended	24	14(c)	
95-47.9	Amended	24	14(c)	
95-50	Amended	24	14(c)	
95-69.18	Amended	24	14(c)	
95-75	Amended	24	14(c)	
95-99	Amended	24	14(c)	
95-104	Amended	24	14(c)	
95-110.11	Amended	24	14(c)	
95-124	Amended	24	14(c)	
95-139	Amended	24	14(c)	
95-194	Amended	24	14(c)	
95-197	Amended	24	14(c)	
96-9	Amended	10	1	
96-9	Amended	10	2	
96-9	Amended	10	3	
96-15.2	Amended	24	14(c)	
96-18	Amended	24	14(c)	
97-21	Amended	24	14(c)	
97-60	Amended	24	14(c)	
97-76	Amended	24	14(c)	
97-90	Amended	24	14(c)	
97-94	Amended	24	14(c)	
97-100	Amended	24	14(c)	
102-4	Amended	24	14(c)	
103-2	Amended	24	14(c)	
104E-23	Amended	24	14(c)	
104E-29	Amended	24	14(c)	
104F-3	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-33	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-50	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-53	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-77	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-86	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-88	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-90	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-99	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-109	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-113.33	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-113.34	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-113.73	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-113.112	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-163.013	Amended	14	50	
105-163.44	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-164.9	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-164.29	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-228.34	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-233	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-234	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-236	Amended	24	14(c)	

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105-249	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-259	Amended	14	51(b)	
105-259	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-290	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-291	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-296	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-308	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-310	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-316.6	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-322	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-334	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-352	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-359	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-368	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-369	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-373	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-440	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-441	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-444	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-447	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-449	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-449.34	Amended	14	52	
105-449.34	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-449.41	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-449.51	Amended	24	14(c)	
105-449A	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-9.2	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-22	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-50.41	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-65.33	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-65.48	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-65.78	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-92.14	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-124	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-145.6	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-168.15	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-189.2	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-196	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-197	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-202.19	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-245.24	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-245.38	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-255	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-266	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-266.14	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-267.4	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-268.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-275	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-277.24	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-284.20	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-284.44	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-307	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-307.6	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-310	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-311	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-312	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-314	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-316.4	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-321	Amended	24	14(c)	

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106-349	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-350	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-360	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-362	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-363	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-397	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-398	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-404	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-405	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-405.9	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-405.19	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-411	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-414	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-417	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-423.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-439	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-443	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-451	Amended	14	53(b)	
106-451	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-451.1	Amended	14	54(b)	
106-451.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-451.28	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-454	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-455	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-464	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-465	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-469	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-501	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-514	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-515	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-516.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-518	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-520.7	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-549	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-549.26	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-549.27	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-549.28	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-549.34	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-549.36	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-549.68	Amended	14	55	
106-549.68	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-579.11	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-579.12	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-614	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-644	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-668	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-714	Amended	24	14(c)	
106-764	Amended	14	56	
106-776	Amended	24	14(c)	
108A-39	Amended	24	14(c)	
108A-53	Amended	24	14(c)	
108A-57	Amended	24	14(c)	
108A-60	Amended	24	14(c)	
108A-64	Amended	24	14(c)	
108A-65	Amended	24	14(c)	
108A-80	Amended	24	14(c)	
110-20.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
110-48	Amended	24	14(c)	
110-55	Amended	24	14(c)	

G.S. *§*	*Effect*	*Session Laws* *Chapter*	*Section*	*Postponed Effective Date*
110-103	Amended	24	14(c)	
111-23	Amended	24	14(c)	
112-32	Amended	24	14(c)	
112-36	Amended	24	14(c)	
113-25	Amended	24	14(c)	
113-34	Amended	24	14(c)	
113-35	Amended	24	14(c)	
113-55	Amended	24	14(c)	
113-58	Amended	24	14(c)	
113-60.3	Amended	24	14(c)	
113-60.29	Amended	24	14(c)	
113-135	Amended	24	14(c)	
113-137	Amended	24	14(c)	
113-154.1	Amended	14	57	
113-156	Amended	14	58	
113-167	Amended	24	14(c)	
113-187	Amended	24	14(c)	
113-202	Amended	24	14(c)	
113-207	Amended	24	14(c)	
113-208	Amended	24	14(c)	
113-209	Amended	24	14(c)	
113-222	Amended	24	14(c)	
113-229	Amended	24	14(c)	
113-230	Amended	24	14(c)	
113-262	Amended	24	14(c)	
113-264	Amended	24	14(c)	
113-266	Amended	24	14(c)	
113-268	Amended	24	14(c)	
113-269	Amended	24	14(c)	
113-270.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
113-273	Amended	24	14(c)	
113-275	Amended	24	14(c)	
113-276.2	Amended	24	14(c)	
113-277	Amended	20	4	
113-277	Amended	24	14(c)	
113-286	Amended	24	14(c)	
113-290.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
113-291.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
113-294	Amended	24	14(c)	
113-295	Amended	24	14(c)	
113-300.3	Amended	24	14(c)	
113-303	Amended	24	14(c)	
113-307.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
113-315.9	Amended	24	14(c)	
113-315.34	Amended	24	14(c)	
113-380	Amended	24	14(c)	
113-409	Amended	24	14(c)	
113A-42	Amended	24	14(c)	
113A-64	Amended	24	14(c)	
113A-126	Amended	24	14(c)	
113A-170	Amended	24	14(c)	
113A-195	Amended	24	14(c)	
113A-226	Amended	24	14(c)	
113B-24	Amended	24	14(c)	
115B-6	Amended	24	14(c)	
115C-13	Amended	24	14(c)	
115C-45	Amended	24	14(c)	
115C-238.40	Added	24	42(b)	
115C-238.41	Added	24	42(b)	

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115C-238.42	Added	24	42(b)	
115C-238.43	Added	24	42(b)	
115C-238.44	Added	24	42(b)	
115C-238.45	Added	24	42(b)	
115C-238.46	Added	24	42(b)	
115C-238.47	Added	24	42(b)	
115C-276	Amended	24	14(c)	
115C-288	Amended	24	14(c)	
115C-290.3	Amended	14	59	1/1/97
115C-307	Amended	24	14(c)	
115C-317	Amended	24	14(c)	
115C-323	Amended	24	14(c)	
115C-379	Amended	24	14(c)	
115C-380	Amended	24	14(c)	
115C-383	Amended	24	14(c)	
115C-447	Amended	24	14(c)	
115C-525	Amended	24	14(c)	
115C-534	Amended	24	14(c)	
115D-96	Amended	24	14(c)	
116-213	Amended	24	14(c)	
116-235	Amended	24	14(c)	
116B-28	Amended	24	14(c)	
119-4	Amended	24	14(c)	
119-13	Amended	24	14(c)	
119-13.3	Amended	24	14(c)	
119-16.2	Amended	24	14(c)	
119-16.3	Amended	24	14(c)	
119-25	Amended	24	14(c)	
119-27	Amended	24	14(c)	
119-32	Amended	24	14(c)	
119-33	Amended	24	14(c)	
119-35	Amended	24	14(c)	
119-39	Amended	24	14(c)	
119-41	Amended	24	14(c)	
119-59	Amended	24	14(c)	
120-32	Amended	24	14(c)	
120-32.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
120-47.9	Amended	24	14(c)	
120-70.93	Added	24	49(a)	
120-70.94	Added	24	49(a)	
120-70.95	Added	24	49(a)	
120-86	Amended	24	14(c)	
121-4	Amended	24	14(c)	
121-5	Amended	24	14(c)	
121-28	Amended	24	14(c)	
122C-25	Amended	24	14(c)	
122C-28	Amended	24	14(c)	
122C-52	Amended	24	14(c)	
122C-65	Amended	24	14(c)	
122C-66	Amended	24	14(c)	
122C-158	Amended	24	14(c)	
122C-192	Amended	24	14(c)	
122C-406	Amended	24	14(c)	
124-3	Amended	24	14(c)	
125-11	Amended	24	14(c)	
126-13	Amended	24	14(c)	
126-14	Amended	24	14(c)	
126-14.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
126-18	Amended	24	14(c)	

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§	*Effect*	*Chapter*	*Section*	
126-27	Amended	24	14(c)	
126-28	Amended	24	14(c)	
127A-131	Amended	24	14(c)	
127A-151	Amended	24	14(c)	
127A-152	Amended	24	14(c)	
127B-5	Amended	24	14(c)	
127B-7	Amended	24	14(c)	
127B-15	Amended	24	14(c)	
128-4	Amended	24	14(c)	
128-12	Amended	24	14(c)	
128-28	Amended	24	14(c)	
128-32	Amended	24	14(c)	
130A-25	Amended	24	14(c)	
130A-26	Amended	24	14(c)	
130A-26.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
130A-55	Amended	24	14(c)	
130A-65	Amended	24	14(c)	
130A-196	Amended	24	14(c)	
130A-304	Amended	24	14(c)	
130A-431	Amended	24	14(c)	
131C-22	Amended	24	14(c)	
131D-2	Amended	24	14(c)	
131D-6	Amended	24	14(c)	
131D-10.7	Amended	24	14(c)	
131D-13	Amended	24	14(c)	
131E-80	Amended	24	14(c)	
131E-81	Amended	24	14(c)	
131E-90	Amended	24	14(c)	
131E-109	Amended	24	14(c)	
131E-141.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
131E-151	Amended	24	14(c)	
131E-154.8	Amended	24	14(c)	
131E-161	Amended	24	14(c)	
131E-207	Amended	24	14(c)	
132-3	Amended	24	14(c)	
132-4	Amended	24	14(c)	
132-5	Amended	24	14(c)	
133-4	Amended	24	14(c)	
133-31	Amended	24	14(c)	
133-32	Amended	24	14(c)	
134A-25	Amended	24	14(c)	
135-6	Amended	24	14(c)	
135-10	Amended	24	14(c)	
136-13	Amended	24	14(c)	
136-14	Amended	24	14(c)	
136-18	Amended	24	14(c)	
136-18.4	Amended	24	14(c)	
136-20	Amended	14	60	
136-20	Amended	24	14(c)	
136-26	Amended	24	14(c)	
136-32	Amended	24	14(c)	
136-32.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
136-32.2	Amended	24	14(c)	
136-33	Amended	24	14(c)	
136-72	Amended	24	14(c)	
136-80	Amended	24	14(c)	
136-89	Amended	24	14(c)	
136-89.58	Amended	24	14(c)	
136-90	Amended	24	14(c)	

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136-91	Amended	24	14(c)	
136-92	Amended	24	14(c)	
136-93	Amended	24	14(c)	
136-94	Amended	24	14(c)	
136-102	Amended	24	14(c)	
136-102.4	Amended	24	14(c)	
136-102.6	Amended	24	14(c)	
136-125	Amended	24	14(c)	
136-135	Amended	24	14(c)	
136-145	Amended	24	14(c)	
139-18	Amended	24	14(c)	
139-27	Amended	24	14(c)	
143-23	Amended	24	9(a)	
143-23	Amended	24	9(b)	
143-23	Amended	24	9(c)	
143-32	Amended	24	14(c)	
143-34	Amended	14	61	
143-34	Amended	24	14(c)	
143-54	Amended	24	14(c)	
143-58.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
143-63	Amended	24	14(c)	
143-115	Amended	24	14(c)	
143-116.6	Amended	24	14(c)	
143-129	Amended	24	14(c)	
143-129.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
143-138	Amended	24	14(c)	
143-143.24	Amended	24	14(c)	
143-151	Amended	24	14(c)	
143-151.18	Amended	24	14(c)	
143-151.36	Amended	24	14(c)	
143-152	Amended	24	14(c)	
143-153	Amended	14	62	
143-153	Amended	24	14(c)	
143-214.2A	Amended	24	14(c)	
143-214.4	Amended	24	14(c)	
143-215.6B	Amended	24	14(c)	
143-215.17	Amended	24	14(c)	
143-215.36	Amended	24	14(c)	
143-215.58	Amended	24	14(c)	
143-215.69	Amended	24	14(c)	
143-215.88B	Amended	24	14(c)	
143-215.98	Amended	24	14(c)	
143-215.102	Amended	24	14(c)	
143-215.114B	Amended	24	14(c)	
143-318.17	Amended	24	14(c)	
143-340	Amended	24	14(c)	
143-341	Amended	24	14(c)	
143-345.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
143-345.2	Amended	24	14(c)	
143-354	Amended	24	14(c)	
143-355	Amended	24	14(c)	
143-469	Amended	24	14(c)	
143-547	Amended	24	14(c)	
143B-74.3	Amended	24	14(c)	
143B-152.1	Added	24	30(a)	
143B-152.1	Added	24	30(a)	
143B-152.2	Added	24	30(a)	
143B-152.3	Added	24	30(a)	
143B-152.4	Added	24	30(a)	

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143B-152.5	Added	24	30(a)	
143B-152.6	Added	24	30(a)	
143B-152.7	Added	24	30(a)	
143B-152.10	Added	24	31(a)	
143B-152.10	Added	24	31(a)	
143B-152.11	Added	24	31(a)	
143B-152.12	Added	24	31(a)	
143B-152.13	Added	24	31(a)	
143B-152.14	Added	24	31(a)	
143B-152.15	Added	24	31(a)	
143B-181.20	Amended	24	14(c)	
143B-181.25	Amended	24	14(c)	
143B-264	Amended	24	14(b)	
143B-266	Amended	21	6	
143B-266	Amended	24	14(b)	
143B-267	Amended	14	63	
143B-267	Amended	24	14(b)	
143B-273	Amended	24	14(d)	
143B-273.5	Amended	24	14(d)	
143B-273.8	Amended	24	14(d)	
143B-273.13	Amended	24	14(d)	
143B-273.14	Amended	24	14(d)	
143B-273.15	Amended	24	14(d)	
143B-450.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
143B-461	Amended	24	14(c)	
143B-472.3	Amended	24	14(c)	
143B-472.6	Amended	24	14(c)	
143B-472.10	Amended	24	14(c)	
143B-472.11	Amended	24	14(c)	
143B-472.12	Amended	24	14(c)	
143B-472.13	Amended	24	14(c)	
143B-472.15	Amended	24	14(c)	
143B-472.19	Amended	24	14(c)	
143B-499.6	Amended	24	14(c)	
146-13	Amended	24	14(c)	
146-43	Amended	24	14(c)	
147-9	Amended	24	14(c)	
147-33.3	Amended	24	14(c)	
147-62	Amended	24	14(c)	
147-76	Amended	24	14(c)	
147-79	Amended	24	14(c)	
147-80	Amended	24	14(c)	
148-4.1	Amended	14	64	
148-4.1	Amended	15	1	
148-4.1	Amended	15	2	
148-4.1	Amended	15	2	
148-4.1	Amended	15	2	
148-4.1	Amended	15	3	
148-4.1	Amended	15	4	
148-4.1	Amended	24	14(b)	
148-4.1	Amended	24	14(e)	
148-13	Amended	24	14(b)	
148-32.1	Amended	14	65	
148-32.1	Amended	24	14(b)	
148-37	Amended	24	16(a)	
148-37	Amended	24	16(b)	
148-45	Amended	24	14(c)	
148-46.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
148-49.10	Amended	24	14(b)	

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§	Effect	Chapter	Section	Date
148-49.11	Amended	24	14(b)	
148-49.12	Amended	24	14(b)	
148-49.13	Amended	24	14(b)	
148-49.14	Amended	24	14(b)	
148-49.15	Amended	24	14(b)	
148-49.16	Amended	24	14(b)	
148-52.1	Amended	24	14(b)	
148-53	Amended	24	14(b)	
148-54	Amended	24	14(b)	
148-56	Amended	24	14(b)	
148-57	Amended	24	14(b)	
148-57.1	Amended	24	14(b)	
148-59	Amended	12	1	
148-59	Amended	12	2	
148-59	Amended	24	14(b)	
148-60.1	Amended	24	14(b)	
148-62.1	Amended	24	14(b)	
148-63	Amended	24	14(b)	
148-64	Amended	24	14(b)	
148-65.3	Amended	24	14(b)	
153A-98	Amended	24	14(c)	
153A-148.1	Amended	14	66	
153A-224	Amended	24	14(c)	
153A-225	Amended	24	14(c)	
153A-334	Amended	24	14(c)	
153A-356	Amended	24	14(c)	
153A-357	Amended	24	14(c)	
153A-361	Amended	24	14(c)	
153A-363	Amended	24	14(c)	
153A-367	Amended	24	14(c)	
153A-371	Amended	24	14(c)	
156-19	Amended	24	14(c)	
156-24	Amended	24	14(c)	
156-25	Amended	24	14(c)	
156-32	Amended	24	14(c)	
156-33	Amended	24	14(c)	
156-92	Amended	24	14(c)	
156-111	Amended	24	14(c)	
156-112	Amended	24	14(c)	
156-114	Amended	24	14(c)	
156-132	Amended	24	14(c)	
157-29.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
159-34	Amended	24	14(c)	
159-181	Amended	24	14(c)	
160A-80	Amended	24	14(c)	
160A-168	Amended	24	14(c)	
160A-208.1	Amended	14	67	
160A-308	Amended	14	68	
160A-308	Amended	24	14(c)	
160A-375	Amended	24	14(c)	
160A-388	Amended	24	14(c)	
160A-416	Amended	24	14(c)	
160A-417	Amended	24	14(c)	
160A-421	Amended	24	14(c)	
160A-423	Amended	24	14(c)	
160A-427	Amended	24	14(c)	
160A-431	Amended	24	14(c)	
160A-443	Amended	24	14(c)	
161-22	Amended	24	14(c)	

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161-27	Amended	24	14(c)	
162-55	Amended	24	14(c)	
162-60	Amended	24	14(b)	
162A-6.1	Amended	14	69	
162A-6.1	Amended	14	70	
163-152	Amended	24	14(c)	
163-155	Amended	24	14(c)	
163-171	Amended	24	14(c)	
163-173	Amended	24	14(c)	
163-177	Amended	24	14(c)	
163-221	Amended	24	14(c)	
163-236	Amended	24	14(c)	
163-237	Amended	24	14(c)	
163-269	Amended	24	14(c)	
163-270	Amended	24	14(c)	
163-271	Amended	24	14(c)	
163-272.1	Amended	24	14(c)	
163-273	Amended	24	14(c)	
163-274	Amended	24	14(c)	
163-278.13	Amended	24	14(c)	
163-278.13A	Amended	24	14(c)	
163-278.19	Amended	24	14(c)	
163-278.20	Amended	24	14(c)	
163-278.27	Amended	24	14(c)	
163-278.44	Amended	24	14(c)	
163-278.53	Amended	24	14(c)	
168-4.5	Amended	24	14(c)	

General Statutes of North Carolina

Sections Added, Amended or Repealed 1993 (Regular Session, 1994) Session

This table lists the sections of the General Statutes of North Carolina which were added, amended or repealed during the 1993 (Reg. Sess., 1994) Session of the General Assembly.

In instances where the effective date of an act has been postponed beyond January 1, 1995, the effective date of such act is indicated in the right-hand column.

G.S.		*Session Laws*		*Postponed*
§	*Effect*	*Chapter*	*Section*	*Effective Date*
1A-1-55	Amended	733	3	
1A-1-58	Amended	594	1	
7A-101	Amended	769	7.10(a)	
7A-102	Amended	769	7.11	
7A-102	Amended	769	7.12	
7A-112	Amended	656	1	
7A-133	Amended	769	24.9	
7A-171.1	Amended	769	7.13(b)	
7A-171.1	Amended	769	7.13(c)	
7A-171.2	Amended	769	7.13(a)	
7A-346.1	Added	769	24.8A	
7A-456	Amended	767	19	
7A-771	Amended	767	14	
7A-773	Amended	767	15	
8-50.1	Amended	733	1	
14-7.6	Amended	767	16	
14-32.1	Amended	767	31	
14-33	Amended	687	1	
14-34.2	Amended	687	2	
14-43	Repealed	767	29(2)	
14-51.1	Added	673	1	
14-116	Repealed	767	30(1)	
14-133	Repealed	767	30(2)	
14-140	Repealed	767	30(3)	
14-170	Repealed	767	30(4)	
14-171	Repealed	767	30(5)	
14-172	Repealed	767	30(6)	
14-173	Repealed	767	30(7)	
14-174	Repealed	767	30(8)	
14-175	Repealed	767	30(9)	
14-176	Repealed	767	30(10)	
14-195	Repealed	767	30(11)	
14-222	Repealed	767	30(12)	
14-253	Amended	767	20	
14-269.7	Amended	597	1	
14-277.4	Amended	767	21	
14-310	Repealed	767	30(13)	
14-311	Repealed	767	30(14)	
14-312	Repealed	767	30(15)	
14-315	Amended	597	2	
14-356	Repealed	767	30(16)	
14-389	Repealed	767	30(17)	

G.S.		*Session Laws*		*Postponed Effective*
§	*Effect*	*Chapter*	*Section*	*Date*
14-396	Repealed	767	30(18)	
14-397	Repealed	767	30(19)	
14-401.5	Amended	596	1	
14-453	Amended	764	1	
14-454	Amended	764	1	
14-455	Amended	764	1	
14-456	Amended	764	1	
15A-406	Amended	571	1	
15A-534.4	Added	723	5	
15A-1340.10	Amended	767	17	
15A-1340.14	Amended	767	11	
15A-1340.14	Amended	767	12	
15A-1340.14	Amended	767	13	
15A-1340.20	Amended	767	1	
15A-1340.21	Amended	767	13.1	
15A-1342	Amended	767	6	
15A-1343.2	Amended	767	8	
15A-1344	Amended	767	9	
15A-1344	Amended	769	21.7(a)	
15A-1351	Amended	767	7	
15A-1351	Amended	767	10	
15A-1368.2	Amended	767	4	
15A-1368.3	Amended	767	5	
15B-23	Amended	769	21.5(b)	
17E-3	Amended	562	1	
18B-601	Amended	762	8	
18B-901	Amended	749	1	
18B-901	Amended	749	2	
18B-902	Amended	745	28	
18B-1000	Amended	579	1	
20-4.01	Amended	761	22	
20-7	Amended	595	1	
20-7	Amended	595	2	
20-7	Amended	750	1	
20-7	Amended	761	1.1	
20-17	Amended	761	1	
20-28	Amended	761	2	
20-28	Amended	761	3	
20-35	Amended	761	4	
20-37.7	Amended	750	2	
20-37.15	Amended	750	3	
20-37.16	Amended	750	4	
20-37.16	Amended	750	6	
20-52	Amended	750	5	
20-54	Amended	754	7	10/1/96
20-66	Amended	761	5	
20-79	Amended	697	1	
20-79	Amended	697	2	
20-79	Amended	761	6	
20-88.1	Amended	761	7	
20-95	Amended	761	8	
20-97	Amended	761	9	
20-118	Amended	761	10	
20-118	Amended	761	11	
20-118	Amended	761	12	
20-118	Amended	761	13	
20-118	Amended	761	14	
20-118	Amended	761	15	
20-118	Amended	761	16	

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§	*Effect*	*Chapter*	*Section*	*Date*
20-125	Amended	719	2	
20-127	Amended	683	1	3/1/95
20-127	Amended	754	4	
20-128.2	Amended	754	5	
20-130.1	Amended	719	1	
20-135.2B	Added	672	1	
20-137.1	Amended	748	1	
20-138.5	Amended	761	34.1	
20-138.5	Amended	767	32	
20-174.1	Amended	761	17	
20-183.1	Amended	754	2	
20-183.1	Repealed	754	3	
20-183.2	Amended	754	1	
20-183.3	Amended	754	1	
20-183.4	Amended	754	1	
20-183.4A	Added	754	1	
20-183.4B	Added	754	1	
20-183.4C	Added	754	1	
20-183.4D	Added	754	1	
20-183.5	Amended	754	1	
20-183.6	Amended	754	1	
20-183.6A	Added	754	1	
20-183.7	Amended	754	1	
20-183.8	Amended	754	1	
20-183.8A	Added	754	1	
20-183.8A	Amended	754	8	10/1/96
20-183.8B	Added	754	1	
20-183.8C	Added	754	1	
20-183.8D	Added	754	1	
20-183.8E	Added	754	1	
20-193	Repealed	761	18	
20-212	Repealed	761	19	
20-213	Repealed	761	19	
20-214	Repealed	761	19	
20-215	Repealed	761	19	
20-218	Amended	761	20	
20-218.1	Repealed	761	21	
20-218.2	Amended	761	23	
20-219	Repealed	761	24	
20-231.1	Repealed	761	25	
20-279.7A	Amended	761	26	
20-279.34	Repealed	761	27	
20-309.1	Repealed	761	28	
20-310	Repealed	761	29	2/1/95
20-310.2	Repealed	761	31	
20-376	Amended	621	5	
20-382	Amended	621	1	
20-382.1	Added	621	2	
20-382.2	Added	621	3	
20-384	Amended	754	6	
20-385	Amended	621	4	
22B-10	Amended	763	2	
25-2A-103	Amended	756	1	
25A-27	Amended	745	38.3(a)	
44A-35	Amended	763	1	
50-12	Amended	565	1	
51-9	Repealed	647	1	
51-10	Repealed	647	2	
51-11	Repealed	647	3	

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51-13	Repealed	647	4	
53-209	Amended	599	1	
53-210	Amended	599	1	
53-211	Amended	599	1	
53-211	Amended	599	3	
53-212	Repealed	599	1	
53-213	Amended	599	1	
53-214	Amended	599	2	
53-216	Amended	599	1	
53-217	Amended	599	1	
53-218	Amended	599	1	
54C-64	Amended	767	22	
58-1-25	Amended	730	3	
58-1-25	Amended	730	4	
58-1-30	Amended	730	3	
58-1-30	Amended	730	4	
58-1-30	Amended	730	6	
58-1-35	Amended	730	2	
58-1-35	Amended	730	3	
58-1-35	Amended	730	5	
58-1-36	Added	730	1	
58-1-40	Repealed	730	3	
58-1-41	Repealed	730	3	
58-1-45	Repealed	730	3	
58-1-50	Repealed	730	3	
58-2-105	Amended	678	3	
58-2-180	Amended	767	23	
58-2-215	Amended	769	14.1	
58-3-75	Amended	678	4	
58-3-90	Amended	678	5	
58-3-172	Amended	678	6	
58-5-71	Added	678	7	
58-7-16	Added	600	1	
58-7-21	Amended	678	8	
58-7-31	Amended	678	9	
58-7-150	Amended	678	10	
58-7-163	Amended	678	11	
58-7-170	Amended	678	12	
58-8-1	Amended	767	24	
58-12-1	Amended	678	2	
58-12-2	Added	678	1	
58-12-6	Added	678	1	
58-12-11	Added	678	1	
58-12-16	Added	678	1	
58-12-21	Added	678	1	
58-12-25	Added	678	1	
58-12-30	Added	678	1	
58-12-35	Added	678	1	
58-12-40	Added	678	1	
58-12-45	Added	678	1	
58-12-50	Added	678	1	
58-12-55	Added	678	1	
58-13-10	Amended	678	13	
58-19-25	Amended	678	14	
58-21-20	Amended	678	15	
58-21-35	Amended	678	16	
58-24-180	Amended	767	25	
58-30-220	Amended	600	2	
58-30-275	Amended	678	17	

SECTIONS ADDED, AMENDED OR REPEALED (REG. SESS.)

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§	*Effect*	*Chapter*	*Section*	*Date*
58-33-130	Amended	678	18	
58-34-2	Amended	678	19	
58-35-100	Added	678	20	
58-36-1	Amended	679	8.5	
58-36-85	Added	761	30	2/1/95
58-40-140	Amended	678	21	
58-41-10	Amended	678	22	
58-48-95	Amended	678	23	
58-49-1	Amended	569	1	
58-49-5	Amended	569	2	
58-49-10	Amended	569	3	
58-49-15	Amended	569	4	
58-49-20	Amended	569	5	
58-50-65	Amended	679	10.4	
58-50-110	Amended	569	6	
58-50-130	Amended	569	7	
58-50-130	Amended	569	8	
58-50-130	Amended	678	24	
58-50-130	Amended	678	25	
58-51-30	Amended	644	2	
58-51-81	Added	716	1	
58-51-115	Added	644	1	
58-51-120	Added	644	1	
58-51-125	Added	644	1	
58-53-50	Amended	569	9	
58-53-55	Amended	569	10	
58-57-90	Amended	720	2	
58-57-100	Amended	720	1	
58-62-77	Added	678	26	
58-62-92	Repealed	678	27	
58-62-95	Amended	678	28	
58-64-33	Amended	678	29	
58-67-10	Amended	769	25.48	
58-69-40	Amended	678	30	
58-70-65	Amended	678	31	
58-71-71	Amended	678	32	
58-85-1	Amended	678	33	
58-86-55	Amended	653	1	
62-3	Amended	777	1(b)	
62-10	Amended	769	7.4(b)	
62-36A	Amended	560	1	
63A	Amended	777	4(a)	
63A-1	Amended	777	4(b)	
63A-2	Amended	777	4(c)	
63A-3	Amended	777	4(d)	
63A-3	Amended	777	4(d1)	
66-58	Amended	769	17.15	
66-58	Amended	777	4(e)	
74-49	Amended	568	1	
74-50	Amended	568	2	
74-51	Amended	568	3	
74-52	Amended	568	4	
74-54	Amended	568	5	
74-54.1	Amended	568	6	
74-56	Amended	568	7	
74-58	Amended	568	8	
74-61	Amended	568	9	
74-64	Amended	568	10	
74E-13	Amended	767	26	

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75A-2	Amended	753	2	
75A-13.2	Added	753	1	
75A-15	Amended	753	3	
77-57	Amended	767	27	
78A-2	Amended	600	3	
88A-7	Amended	755	5.1	
88A-10	Amended	755	1	
88A-10.1	Added	755	2	
88A-12	Amended	755	3	
88A-15	Amended	755	4	
88A-19	Amended	755	5	
89C-3	Amended	671	1	
89C-10	Amended	671	8	
89C-13	Amended	671	2	
89C-14	Amended	671	5	
89C-18	Amended	671	3	
89C-21	Amended	671	6	
89C-22	Amended	671	7	
89C-24	Amended	671	4	
90-15	Amended	566	2	
90-15.1	Amended	566	1	
90-16	Amended	570	6	
90-85.3	Amended	692	2	
90-85.22	Amended	692	1	
90-85.24	Amended	692	3	
90-85.40	Amended	692	4	
90-113.30	Added	685	1	
90-113.31	Added	685	1	
90-113.32	Added	685	1	
90-113.32	Amended	773	15.2(a)	
90-113.32	Amended	773	15.2(b)	
90-113.33	Added	685	1	
90-113.34	Added	685	1	
90-113.35	Added	685	1	
90-113.36	Added	685	1	
90-113.37	Added	685	1	
90-113.38	Added	685	1	
90-113.39	Added	685	1	
90-113.40	Added	685	1	
90-113.41	Added	685	1	
90-113.42	Added	685	1	
90-113.43	Added	685	1	
90-113.44	Added	685	1	
90-113.45	Added	685	1	
90-113.46	Added	685	1	
90-171.61	Amended	769	17.11(a)	
90-171.62	Amended	769	17.11(b)	
90-210.70	Amended	767	28	
90-270.2	Amended	569	14	
90-270.15	Amended	570	7	
90-270.20	Amended	569	13	
90-270.45	Amended	564	2	
90-270.46	Amended	564	2	
90-270.47	Amended	564	2	
90-270.48	Amended	564	2	
90-270.48A	Added	564	2	
90-270.48B	Added	564	2	
90-270.49	Amended	564	2	
90-270.50	Amended	564	2	

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90-270.51	Amended	564	2	
90-270.52	Amended	564	2	
90-270.53	Repealed	564	2	
90-270.54	Amended	564	2	
90-270.55	Amended	564	2	
90-270.55A	Added	564	2	
90-270.56	Amended	564	2	
90-270.57	Amended	564	2	
90-270.58	Amended	564	2	
90-270.58A	Added	564	2	
90-270.58B	Added	564	2	
90-270.58C	Added	564	2	
90-270.59	Amended	564	2	
90-270.60	Amended	564	2	
90-270.61	Amended	564	2	
90-270.62	Amended	564	2	
90-294	Amended	688	1	7/1/95
90-298.1	Added	688	2	7/1/95
90-332.1	Amended	591	12	
90-332.1	Amended	591	16(a)	
90-332.1	Amended	591	16(b)	
90-332.1	Amended	685	2	
90-338	Amended	685	3	
90-338	Amended	769	25.19	
90-390	Amended	570	8	
90-400	Amended	689	1	
90-401	Amended	689	2	
90-401.1	Added	689	3	
90-402	Amended	689	4	
90-411	Amended	679	5.5	
90B-10	Amended	745	38.1	
95-47.4	Amended	769	29(a)	
95-47.7	Amended	769	29(b)	
96-8	Amended	680	4	
96-8	Amended	680	7	
96-8	Amended	680	8	
96-8	Amended	680	9	
96-12	Amended	680	1	
96-12	Amended	680	2	
96-12	Amended	680	3	
96-13	Amended	680	5	
96-21	Amended	680	6	
97-2	Amended	679	2.6	
97-2	Amended	679	10.7	
97-18	Amended	679	3.1	
97-18.1	Added	679	3.6	
97-18.1	Amended	679	10.9	
97-19	Amended	679	10.6	
97-24	Amended	679	3.4	
97-25.1	Added	679	2.5	
97-25.2	Added	679	2.1	
97-25.3	Added	679	2.2	
97-25.4	Added	679	2.4	
97-25.5	Added	679	2.4	
97-26	Amended	679	2.3	
97-26.1	Added	679	5.6	
97-32.1	Added	679	4.1	
97-40.1	Amended	679	6.1	
97-42	Amended	679	3.7	

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97-47.1	Added	679	3.5	
97-77	Amended	769	28.15(a)	
97-77.1	Added	679	5.1	
97-79	Amended	679	5.2	
97-80	Amended	679	5.3	
97-81	Amended	679	10.2	
97-82	Amended	679	3.2	
97-83	Amended	679	3.3	
97-83.1	Added	679	5.7	
97-86	Amended	679	10.5	
97-88.2	Added	679	7.1	
97-88.3	Added	679	7.2	
97-90	Amended	679	9.1	
97-92	Amended	679	10.8	
97-93	Amended	679	8.2	
97-94	Amended	679	8.1	
101-8	Amended	565	2	
105-53	Amended	731	1	
105-113.18	Amended	745	2	
105-113.45	Amended	745	3	
105-113.46	Amended	745	38.2(a)	
105-113.47	Amended	745	38.2(b)	
105-113.51	Amended	745	32	
105-113.52	Amended	745	33	
105-130.5	Amended	745	4	
105-130.5	Amended	745	5	
105-130.20	Amended	582	2	
105-130.23	Amended	584	1	
105-130.25	Amended	674	1	
105-130.25	Amended	674	2	
105-130.25	Amended	674	4	
105-130.27	Amended	745	34	
105-130.28	Amended	584	2	
105-130.32	Amended	584	3	
105-130.37	Amended	745	6	
105-130.41	Amended	681	1	
105-134.6	Amended	745	7	
105-151.2	Amended	584	4	
105-151.6	Amended	745	35	
105-151.8	Amended	584	5	
105-151.12	Amended	717	4	
105-151.22	Amended	681	2	
105-159	Amended	582	1	
105-160.8	Amended	582	3	
105-163.6	Amended	661	1	
105-163.6A	Added	582	4	
105-163.7	Amended	679	8.3	
105-163.012	Amended	745	8	
105-163.013	Amended	745	9	
105-163.013	Amended	745	10	
105-164.13	Amended	739	1	
105-164.44B	Amended	591	9(a)	
105-164.44B	Amended	769	27.1(a)	
105-187.24	Amended	769	15.1(a)	
105-197.1	Amended	582	6	
105-213	Amended	745	11	7/1/95
105-228.4	Amended	745	12	
105-228.5	Amended	600	4	
105-228.30	Amended	772	2	

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105-228.90	Amended	662	1	
105-228.90	Amended	745	13	
105-241.1	Amended	582	5	
105-241.1	Amended	745	14	
105-241.2	Amended	745	15	
105-241.2	Amended	745	16	
105-248	Amended	745	17	
105-251	Amended	661	2	
105-258.1	Amended	745	18	
105-259	Amended	679	8.4	
105-266	Amended	662	2	
105-266	Amended	662	3	
105-269.3	Amended	745	19	
105-269.15	Added	674	3	
105-275	Amended	745	39	
105-330.1	Amended	745	1	
105-430	Amended	726	1	
105-432.1	Added	726	2	
105-433	Amended	726	3	
105-438.1	Added	726	4	
105-441	Amended	726	5	
105-446	Amended	745	20	
105-447	Amended	726	6	
105-449.2	Amended	726	9	
105-449.16	Amended	745	21	
105-449.17	Amended	745	22	
105-449.18	Amended	745	23	
105-449.19	Amended	745	24	
105-449.20	Amended	745	25	
105-449.24A	Added	726	10	
105-449.26	Amended	745	26	
105-449.27	Amended	726	7	
105-449.32	Repealed	745	27	
105-449.34	Amended	726	8	
105A-2	Amended	735	1	
106-435	Amended	769	26(a)	
108A-39.1	Amended	769	25.8(a)	
108A-69	Added	644	3	
108A-70	Added	644	3	
108A-70.5	Added	769	25.47(a)	
110-132.1	Added	733	2	
110-148	Amended	677	1	
113-44.15	Added	772	1	
113-77.6	Amended	772	3	
113-77.7	Amended	772	3	
113-77.8	Amended	772	3	
113-77.9	Amended	772	3	
113-153.1	Added	576	1	
113-153.1	Amended	675	1	
113-153.1	Amended	675	2	
113-154	Amended	576	2	
113-206	Amended	717	1	
113-206	Amended	717	2	
113-206	Amended	717	3	
113-229	Amended	777	6(a)	
113-229	Amended	777	6(b)	
113-270.1B	Added	684	1	7/1/95
113-270.1C	Added	684	1	7/1/95
113-270.1D	Added	684	1	7/1/95

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113-270.2	Amended	684	2	7/1/95
113-270.3	Amended	557	2	
113-270.3	Amended	684	3	7/1/95
113-271	Amended	684	4	7/1/95
113-272	Amended	684	5	7/1/95
113-272.2	Amended	778	1	
113-272.3	Amended	684	6.1	7/1/95
113-275	Amended	684	7	7/1/95
113-276	Amended	684	6	
113-276	Amended	684	8	7/1/95
113-276	Amended	684	9	7/1/95
113-296	Added	557	1	
113A-52	Amended	776	1	
113A-52.01	Added	776	2	
113A-54	Amended	776	3	
113A-54.1	Amended	776	4	
113A-54.2	Amended	776	5	
113A-55	Amended	776	6	
113A-60	Amended	776	7	
113A-61	Amended	776	8	
113A-61	Amended	776	9	
113A-61.1	Amended	776	10	
113A-64	Amended	776	11	
113A-64.1	Added	776	12	
113A-65	Amended	776	13	
115C-12	Amended	769	19(a)	
115C-12	Amended	769	19.9	
115C-15	Amended	677	8	
115C-21.1	Amended	677	2	
115C-47	Amended	716	2	
115C-47	Amended	775	5	
115C-81	Amended	769	19.5(a)	
115C-85	Amended	677	20	
115C-88	Amended	777	3(a)	
115C-99	Amended	777	3(b)	
115C-100	Amended	777	3(c)	
115C-102.5	Amended	591	11(a)	
115C-102.6	Amended	769	19.26(a)	
115C-102.6A	Added	769	19.26(b)	
115C-102.6B	Added	769	19.26(b)	
115C-102.6C	Added	769	19.26(b)	
115C-102.6D	Added	769	19.26(b)	
115C-102.7	Amended	769	19.26(c)	
115C-105.3	Amended	677	3	
115C-105.5	Amended	677	4	
115C-174.19	Repealed	677	5	
115C-238.7	Amended	677	7	
115C-238.17	Amended	677	6	
115C-238.24	Amended	677	9	
115C-287	Amended	677	16(a)	
115C-287	Amended	677	16(a)	
115C-287.1	Amended	677	16(a)	
115C-290.5	Amended	677	11	
115C-295.1	Added	740	1	
115C-325	Amended	677	10	
115C-325	Amended	677	16(a)	
115C-341.1	Amended	769	7.28A	
115C-418	Amended	677	15	
115C-441.1	Amended	769	7.28A	

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115C-506	Amended	762	9	
115C-521	Amended	775	6	
115D-5	Amended	769	18.4	
115D-20	Amended	775	7	
115D-25.1	Amended	769	7.28A	
115D-25.2	Amended	769	7.28A	
116-17.1	Amended	769	7.28A	
116-17.2	Amended	769	7.28A	
116-30.1	Amended	591	10(a)	
116-30.2	Amended	591	10(a)	
116-30.2	Amended	769	17.6(c)	
116-30.3	Amended	591	10(a)	
116-30.4	Amended	591	10(a)	
116-30.5	Amended	591	10(a)	
116-30.6	Added	769	17.6(a)	
116-37	Amended	591	10(a)	
116-74.43	Amended	677	12(a)	
116-209.30	Added	769	17.16	
116C-3	Amended	677	12.1	
119-16.2	Amended	745	29	
120-3	Amended	769	7.5	
120-3.1	Amended	769	7.28	
120-4.8	Amended	769	7.29(a)	
120-4.21	Amended	769	7.30(p)	2/1/95
120-4.22A	Amended	769	7.30(k)	
120-37	Amended	769	7.6	
120-37	Amended	769	7.7	
120-70.50	Amended	761	32	
120-123	Amended	777	4(f)	
120-131	Amended	570	9	
120-195	Added	771	2.1	
120-196	Added	771	2.1	
120-197	Added	771	2.1	
120-198	Added	771	2.1	
120-199	Added	771	2.1	
120-200	Added	771	2.1	
120-201	Added	771	2.1	
120-202	Added	771	2.1	
120-203	Added	771	2.1	
121-7	Amended	769	12.3	
121-9	Amended	682	2	7/1/95
121-20	Amended	769	12.2	
122C-147	Amended	592	1	
126-5	Amended	777	4(g)	
126-37	Amended	572	1	
127A-193	Amended	769	22.3	
128-24	Amended	769	7.30(a)	
128-24	Amended	769	7.31(a)	
128-24	Amended	769	7.31(b)	
128-27	Amended	769	7.30(b)	
128-27	Amended	769	7.30(c)	
128-27	Amended	769	7.30(d)	
128-27	Amended	769	7.30(l)	
130-315	Amended	776	15	
130A-5	Amended	715	1	
130A-22	Amended	686	1	
130A-23	Amended	732	2	
130A-25	Amended	767	18	
130A-26.2	Added	598	3	

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130A-29	Amended	670	3	
130A-39	Amended	670	2	
130A-50	Amended	736	1.1	
130A-261	Amended	647	5	
130A-282	Amended	732	1	
130A-283	Added	670	1	
130A-294	Amended	580	1	
130A-294	Amended	722	1	
130A-294	Amended	722	2	
130A-301.1	Added	580	2	
130A-309.81	Amended	745	36	
130A-309.81	Amended	745	37	
130A-309.81	Amended	745	38	
130A-310.9	Amended	598	1	
130A-310.12	Amended	598	2	
130A-313	Amended	776	14	
130A-444	Amended	686	2	
130A-447	Amended	686	3	
130A-448	Amended	686	4	
130A-451	Amended	686	5	
130A-452	Added	686	7	
131C-1	Repealed	759	1	
131C-2	Repealed	759	1	
131C-3	Repealed	759	1	
131C-4	Repealed	759	1	
131C-5	Repealed	759	1	
131C-6	Repealed	759	1	
131C-7	Repealed	759	1	
131C-8	Repealed	759	1	
131C-9	Repealed	759	1	
131C-10	Repealed	759	1	
131C-11	Repealed	759	1	
131C-12	Repealed	759	1	
131C-13	Repealed	759	1	
131C-14	Repealed	759	1	
131C-15	Repealed	759	1	
131C-16	Repealed	759	1	
131C-16.1	Repealed	759	1	
131C-17	Repealed	759	1	
131C-17.1	Repealed	759	1	
131C-17.2	Repealed	759	1	
131C-18	Repealed	759	1	
131C-19	Repealed	759	1	
131C-20	Repealed	759	1	
131C-21	Repealed	759	1	
131C-21.1	Repealed	759	1	
131C-22	Repealed	759	1	
131D-34	Amended	698	1	
131E-14.1	Amended	676	1	
131E-97	Added	570	10	
131E-97.1	Added	570	10	
131E-97.2	Added	570	10	
131E-97.3	Added	570	10	
131F-1	Added	759	2	
131F-2	Added	759	2	
131F-3	Added	759	2	
131F-5	Added	759	2	
131F-6	Added	759	2	
131F-7	Added	759	2	

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131F-8	Added	759	2	
131F-9	Added	759	2	
131F-15	Added	759	2	
131F-16	Added	759	2	
131F-17	Added	759	2	
131F-18	Added	759	2	
131F-20	Added	759	2	
131F-21	Added	759	2	
131F-22	Added	759	2	
131F-23	Added	759	2	
131F-24	Added	759	2	
131F-25	Added	759	2	
131F-26	Added	759	2	
131F-27	Added	759	2	
131F-28	Added	759	2	
133-4.1	Added	775	8	
135-1	Amended	769	7.31(c)	
135-3	Amended	769	7.30(e)	
135-3	Amended	769	7.30(f)	
135-3	Amended	769	7.31(d)	
135-3	Amended	769	7.31(e)	
135-5	Amended	769	7.30(g)	
135-5	Amended	769	7.30(h)	
135-5	Amended	769	7.30(i)	
135-5	Amended	769	7.30(j)	
135-5	Amended	769	7.30(m)	
135-5	Amended	769	7.30(r)	
135-39.5	Amended	679	10.3	
135-65	Amended	769	7.30(n)	
135-101	Amended	769	7.30(s)	
135-105	Amended	769	7.30(t)	
135-106	Amended	769	7.30(u)	
135-114	Added	769	7.30(q)	
136-27.1	Amended	736	1	
136-41.3	Amended	690	1.1	
136-66.1	Amended	690	1	
136-82.2	Added	765	1	
136-131.1	Amended	725	1	
138-6	Amended	769	7.27A	
139-40	Amended	762	10	
143-3.5	Amended	769	11.1(b)	
143-10.3	Added	769	11.1(c)	
143-10.4	Added	769	11.1(c)	
143-10.5	Added	769	11.1(c)	
143-10.6	Added	769	11.1(c)	
143-11	Amended	769	11.1(d)	
143-15.1	Amended	769	11.3	
143-15.2	Amended	591	5(a)	
143-15.3	Amended	591	5(b)	
143-15.3	Amended	769	7.27(b)	
143-15.3A	Amended	591	5(c)	
143-23	Amended	769	13	
143-34.1	Amended	769	7.28A	
143-53.1	Amended	591	10(a)	
143-53.1	Amended	769	17.6(b)	
143-64.10	Amended	775	1	
143-64.10	Added	775	1.1	
143-64.16	Amended	775	2	
143-64.17	Added	775	3	

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143-64.17A	Added	775	3	
143-64.17B	Added	775	3	
143-64.17C	Added	775	3	
143-64.17D	Added	775	3	
143-64.17E	Added	775	3	
143-129.4	Added	775	4	
143-151.15	Amended	678	35	
143-151.17	Amended	678	36	
143-151.43	Added	724	1	
143-151.44	Added	724	1	
143-151.45	Added	724	1	
143-151.46	Added	724	1	
143-151.47	Added	724	1	
143-151.48	Added	724	1	
143-151.49	Added	724	1	
143-151.50	Added	724	1	
143-151.51	Added	724	1	
143-151.52	Added	724	1	
143-151.53	Added	724	1	
143-151.54	Added	724	1	
143-151.55	Added	724	1	
143-151.56	Added	724	1	
143-151.57	Added	724	1	
143-151.58	Added	724	1	
143-151.59	Added	724	1	
143-151.60	Added	724	1	
143-151.61	Added	724	1	
143-151.62	Added	724	1	
143-151.63	Added	724	1	
143-215.3	Amended	694	1	
143-215.3C	Added	694	2	
143-215.107	Amended	686	6	
143-240	Amended	684	13	
143-241	Amended	684	14	
143-250.1	Amended	684	10	7/1/95
143-250.1	Amended	684	11	7/1/95
143-250.1	Amended	684	12	7/1/95
143-291	Amended	769	19.33(a)	
143-291	Amended	777	5(a)	
143-318.10	Amended	570	1	
143-318.11	Amended	570	2	
143-318.16B	Amended	570	3	
143-318.16C	Added	570	4	
143-318.16D	Added	570	4	
143-336	Amended	777	4(h)	
143-408.3	Amended	769	12.1(a)	
143-408.4	Amended	769	12.1(b)	
143-408.5	Amended	769	12.1(c)	
143-573	Amended	769	27.8(d)	
143-577	Amended	769	27.8(a)	
143-623	Amended	569	11	
143-625	Amended	569	12	
143-640	Added	777	7(a)	
143-641	Added	777	7(a)	
143-642	Added	777	7(a)	
143-643	Added	777	7(a)	
143A-17	Repealed	769	11.1(a)	
143B-80.5	Added	682	1	
143B-80.6	Added	682	1	

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143B-80.7	Added	682	1	
143B-80.8	Added	682	1	
143B-80.9	Added	682	1	
143B-80.10	Added	682	1	
143B-80.11	Added	682	1	
143B-80.12	Added	682	1	
143B-80.13	Added	682	1	
143B-80.14	Added	682	1	
143B-129	Repealed	769	12.5(c)	
143B-130	Repealed	769	12.5(c)	
143B-130.1	Repealed	769	12.5(c)	
143B-131	Repealed	769	12.5(c)	
143B-131.1	Added	769	12.5(a)	
143B-131.2	Added	769	12.5(a)	
143B-131.3	Added	769	12.5	
143B-131.4	Added	769	12.5(a)	
143B-131.5	Added	769	12.5	
143B-131.6	Added	769	12.5(a)	
143B-131.7	Added	769	12.5(a)	
143B-168.11	Amended	766	1	
143B-168.12	Amended	766	1	
143B-168.13	Added	766	1	
143B-168.14	Added	766	1	
143B-168.15	Added	766	1	
143B-168.16	Added	766	1	
143B-282.1	Amended	570	5	
143B-426.39	Amended	777	1(a)	
143B-426.39A	Added	769	10.1(c)-(e)	
143B-434	Amended	773	15.1	
146-22.2	Amended	691	1	
147-11	Amended	769	7.1	
147-69.2	Amended	777	4(i)	
148-2	Amended	769	21.5(a)	
150B-1	Amended	777	4(j)	
150B-1	Amended	777	4(k)	
150B-21.18	Amended	777	2	
150B-23	Amended	572	2	
153A-15	Amended	624	1	
153A-15	Amended	628	1	
153A-157	Amended	611	1	
153A-157	Amended	612	1	
153A-157	Amended	614	1	
153A-157	Amended	622	1	
153A-157	Amended	623	1	
153A-157	Amended	642	3(a)	
153A-157	Amended	655	1	
153A-158.1	Added	611	1, 2	
153A-158.1	Added	612	1.1-3	
153A-158.1	Added	614	2-4	
153A-158.1	Added	622	1.1-3	
153A-158.1	Added	623	1.1-3	
153A-158.1	Added	642	3(c), (d)	
153A-158.1	Added	655	1.1-3	
153A-230.3	Amended	767	3	
153A-357	Amended	741	1	
158-8.1	Amended	769	28.7(j)	
158-8.1	Amended	769	28.8(a)	
158-8.1	Amended	769	28.8(b)	
158-8.2	Amended	769	28.7(k)	

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158-8.2	Amended	769	28.7(l)	
158-8.2	Amended	769	28.8(c)	
158-8.2	Amended	769	28.8(d)	
158-8.2	Amended	769	28.9	
158-8.3	Amended	769	28.7(m)	
158-8.3	Amended	769	28.8(e)	
158-8.3	Amended	769	28.8(f)	
158-17	Amended	762	11	
158-31	Amended	751	1	
158-33.1	Added	751	2	
158-37	Amended	745	30	
158-37	Amended	745	31	
158-42	Amended	751	3	
158-42	Amended	761	33	
159B-38	Added	570	11	
159G-10	Amended	696	8	
159G-10	Amended	714	8	
160A-20	Amended	592	2	
160A-36	Amended	696	6	
160A-36	Amended	714	6	
160A-48	Amended	696	7	
160A-48	Amended	714	7	
160A-176.2	Amended	625	1	
160A-417	Amended	741	2	
160A-623	Amended	761	34	
162-60	Amended	767	2	
162A-6	Amended	696	8.1	
162A-86	Amended	696	1	
162A-86	Amended	714	1	
162A-87	Amended	696	2	
162A-87	Amended	714	2	
162A-87.1A	Added	696	3	
162A-87.1A	Added	714	3	
162A-87.2	Amended	696	4	
162A-87.2	Amended	714	4	
162A-88.1	Added	696	5	
162A-88.1	Added	714	5	
163-1	Amended	738	2	
163-22	Amended	762	5	
163-22	Amended	762	12	
163-31	Amended	762	5	
163-31	Amended	762	13	
163-32	Amended	762	14	
163-33	Amended	762	5	
163-33	Amended	762	15	
163-35	Amended	762	5	
163-35	Amended	762	16	
163-36	Added	762	6	
163-41	Amended	762	3	
163-41	Amended	762	5	
163-42	Amended	762	5	
163-42	Amended	762	17	
163-43	Amended	762	5	
163-43	Amended	762	18	
163-45	Amended	762	5	
163-45	Amended	762	19	
163-46	Amended	762	5	
163-46	Amended	762	20	
163-47	Amended	762	4	

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		Chapter	*Section*	
163-47	Amended	762	5	
163-48	Amended	762	5	
163-48	Amended	762	21	
163-57	Amended	762	5	
163-57	Amended	762	22	
163-59	Amended	762	23	
163-65	Repealed	762	1	
163-65	Amended	762	5	
163-66	Repealed	762	1	
163-66	Amended	762	5	
163-66.1	Repealed	762	1	
163-67	Repealed	762	1	
163-67.1	Repealed	762	1	
163-68	Repealed	762	1	
163-69	Repealed	762	1	
163-69.1	Repealed	762	1	
163-69.1	Amended	762	5	
163-69.2	Repealed	762	1	
163-69.3	Repealed	762	1	
163-70	Repealed	762	1	
163-71	Repealed	762	1	
163-72	Repealed	762	1	
163-72	Amended	762	5	
163-72.1	Repealed	762	1	
163-72.1	Amended	762	5	
163-72.2	Repealed	762	1	
163-72.3	Repealed	762	1	
163-72.3	Amended	762	5	
163-72.4	Repealed	762	1	
163-73	Repealed	762	1	
163-74	Repealed	762	1	
163-74	Amended	762	5	
163-75	Repealed	762	1	
163-76	Repealed	762	1	
163-77	Repealed	762	1	
163-78	Repealed	762	1	
163-78	Amended	762	5	
163-79	Repealed	762	1	
163-80	Repealed	762	1	
163-80	Amended	762	5	
163-81	Repealed	762	1	
163-82	Repealed	762	1	
163-82.1	Added	762	2	
163-82.2	Added	762	2	
163-82.3	Added	762	2	
163-82.4	Added	762	2	
163-82.5	Added	762	2	
163-82.6	Added	762	2	
163-82.7	Added	762	2	
163-82.8	Added	762	2	
163-82.9	Added	762	2	
163-82.10	Added	762	2	
163-82.11	Added	762	2	
163-82.12	Added	762	2	
163-82.13	Added	762	2	
163-82.14	Added	762	2	
163-82.15	Added	762	2	
163-82.16	Added	762	2	
163-82.17	Added	762	2	

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163-82.18	Added	762	2	
163-82.19	Added	762	2	
163-82.20	Added	762	2	
163-82.21	Added	762	2	
163-82.22	Added	762	2	
163-82.23	Added	762	2	
163-82.24	Added	762	2	
163-82.25	Added	762	2	
163-82.26	Added	762	2	
163-84	Amended	762	5	
163-84	Amended	762	24	
163-85	Amended	762	25	
163-87	Amended	762	5	
163-87	Amended	762	26	
163-88	Amended	762	5	
163-88	Amended	762	27	
163-88.1	Amended	762	5	
163-88.1	Amended	762	28	
163-89	Amended	762	5	
163-89	Amended	762	29	
163-105	Amended	762	5	
163-105	Amended	762	30	
163-106	Amended	762	31	
163-109	Amended	762	5	
163-109	Amended	762	32	
163-116	Added	762	7	
163-128	Amended	762	33	
163-129	Amended	762	5	
163-129	Amended	762	34	
163-132.1	Amended	762	69	
163-132.2	Amended	762	70	
163-132.3	Amended	762	71	
163-141	Amended	762	5	
163-141	Amended	762	35	
163-142	Amended	762	5	
163-142	Amended	762	36	
163-143	Amended	762	5	
163-143	Amended	762	37	
163-144	Amended	762	5	
163-144	Amended	762	38	
163-146	Amended	762	5	
163-146	Amended	762	39	
163-147	Amended	762	5	
163-147	Amended	762	40	
163-148	Amended	762	5	
163-148	Amended	762	41	
163-150	Amended	762	5	
163-150	Amended	762	42	
163-152	Amended	762	5	
163-152	Amended	762	43	
163-152.1	Amended	762	5	
163-152.1	Amended	762	44	
163-153	Amended	762	5	
163-153	Amended	762	45	
163-155	Amended	762	5	
163-155	Amended	762	46	
163-168	Amended	762	5	
163-168	Amended	762	47	
163-169	Amended	762	5	

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163-169	Amended	762	48	
163-171	Amended	762	5	
163-171	Amended	762	49	
163-173	Amended	762	5	
163-173	Amended	762	50	
163-174	Amended	762	5	
163-174	Amended	762	51	
163-210	Amended	738	1	
163-213.7	Amended	762	52	
163-227.2	Amended	762	53	
163-232	Amended	762	5	
163-232	Amended	762	54	
163-234	Amended	762	5	
163-234	Amended	762	55	
163-251	Amended	762	5	
163-251	Amended	762	56	
163-251	Amended	762	57	
163-274	Amended	762	5	
163-274	Amended	762	58(a)	
163-274	Amended	762	58(b)	
163-274	Amended	762	58(c)	
163-275	Amended	762	5	
163-275	Amended	762	58(d)	
163-275	Amended	762	58(e)	
163-275	Amended	762	58(f)	
163-275	Amended	762	58(g)	
163-278.8	Amended	744	1	
163-280	Amended	762	5	
163-280	Amended	762	59	
163-281	Amended	762	5	
163-281	Amended	762	60	
163-283	Amended	762	62	
163-285	Amended	762	5	
163-285	Amended	762	63	
163-286	Amended	762	64	
163-287	Amended	762	65	
163-288	Amended	762	66	
163-288.2	Amended	762	67	
163-295	Amended	762	68	
164-35	Amended	591	6(a)	
164-36	Amended	591	6(a)	
164-37	Amended	591	6(a)	
164-38	Amended	591	6(a)	
164-38	Amended	591	6(b)	
164-39	Amended	591	6(a)	
164-40	Amended	591	6(a)	
164-41	Amended	591	6(a)	
164-42	Amended	591	6(a)	
164-42.1	Amended	591	6(a)	
164-42.2	Amended	591	6(a)	
164-43	Amended	591	6(a)	
164-44	Amended	591	6(a)	
164-45	Amended	591	6(a)	
166A-1	Amended	769	22.4(a)	
166A-17	Amended	769	22.4(b)	
166A-17	Added	769	22.4(b)	
166A-18	Added	769	22.4(b)	
166A-19	Added	769	22.4(b)	
166A-20	Added	769	22.4(b)	

G.S. §	Effect	Session Laws Chapter	Session Laws Section	Postponed Effective Date
166A-21	Added	769	22.4(b)	
166A-22	Added	769	22.4(b)	
166A-23	Added	769	22.4(b)	
166A-24	Added	769	22.4(b)	
166A-25	Added	769	22.4(b)	
168-22	Amended	619	1	

G.S.		Session Laws		Proposed Effective
§	Effect	Chapter	Section	Date
105A-21	Added	709	[illegible]	
105A-23	Added	709	[illegible]	
105A-25	Added	709	[illegible]	
[illegible]	Added	709	[illegible]	
105A-25	Added	709	[illegible]	
[illegible]	Amended	819		